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Introduction
The Question of the Relation Between Nietzsche’s Early and Late Work
on Language
Background to the Project
This project explores elements of Nietzsche’s work on and with language. The
particular form that this exploration takes must be prefaced by noting two elements:
the interest from which the project emerges and the status of language in Nietzsche’s
oeuvre.
The interest is one in writing, specifically, in the relation between writing and the self in
Nietzsche’s later work, most notably his last published work, Ecce Homo, and the
Prefaces to his works written in 1886. In these texts we seem to be faced with writing in
two senses: in its gerundive sense, as the written text, constitutive of a work; and in its
participial sense, as the act, performative of a certain work, which regards the self. The
duality of the work of writing is called into relief here: it is that which is written, but also
that which is performed in the implied act of writing. This participial sense, calling
attention to the performance of a work in writing, is emphasized in Nietzsche’s
relentless focus on the first person, or the narrative voice, and on the direct project of
articulating the self, in these texts.
Nowhere are both features of the duality of writing so apparent as in these
certain sections of the later texts of which ‘self-narrativizing’ seems to be an apt
description, namely, in Ecce Homo, in which the titular work is both a work and a
performance of a working in it, as the text comprises the narrator’s performance of

telling, through writing, himself, as well as the work or product that is thereby
produced, and in the Prefaces in which we find the same features. We confront, in such
texts, not only a resultant work but also the performance of a working through it.
But in my project, the issue of this work of writing in relation to the self does not
obtain explicit attention until the final, fourth chapter, which is preceded by two
chapters that take up the issue of language in Nietzsche’s oeuvre as a whole. Let me
now explain the original logic of this structure.
The general significance of language to Nietzsche’s work is oft noted, and, as
Alan Schrift points out, both Samuel IJsseling and Michel Foucault suggest that
Nietzsche engages in a “radical reflection” on language.1 What is this radical reflection
on language that both thinkers suggest comprises Nietzsche’s work? In which texts is it
found, and what clues do we use to locate it?
If we take up these questions regarding the import of language in Nietzsche’s
work, and of how to recognize the signs whereby Nietzsche’s radical reflection on
language is indicated, and hence ask in which texts we are to find those signs and this
reflection, and we let them guide us in our entry into Nietzsche’s oeuvre, quite soon we
come upon what I will call a surface curiosity. At least superficially, language seems to
be one of those themes with regard to which there is a shift in Nietzsche’s corpus, a

1

Alan D. Schrift, “Language, Metaphor, Rhetoric: Nietzsche’s Deconstruction of Epistemology,” Journal of
the History of Philosophy 23, no. 3 (July 1985): 371. Samuel IJsseling claims that although language has
never been one object among others in philosophy, Nietzsche is the first to connect his “radical reflection
with a radical reflection on language” (Samuel IJsseling, Rhetoric and Philosophy in Conflict: An Historical
Survey, translated by Paul Dunphy [The Hague; Martinus Nijhoff, 1976], 106.) Echoing this sentiment,
Foucault remarks that Nietzsche’s “radical reflection upon language” in part returns language to the field
of thought in the modern age (Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human
Sciences [New York; Random House, 1970], 305.)
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possible disjuncture in its unity. Certainly, language is significant, and frequently
emerges, across the Nietzschean texts. However, the early and late texts have striking
differences as regards the treatment of language as a theme within them.
A number of texts from the 1870s, published texts as well as notes and other
unpublished writings, treat language in a way that seems absent in the later work. 2
These early texts consider language as an explicit philosophical issue, sometimes asking
the question of what it is; often place language in developmental (what I will call
“genetic”3) schemas that attempt to describe the nature of reality or knowledge,
whereby spoken language derives from or translates something else (physiological
material, music, or a primal unity), and treat rhetorical figures of language, especially
metaphor, as transcendent of merely linguistic status, as the basic form of all
perception. In most cases in these early works, what seems emphasized is the derivative
status of language, its separation from an implied origin that it copies or translates.

2

Citations of the early works and notes of Friedrich Nietzsche that will be addressed in this Introduction,
and in Part I, are from the following sources. Further information on the history of these works and notes
can be found in notes 1 and 2 of the Introduction to Part I.
“On Music and Words,” translated by Walter Kaufmann, in Dalhaus, Carl, Between Romanticism and
Modernism: Four Studies in the Music of the Later 19 th Century (Berkeley; University of California
Press, 1980), 103-120;
The Birth of Tragedy, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York; Random House, 1967);
The Philosopher, in Philosophy and Truth: Selections From Nietzsche’s Notebooks of the Early 1870’s,
edited and translated by Daniel Breazeale (Amherst; Prometheus Books, 1979);
Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks, translated by Marianne Cowan (Washington, D.C.;
Regnery Publishing, 1962);
“On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense,” in Philosophy and Truth: Selections From Nietzsche’s
Notebooks of the Early 1870’s, edited and translated by Daniel Breazeale (Amherst; Prometheus
Books, 1979);
“Nietzsche’s Lecture Notes on Rhetoric: A Translation,” translated by Carole Blair, in Philosophy and
Rhetoric 16, no. 2 (1983).
3
“Genetic” is simply meant to indicate the fact that these schemas trace the development from an origin.
When referring to some of these passages, Schrift also uses this term. For such uses, see Schrift,
“Language, Metaphor, Rhetoric: Nietzsche’s Deconstruction of Epistemology.”
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While language is certainly mentioned in works and notes of the 1880s, and
plays a role in the critiques of the period, the very term “language” seems to be
accorded a less central status: it is less frequently explicitly thematized; gone are those
genetic schemas in which it is depicted as one link in a chain that leads back to an origin;
and gone is the explicitness of metaphor as a theme. When language is addressed
explicitly, it is so most often in terms of claims regarding the various seductions of
grammar and words attached to the critique of the Subject.
But IJsseling and Foucault’s similar suggestions about Nietzsche’s radical
reflection on language raise a question when held together with this surface curiosity: If
the whole of Nietzsche’s work represents a radical reflection on language, what is the
significance of these differences in the treatment of language to the constitution of that
reflection? Does the reflection on language that Nietzsche’s work is, in fact, split into
distinct phases? In what sense is it “a” reflection?
It is, given these differences that I have just referred to as constituting a surface
curiosity, no surprise that many readers of Nietzsche who address language in his work
end up dealing with the very question of the relation between the treatment of
language in the early and the late work. This was not always the case. As Schrift
contends, for a long time, these differences seem not to have raised much sustained
questioning, and it seems to have been standard to read the differences between the
early and late work on language as a mere expression of Nietzsche’s turn away from
philology.4 There was not really a pressing question here, not much curiosity raised, it

4

Ibid, 371.

4

seems, until later in the twentieth century. In the 1970s, perhaps in the wake of new
publications and translations of early notes in addition to published texts, this question
of how to figure the relationship between Nietzsche’s early and late work on language
gained emphasis.5 Attributing the differences in the treatment of language to a break in
Nietzsche’s identification with philology eventually became unsatisfying, and at the
same time, a consideration of possible continuities despite surface differences
emerged.6
Notice, though, that whether or not the difference in the treatment of language
across the work—this surface curiosity—is treated as easily explained by Nietzsche’s
own turn away from explicitly philological interests, we nevertheless have the basic
form of a certain question at work. Allowing this curiosity of the differences between
the early and late work to give rise to a question, we find such a question oriented
around terms connoting unity, specifically, those of “continuity” versus “break” in the
Nietzschean corpus; and in many ways, this orientation seems to be a necessity.7 There

5

An important publication along these lines was a 1971 issue of Poetique, which contained the first
translation into French of certain notes and course fragments from 1872-1875, including the first seven
sections of Nietzsche’s 1874 lecture notes to a course on rhetoric, as well as Derrida’s “White Mythology”
and Lacoue-Labarthe’s “The Detour,” the latter also published in that author’s The Subject of Philosophy.
This was followed in 1983 by the first translation into English of those sections of the rhetoric course
notes, and, in 1989, by the first publication in German of the last nine sections of that course. My
mentioning of these sources is not meant to underplay the force of other publications at this time that
impacted the reading of Nietzsche; my selection of texts here regards those dealing specifically with the
issue of language and Nietzsche’s writings on language.
6
It should be noted that writing as late as 1985, Alan D. Schrift claims that “few [save Breazeale] have
related Nietzsche’s early insights into the nature of language to the work of his so-called ‘mature’ period”
(Schrift, “Language, Metaphor, Rhetoric: Nietzsche’s Deconstruction of Epistemology,” 371).
7
It might be that in writing this phrase, “Nietzsche’s treatment of language,” already, we raise the spectre
of an actually fragmented body, one which casts the shadow of an autobiographical concern and reading
over such a project. Perhaps the onus is on the use of the notion of a “corpus,” or of a “Nietzsche.” I am
primarily interested neither in Nietzsche’s autobiography, nor in the question of phases of Nietzsche’s
development. But rather than interrogate the assumptions invoked here, I follow them into the ensuing
questions.

5

have been a number of readers of Nietzsche in the last few decades, interested in some
element of his work on language, who have taken up precisely this form of the question:
is the early and late work continuous or discontinuous with regard to language?
Although this question may seem to threaten to embroil us in a merely pedantic
question of oeuvre or historical scholarship, as if the only issue were whether the
oeuvre is continuous or discontinuous as regards one concept or theme, I think the
stakes revealed in asking the question provoked here can be higher. I suggest that a
consideration of this question can give rise to a new prospect, one which favors the
image of the constellation when discussing Nietzsche’s work on language.
Figuring Language
I. From Continuity to Constellation
The very question of the relation between any two texts already sets an
interpretive horizon, and impacts the readings that are made possible of those texts. An
answered question as to their relation, if it is foregrounded, does much the same. We
are forced to notice that, as it has been laid out above, even posing the question of
potential continuity, and hence of potential discontinuity, between Nietzsche’s early
and late works on language already impacts the way that we read, as the early work
then forms part of the frame of reference within which we situate our reading of the
later, and vice versa. So it seems that, no matter how this question of continuity might
eventually be answered, there will already be an approach to Nietzsche’s texts that is

6

opened up by simply asking it. This approach consists in allowing for a view of language
as a constellation, rather than a concept, which I will explain below.8
As we have found above, one of the issues facing us regards how we are to
proceed with language in Nietzsche’s work once we notice the alteration in the
treatment of language across the work. If we are limited to looking for that which is
signified by the one signifier, “language,” we seem only able to articulate discontinuities
and differences between the early and late work. That is, unless we are to think of
language in a different way, as other to a unitary concept marked by one signifier.
So much depends upon those concepts and phenomena that are regarded as
related to language and that are thus brought into the discussion, for it is in observing
consistency or alteration in the depiction or treatment of these concepts and
phenomena related to “language” that a continuity or discontinuity can even be framed
or established. In other words, the above question regarding unity of the oeuvre,
captured in the terminology of “continuity” versus “discontinuity,” will prove to be a bit
misleading, if not reductive, given that Nietzsche’s view of language is never in isolation
from certain related concepts and phenomena that themselves might be better markers
of transitions and continuities in his thought. It is an attention to these related concepts
and phenomena that allows a second approach to language to be built, one in which we
view language less as a discrete concept and more as a field or network of multiple
concepts and phenomena, the discussion of which provides the content for
8

Adorno, borrowing from Benjamin, uses the term “constellation” in a few senses. I take up only one,
described succinctly by Martin Jay as that of “a juxtaposed rather than integrated cluster of changing
elements that resist reduction to a common denominator, essential core, or generative first principle”
(Martin Jay, Adorno. [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984], 14-15). This sense is, in fact, suggested
by the image of a constellation of stars.
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interpretations of continuities and discontinuities in Nietzsche’s work. In this sense,
language can be said to be constellational.
This term, the constellation, invokes Adorno’s many usages of the term. One of
these, though not the only one, plays upon the image of networked stars. It is mainly
this that I take from Adorno’s sense, and my usage of this term is not meant to invoke
much beyond this image of an astronomical constellation. What we mean by ‘the
constellation’ in the heavens is nothing other than the particular luminous stars, and,
these stars seen as in an arrangement whose contours are set by the human perceiver
(at least, the one who named the constellation and thus fixed the arrangement into a
convention). This arrangement of luminous stars, or this seeing of these particular stars
and of these stars in a network with the others, is what a constellation is: a grouping or
arrangement of stars. We might give it a name, “Orion.” In saying “Orion,” we mean
both aspects: the stars, and, their arrangement. “Orion” is neither the origin, nor the
unity to which the arranged stars reduce. They, in their luminous standing out,
constitute, or bring to appear, “Orion.”
This is the basic sense, or guiding image, with which we might approach
language in Nietzsche. Language is not merely a unitary concept (though it certainly is
this), but is also, as a matter of thought, that which is articulated through an
arrangement of nodal points, illuminative points, yoked into a network, the network of
which articulates what is meant by the name “language.” A nodal point would be an
illuminating point—a theme, concept, or phenomenon whose own articulation serves to

8

articulate, in part, the constellational whole.9 I mean simply that “language” is a term
used for a configuration of nodal points in which none is the determining center, but in
which each taken, yoked, together, as that yoking, articulates the whole.10 What I mean
to emphasize in using this image of the constellation is the possible alternating or
shifting of the constitutive nodal points. Using this image of a constellation, we can then
consider language as the matter that becomes articulated, in part, through how
“language,” the specific signifier, is refracted by and through the interrelation of a set of
nodal points. These nodal points involved in the refraction, articulation, of language
constitute the constellation of language at a given time, and thus, the constitution of
the constellation can change as the nodal points alter, displace, and replace one another
within the whole.
But notice that this means that the signified of “language” is itself continually
altering. It remains the same, even as its constitution changes over time, like the time of
the year, in relation to which different astronomical elements emerge and disappear
from view—there is the summer and winter Orion, the southern and northern
hemispherical Orion. These nodal points involved in the refraction of language
constitute the constellation of language at a given time, but they alternate, displace,
and hide, and thus the constellation itself changes over Nietzsche’s career, given the
alteration, displacement, and replacement of these nodal points.

9

Of course, even these nodal points might reveal their own constitutive constellations—that is the thing
about concepts, and our perceptions of what we name “stars,” their analysis can reveal comprising
multiplicities.
10
We might equally use a spatial metaphor, that of shifting terrain within a region of thought.

9

So my claim here is twofold. Language should be understood as that which is
articulated by a number of concepts and phenomena, and not simply that which is
described in ahistorical immediacy by the signifier “language.” Second, these
constitutive concepts and phenomena alter and displace one another over time, such
that there is no unitary or unchanging constellation itself. The constellation is its own
unworking. Language is then a unity of relations which are themselves unworked.
Approaching Secondary Readings Through the Question of Continuity:
A Summary of Trends
I have suggested above that we are able to espy a different way of framing the
question of what language itself is, considering language as a constellation rather than a
concept, because language is always addressed within the context of an articulation of
other concepts and phenomena, be these origin, truth, physiology, the Subject, or the
self. Language is thus always stretched out into a network of interrelated concepts and
phenomena. Thus, if we are to ask about language itself, we will need not only to look
for the isolated signifier “language,” but to look for these connections, for these
concepts and phenomena that are related to and associated with that signifier, for their
disappearance and alteration over time. If language is the constellation, then the task
becomes tracing the constellation through which language appears at given junctures,
as well as tracing the shifts in the constellation over time.
In the remainder of the Introduction, I will, first, summarize the dominant trends
in the secondary literature, as I see them, in answering that question of continuity
versus break in Nietzsche’s treatment of language. Then, I want to show how these

10

readings actually provide us reason and means to revise the very prejudice that gave
rise to this motivating question—the prejudice that language is a unitary concept, and
treated as the same unity across the corpus. This exercise will thus serve two goals:
provision of a summary of trends in the secondary literature, and, demonstration of the
emergence of my desire to treat language otherwise than as a unitary concept in
Nietzsche’s work.
I do not intend this treatment of the secondary sources to be exhaustive, only
enough to trace the outlines of what I have called above “dominant trends.” We focus
on readers who provide possible answers to the question of the relation between the
early and later work on language, even if this is not the explicit frame of their discussion.
In attending to how readers address this question of the relation between the
treatment of language in the early and later works, we will find another possible view of
language emerging, one made possible by attending to the related phenomena that
help to illuminate what is at stake in language for Nietzsche. Noting them helps us to
more extensively figure what language is for Nietzsche, and hence, in what this radical
reflection consists. My suggestion is that in surveying this literature, we can already see
the issue of “continuity” being altered into a problematic best articulated in terms of
constellation.
So, first, we will follow this question of whether the early and late works are
continuous or discontinuous in their treatment of language. In those sources that
explicitly address this question of the relation between the early and later work on
language, there seem to be three major tendencies toward answering this question: 1)

11

reading the later work as a rejection and correction of the treatment of language in the
earlier work, hence a reading of discontinuity (exemplified by Clark in Nietzsche on Truth
and Philosophy); 2) reading a kind of ‘mitigated’ discontinuity through the corpus on
language (exemplified by both Kofman in Nietzsche and Metaphor, and Lacoue-Labarthe
in The Subject of Philosophy); 3) reading a strong continuity throughout (exemplified by
Schrift in Nietzsche and the Question of Interpretation, and Klein in Nietzsche and the
Promise of Philosophy). After we do this work of attending to the readings of the
question of continuity, highlighting the concepts and themes that are involved in making
arguments for these readings, we will be able to circle back and build up elements of a
constellation of language that has been implied throughout.
1) Discontinuity
The first tendency is to read the later work as a rejection and correction of the
earlier work on language, hence, as discontinuous with it. This tendency is perhaps best
represented by Maudemarie Clark in Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy.11
Clark’s theme is Nietzsche’s view of truth, not language, but the treatment of
language plays a significant role here. Her text is oriented around a dispute in the
scholarship on how to treat Nietzsche’s apparently contradictory position on truth,
shown in the fact that Nietzsche denies truth while also making assertions, including
those regarding the will to power, eternal recurrence, the ascetic ideal, and other
elements of his critiques, that seem to require some admission of truth for their
11

Maudemarie Clark, “Language and Truth: Nietzsche’s Early Denial of Truth,” and “The Development of
Nietzsche’s Later Position on Truth,” in Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy, (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1990), 63-125.
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acceptance. Clark argues that the diminished relative explicit attention given to
language in the later work indicates Nietzsche’s rejection of his early view of language,
based on its connection to a version of truth he would later revise.
Situating her position between that of Heidegger, who is said to hold that
Nietzsche is contradictory on this count due to his continuation of a metaphysical
position, and the ‘new Nietzscheans,’ who are said to claim that there is no
contradiction given that the features of ‘doctrine’ mentioned above are meant not as
‘truths’ but as interpretations, she argues that a reconciliation of the sides of the
contradiction requires acknowledging a development in Nietzsche’s work and a denial of
his earlier view of truth in the later work. She claims that the early Nietzsche held a
metaphysical view that also depended on a representational theory of knowing, while
the later Nietzsche rejects both elements from his thinking. The absence of denials of
truth in the later Nietzsche demonstrates that he in fact rejected the denial of truth by
the time of the later work, as such denials actually grow out of the ascetic ideal and
imply a correspondence view of truth. She suggests that the later emphasis on
affirmation, and perspectivism, does not require a denial of truth, and demonstrates
that Nietzsche can deny metaphysical views of truth while also affirming the existence
of truth.
While the argument, and text, focuses on truth, language is an intimate part of
the discussion. Clark’s main chapter on Nietzsche’s early views of truth deals almost
exclusively with OTL and passages in which his discussion of the impossibility of, or
illusory nature of, truth includes reference to language. Clark’s main argument here is

13

that Nietzsche does not derive his early critique of truth from an observation about
language, as some thinkers claim, but rather from an observation about perception. His
position here is that because human perception is always of representations created by
human imagination out of nerve stimuli, and not of ‘extra-mental’ entities, it is not
possible to access such entities as they are in themselves, apart from this work of
translation. Language, creating further signs by which to refer to those representations,
is a further development out of this originary physiological situation. Hence Nietzsche
here implicitly considers truth to be correspondence between representations and
things-in-themselves, which is impossible, given the representational nature of all
perception. Thus there is a metaphysical presumption at the heart of his critique: that
reality is independent of human beings given this representational nature of perception,
and, language is only a second-level mirroring of the situation of perception, ever out of
contact with things-in-themselves. OTL’s denial of truth thus depends upon a
metaphysical correspondence theory of truth.
Clark argues that this metaphysical presumption is in tension with Nietzsche’s
later project of revaluation, which requires some workable notion of truth to ground its
own reading of the ‘falsity’ of the ascetic ideal as true. Hence, the early work involving
language, tied as it is to the claim that truth is an impossibility, is abandoned to make
way for true claims in the later critiques. We note this abandonment after BGE, when
perspectivism, which makes justification contextual rather than dependent upon
reference to decontextualized foundational knowledge of an object, provides Nietzsche
an alternative to a representational model of knowing. Such an alternative allows him to
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deny metaphysical truth while affirming the existence of a pragmatic notion of truth
that builds on his later “respect for facts, the senses, and science.”12 This development is
critical for Nietzsche’s critique of Christian morality to gain traction, and to resist the
contradiction in which the earlier view of language would land it: that of asserting as
true a view of Christian morality and the ascetic ideal that cannot in fact be true.
In her view, then, the view of language in the early work is later abandoned,
making this early work not incredibly significant to the mature Nietzsche’s views. So, this
first tendency holds the corpus to be discontinuous as regards the treatment of
language.
2) Mitigated Discontinuity
The second tendency is to read what could be called a mitigated discontinuity
through the corpus. Here Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Sarah Kofman seem exemplary.
Lacoue-Labarthe
Lacoue-Labarthe is classed as a figure of mitigated discontinuity because he
suggests that there is a major change in the corpus as regards language, but one which
occurs within this 1870s work itself, namely, in Nietzsche’s turn to rhetoric after The
Birth of Tragedy.
In the second chapter of The Subject of Philosophy, titled “The Detour,” LacoueLabarthe considers Nietzsche’s early interest in language in the 1870s after BT. 13 He
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Ibid., 105.
Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, “The Detour,” in The Subject of Philosophy, edited and translated by Thomas
Trezise, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), 14-36. Originally published in Poetique 5
(1971): 53-76. (As Blair and Gilman explain, Poetique 5 included this essay, followed by a series of
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calls this an interest in rhetoric, and he gives it the name of a ‘detour,’ suggesting that
Nietzsche’s treatment of language passes from an early focus on music through a
rhetorical ‘detour’ that changed the theory of language and of tragedy that he had
already employed in BT.14 The encounter with rhetoric, which he calls ‘accidental’ and ‘a
discovery,’ changed the theory of language and of tragedy that he already had in BT,
which the romantic tradition informed.15
What comprises the detour? It is really a detachment from origins. LacoueLabarthe claims that the depiction of music in BT had maintained a focus on origins, as
herein music was said to be the expression of an originary Dionysian vision, and an
expression which language itself would go on to copy. The priority of music to language
was thereby maintained, and “language was always conceived on the basis of its musical
essence and the analysis of music was always governed by the dream of, by the desire
and the nostalgia for, proximity, immediacy, and presence—even the divine. . . .”16
Rhetoric eradicated the possibility of retrieving an origin anterior to the transpositions
involved in language, as rhetoric introduced the sense that the turning or transposing of
documents called “Nietzsche—Rhetorique et Langage” (99-142), prepared with Jean-Luc Nancy, which
introduced the first translation into French of certain notes and fragments from 1872-1875, including the
first seven of the sixteen sections of the rhetoric course notes, passages from a course on the history of
Greek eloquence, the introduction to a course on Latin grammar (translated into English as “On the Origin
of Language”), among others (see Carole Blair and Sander L. Gilman, “Nietzsche’s Lectures on Rhetoric:
Reading a Rhetoric Rhetorically,” introduction to Friedrich Nietzsche on Rhetoric and Language [New York:
Oxford University Press, 1989], ix-xxvii).
14
Lacoue-Labarthe believes that readers have not always noted this great interruption that a rhetorical
view of language introduces into the previous view of language as derived from music, right here in the
early 1870s, and that usually they have thought that The Philosopher is a reprisal of BT, with an added
interest in rhetoric that is treated mostly as a terminological change.
15
The detour allegedly emerged from Nietzsche’s reading of Volkmann’s Systematic Exposition of Greek
and Roman Rhetoric and Gerber’s Language as Art; Lacoue-Labarthe claims that before this Nietzsche had
not been “particularly aware of rhetoric as such,” and that Nietzsche’s reading of Gerber began to
reorient the claims Nietzsche had already made about language in BT (Lacoue-Labarthe, “The Detour,”
16).
16
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language could not be experienced as the repetition of an original, but as always already
implicated in any giving of appearances. This usurpation of music’s position occurs
because rhetoric makes everything tropological, a turn behind which there is no
“origin,” whereas music had been considered the “copy” of the will, hence a link to the
origin. Thus any attempt to suggest an original to the rhetorical turn would itself be
implicated in the rhetorical turn of all language, with the turn having always already
usurped its own origin in its very appearance. It seems that the introduction of rhetoric
reveals the very notion of an origin of music as itself a rhetorical myth. Thus, the BT
depiction of language is subverted: the theory of language put forth therein falls apart
when rhetoric enters the scene, because “it tends to eliminate music and take its
place.”17
Lacoue-Labarthe suggests that we might be inclined to read the musical view of
language in BT as prefatory to the later rhetorical view, if not for a certain ambiguity in
the terms used to describe music, specifically, that of symbol. Even when Nietzsche
presents the idea of an insurmountable and originary representation, the idea of a
possible reduction of symbolic distance continues to dominate all his analyses of
language: “. . . [I]n all the work carried out on tragedy, that is, on music, this ambiguity
was never dispelled.”18 But with rhetoric, it was no longer possible to turn an originarity
(either music or myth) back against philosophy.
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Kofman
In Nietzsche and Metaphor, Sarah Kofman focuses her claim regarding the
disjuncture between the early and late work in Nietzsche on the specific theme of
metaphor, noting the disappearance of its explicit treatment as a philosophical issue in
the later work.19 Her view is that there is a disjuncture in Nietzsche’s work regarding the
approach to metaphor, and that Nietzsche’s work moves from early direct theoretical
thematization of metaphor to heightened incorporation of metaphor as a means of
strategy, use, and style in the later work. She claims that Nietzsche takes this second
approach to metaphor because metaphor as a concept reinstates a metaphysical view
that Nietzsche was trying to counter. This metaphysical view within which the concept
of metaphor works can be seen in noting that the traditional conceptions of metaphor
as figure, as transfer, renders it always as distanced from the proper, or the origin,
because it implies the view that there is a ground already undergirding metaphor’s
movement away from it. Metaphor as an explicit conceptual theme can never escape
these metaphysical vestiges of the origin.20
Thus, Kofman argues that Nietzsche abandons the earlier explicit treatment of
metaphor as a philosophical theme, but does not abandon metaphor itself; an interest
in metaphor is retained, but one of the order of use rather than explicit investigation or
content. While the early work treats metaphor as a philosophical theme and employs it
19

Sarah Kofman. “An Unheard of and Insolent Philosophy,” “Metaphor, Symbol, Metamorphosis,” and
“The Forgetting of Metaphor,” in Nietzsche and Metaphor, translated by Duncan Large, (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1993), 1-58. Originally published in Nietzsche et la metaphore, Payot
(‘Bibliothèque scientifique’), 2nd ed. Galilée (‘Débats’), 1983.
20
See also Jacques Derrida, “White Mythology,” in Margins of Philosophy, translated by Alan Bass
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), and Martin Heidegger, The Principle of Reason, translated by
Reginald Lilly (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991), p. 48.
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as a model for conceptual analysis, the later work takes it up as a rhetorical tool utilized
in the construction of the written form of the work. Later Nietzsche, rather than take up
metaphor directly, instead intensifies a strategic use of metaphor, as a matter of style.
In Kofmans’ view, this difference may lend the appearance of a devaluation of metaphor
to the later work, but it should be noted that the devaluation is only as regards its
treatment as a theme, not as regards its utilization in philosophical work.
Other readers of mitigated discontinuity: Crawford
While The Beginnings of Nietzsche’s Theory of Language is a detailed,
genealogical reading of Nietzsche’s earliest work on language and its sources, Claudia
Crawford’s Preface provides an overview of Nietzsche’s theory of language across his
career. 21 Her overview here helps contribute to the constellation view of language in
that she identifies six areas of Nietzsche’s theory of language, which largely follow a
temporal trajectory. Crawford’s view is that the early theory of language sets many of
the terms of all of Nietzsche’s philosophy, though his approach to language receives
depth and new insights and directions across his career.
While the essay OTL is often cited as a point of departure for Nietzsche’s theory
of language, Crawford believes that this text represents ideas that had occupied
Nietzsche’s thought for years, given the influence of Schopenhauer, Lange, Hartmann,
Gerber, and Kant. Major ideas of Gerber’s Die Sprache als Kunst are taken over in OTL
and the rhetoric course notes, but her research shows that the influence of Gerber was
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Claudia Crawford, Preface to The Beginnings of Nietzsche’s Theory of Language, (Berlin: Walter de
Gruyter, 1988), ix-xvii.
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in providing a new means of expressing ideas Nietzsche had already been developing
through the influence of Kant, Schopenhauer, Lange, and Hartmann. She believes that
this period in which Nietzsche thinks about language in terms of rhetoric is not the
beginning but moreso the midpoint of this theory of language.22
In Crawford’s view, OTL shows a view of the unconscious and instinctual origin of
language that makes community possible. The essay demonstrates that the origins and
process of language do not “reside in community,” but that conscious use of language is
itself based on “unconscious instinctual activities of individual human beings.”23 OTL’s
schema24 shows an unconscious physiological origin of language, out of which then grow
“consciousness, community, the pathos of truth, and science” as “weakened
processes.”25 Conscious language provides only the metaphor of a metaphor, an idea
found also in Gerber, while the individual has a unique language of his or her own in
images, and it is these which the conscious language of the community uses. This is
what we find in the beginning theory of language, the “artistic nature of the
unconscious metaphorical production of language.”26
Crawford also suggests, in regard to music, that music becomes a ‘paradigm’
against which to measure language, in 1870. Nietzsche explores the distinctions
between various unconscious and conscious languages in “On Music and Words,”
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“Gerber offered Nietzsche a new metaphor, that of rhetoric, for a body of ideas concerning language
which Nietzsche already had in place by 1871” (Crawford, The Beginnings of Nietzsche’s Theory of
Language, x). We might wonder whether this claim is really plausible.
23
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To be discussed in more detail in Chapter 2, by this “schema” I mean to refer to the fourth through sixth
paragraphs of OTL in which Nietzsche depicts the series of metaphors resulting in concepts.
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among other texts from this time. The language of thoughts and concepts consists in
unconscious feeling transferred into conscious representations. Music is privileged
throughout Nietzsche, and Crawford finds a ranking of languages that remains constant:
“music first, then gesture, and finally the word and conceptuality.”27
GM introduces another phase of Nietzsche’s thinking of language, one in which
genealogy plays a central role and language is depicted in the context of force: “Thus,
Nietzsche’s thinking about language turns from an interest in its origins and manner of
unconscious production to a concern with the effects of language change upon humans
and cultures.”28 The works of Nietzsche’s last productive year introduce yet another
phase in which Nietzsche is interested in the conscious willing and use of the
unconscious forces of language. More stress is laid on the power of each instance of
language use as “an instance of value and action,” and “language becomes a dynamic
instance of interpretation and valuing,” not in the sense of an individual subject who
performs the interpreting, but “in a creative sense where the speaking and writing itself
is the new value force embodied.”29 Language no longer names, but creates. The
critique of grammar depends on this distinction between “language as the reportage of
a ‘subject’ and language as actually creating being.”30
3) Strong Continuity
There is a third tendency, which might be obvious from the foregoing: it might
be called strong continuity. Readers who find strong continuity explicitly position
27
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themselves as reading against the assumption that the early unpublished work on
language is abandoned by Nietzsche or by the later work, or that the later work
represents a significant departure in Nietzsche’s thinking of language. These readers
claim that attention to these early texts can in fact provide important insights into
Nietzsche’s later work, and that, more important than appearances of surface
discontinuities, there are consistent underlying conceptual interests demonstrated by
Nietzsche’s treatment of language throughout all of his works. While some details of
how Nietzsche figures or frames language might change, the conceptual interests to
which language is wedded do not; and in fact, understanding of later conceptual
interests can be seriously, often requisitely, deepened by noting their connection with
and provenance in the early work on language. Notable here are Wayne Klein and Alan
Schrift.
Schrift
Alan D. Schrift, in Nietzsche and the Question of Interpretation, calls into
question the presumption of the ‘disappearance’ of language in Nietzsche’s later work.31
While in the later work, Nietzsche may no longer refer to the various translations of
consciousness as metaphorical, there is a continuity in the corpus regarding not only the
treatment of language but also the presence of the theme of language.
What Schrift finds uniting the early and later work is a view that critiques of
previous philosophy ought to concentrate on ‘grammatical blunders,’ or the positions to
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Alan D. Schrift, “Language, Metaphor, Rhetoric,” in Nietzsche and the Question of Interpretation:
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which philosophers are committed because of certain views of language, as we see in
Nietzsche’s claim that philosophical articles of faith are often derived from a linguistic
situation. As well, some of the themes that dominate all of Nietzsche’s work—such as a
rejection of traditional epistemology and a correspondence theory of truth, an attention
to the process of becoming—focus on the phenomenon of language all the way through
the work. While Nietzsche abandons a ‘strictly rhetorical’ epistemology—one primarily
referencing rhetorical figures like metaphor and trope—he yet continues to focus on
words and grammar and their contribution to epistemological views and illusions. Thus,
he is ever “linguistically dismantl[ing]” various illusory philosophical constructions, an
inextricable part of the later task of transvaluation.32
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We should note a few ways in which Schrift’s reading of language in Nietzsche is in conflict with Clark’s
reading of discontinuity. In Schrift’s reading of OTL, he claims that the schema involving language in the
text is a critique of the representational nature of language and the correspondence theory of truth on
which the former depends. This is in direct contrast to Clark’s assertion that the view of language in OTL
comprises an expression of agreement with such views. Contra Clark here, Schrift claims that it is not the
case that Nietzsche must implicitly assume a correspondence theory of knowing in order to create the
argument in the essay, but rather, that the essay presents a critique of such a view on its own terms: if
truth is taken to mean correspondence, then it is not possible on the very terms of that position, given
what the analysis asserts. Schrift is not committed, then, to the idea that this was a view Nietzsche also
shared, as Clark is.
Further, Schrift, unlike Clark, reads OTL with the rhetoric course in mind, a connection that makes an
amount of difference. By making this connection, he is able to read OTL as presenting the tropological
view of language described in the course. Further, he notices the role of tropes in describing perception in
“The Philosopher.” And because he links these three early works, it seems that he escapes Clark’s claim
that language is only secondary in this essay. The linguistic trope of metaphor is shown to actually extend
beyond language, to constitute a form of creation that humans employ even in perception. This essay
shows that perception is metaphorical and rhetorical, too, and that we cannot escape from those nets.
For Schrift, then, the project in OTL is one of critique. Nietzsche is not lamenting the impossibility of
correspondence, but showing its impossibility as that which must be acknowledged. This kind of
‘demystification’ of pretensions forms a link with all of Nietzsche’s work, in Schrift’s view. Schrift also
disagrees with Clark that later Nietzsche claims a kind of truth, and thus must deny his earlier claims. He
refers to passages in which will to power, eternal recurrence, and Übermensch are called interpretations
or metaphors, and finds such moments to be reaffirmations of points made in that early text. It seems
that by bringing three of these early texts together—the rhetoric course, OTL, and “The Philosopher”—
Schrift is able to find a continuity from the early to late work, rather than a discontinuity.
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Klein
Klein argues that Nietzsche’s early unpublished work on rhetoric and language in
the 1870s is in continuity with much of Nietzsche’s later work, and that noting this
underscores that language is an important concern in the entire corpus and is a key to
approaching issues in Nietzsche interpretation.33
The heart of Klein’s argument is attention to the sections in OTL and the rhetoric
course notes that deal with the tropological nature of language. He reads together the
passages in the essay detailing the transfers from nerve stimulus to image to word to
concept and the course notes section dealing with the three major tropes. Klein’s
argument is that Nietzsche does not, in these sections of OTL, merely demonstrate the
impossibility of achievement of the ideal of a correspondence theory of truth—he is not
simply claiming that our access to things as they are in themselves is made impossible.
Rather, Klein argues, in agreement with Schrift, that Nietzsche herein questions the very
correspondence notion of truth. Nietzsche’s attention to the tropological nature of
sensation, language, conceptuality, and causation in general, has the effect of calling
into question the very possibility of something like correspondence, as tropes call into
question the possibility of a retrievable origin.
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Wayne Klein, “Nietzsche’s Theory of Language and Rhetoric,” in Nietzsche and The Promise of
Philosophy, (Albany: SUNY Press, 1997), 56-95.
Again, as with Schrift’s reading, we can see in Klein’s not only an implicit contrast with Clark’s
reading, but an explicit one. Klein suggests that much scholarship has agreed with Clark’s view that the
earlier work is misguided and adds little to our understanding of Nietzsche’s later work, citing Nehamas
and Rorty here as two who agree (212). He contends that the 1870s work on language is consistent with
the later work, and that the way to see this is to engage the notion of truth from within a broader
perspective than that from within which Clark, Nehamas, and Rorty approach it. He believes that the
central problematic in these early texts is the relation of language to truth, which Clark also noted, but
Klein claims that there is actually a radical reinterpretation of truth already at work here. He attempts to
bear this out with a reading of OTL and notes from the rhetoric course.
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But this is not to deny the possibility of truth. Rather, this opens the door to
reconceiving truth itself. The new conception of truth is that of ‘shining truth,’ or truth
contained in appearance, where appearance is not thought of as the opposite of reality.
This is the crux of Klein’s argument against readings such as Clark’s, for he insists that in
continuing to pose appearance as the oppositional other to reality, we remain trapped
in that metaphysical belief in opposites. Appearance should not be thought of as the
opposite of reality. Thus all those moments in which Nietzsche claims that artists give
appearance ‘again’ do not suggest an appearance that is oppositional to reality, but one
which constitutes it. Klein’s notion of Nietzsche’s reinterpretation of truth as ‘shining
truth’ captures this sense of appearance as shine (building on the German Schein).
Klein argues that this is a reinterpretation of truth that started all the way back
in the 1870s, when Nietzsche questioned the possibility of correspondence with the real
in OTL, and emphasized the materiality of language in the rhetoric course. There is no
alteration in his view of language and truth, then, in the later work, but rather the same
working with a reinterpreted truth as appearance.
Other readers of strong continuity: Gilman et al.
While the bulk of Friedrich Nietzsche on Rhetoric and Language is translations of
early notes, the brief introduction provides an explicit discussion of the treatment of
language within them.34
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Sander L. Gilman, Carole Blair, and David J. Parent, Introduction to Friedrich Nietzsche on Rhetoric and
Language, (New York: Oxford, 1989), ix-xxvii. As the editors explain herein, this 1989 text presented for
the first time the complete lecture course notes on rhetoric in both German and English, based on the
manuscript in the Goethe-Schiller Archive. The first seven sections of these course notes had been
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First, they argue that both the third section of the rhetoric course notes and OTL
present an early version of perspectivism, given the significance of partiality in both.
Both describe the presentation of partial views, and the course notes suggest that the
partiality expressed in rhetoric is based on that already in language, which is based on
that already in consciousness. The content of consciousness, itself imperfect copies of
things, is already a kind of language, in the form of partial images that are signs, not
things themselves. These images represent the impulses grasped by consciousness, and
natural language is an extension of these images. Rhetoric, then, is a refinement of this
quality already existing in natural language. From Nietzsche’s claim that language is the
material of perception and experience, the editors suggest that the partial perceptions
of consciousness, found in impulses, are already language, even before the kind of
language that is “the result of audible rhetorical arts.”35 The editors imply that there is a
language prior to the use of words, that human language in the “full blown” sense is
simply the translation into a partial view that signifies the language of consciousness.
Language’s perspectival nature is demonstrated in a further way, though, as the
editor’s find when they seem to import the specific point made in this third section of
the rhetoric course back into the view expressed in OTL. This is the point that all words
and signs are tropes, their tropic nature making them not only partial, but transferable
and reversible. This allows words and signs to ‘turn,’ to be transferred synecdochally,
published in German in the Kroner (1912) and Musarion (1922) editions of Nietzsche’s work, and
translated into French by Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe and into English by Blair. In addition to the
complete series of rhetoric course notes, this text also includes the following shorter unpublished essays
which had never appeared before in English and which were translated from the Musarion edition of
German works: “On the Origin of Language,” “On the Poet,” and “On Rhythm.”
35
Sander L. Gilman, Carole Blair, and David J. Parent, Introduction to Friedrich Nietzsche on Rhetoric and
Language, xiii.
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metonymically, and metaphorically, away from the nature of things. These uses
become part of the conventions of language use, and because of this, the knowledge
they present is further made imperfect. The authors suggest that this view of language
connects to the later work
This view of language anchors the ethical and epistemological
perspectivism advocated by Nietzsche, as well as its connection to the
will to power. Because our ethics and knowledge are grounded in
language use, they always are partial; there are no absolute truths, for
our experience and knowledge are linguistically based.36
After establishing that perspectives are linguistically based interpretations, the
editors connect this to will to power, which they argue is a straightforward connection.
Rhetoric plays a mediating role, and is the way that will to power gains mastery over a
thing by interpreting it (building on the WTP 643 claim that to interpret a thing is to gain
mastery over it). Thus, in advancing his perspectival interpretation of language,
Nietzsche achieves mastery over language. The use of rhetoric, then, while not allowing
more truth, nevertheless allows for “a higher degree of power or mastery over
concepts.”37
The editors express the hesitation that their reading of continuity from the
perspectival nature of language indicated in the rhetoric course and OTL to
interpretation and will to power in the later work deserves more inquiry: “Whether or
not Nietzsche’s early and late works can be so intimately intertextualized is certainly an
issue that qualifies these speculations and one that deserves more inquiry than is
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possible here.”38 But they argue that the early concentration on language and rhetoric
makes us more attentive to those concepts as they appear in the later writing.
Working Constellationality from the Question of Continuity
Even from a cursory glance over the summaries of these sources, it is clear that
these readings show us not merely several ways of answering the question of whether
Nietzsche’s work on language is continuous or discontinuous. They also serve to call our
attention to, in the overlap of the concepts and phenomena that are repeated between
them in discussing language, something like a constellational view of language, wherein
we are attentive to these related concepts and phenomena and their alteration over
time. Let me then, very cursorily, sketch out the several potential nodes comprising the
constellation of language at any given time that the above readings call to our attention.
Truth
In a number of the secondary readings considered above, the explicit argument
about the continuity versus discontinuity of language in the corpus is related to an
argument about Nietzsche’s thinking of truth. For Clark, in fact, the major discontinuity
traced is that of Nietzsche’s view of truth: in the early work, Nietzsche employs a
correspondence view, while in the later, a pragmatic view. For Klein, Nietzsche’s work
with language is always involved in his reinterpretation of truth from a standard
correspondence view, of which he claims Nietzsche was always critical, to what he calls
‘shining’ truth, a non-metaphysical view that aligns truth with a non-representational
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notion of appearance. The opposed views that these two thinkers take on Nietzsche’s
approach to language—Clark holding that the early view was abandoned, Klein holding
that the early view remains throughout the corpus—rely significantly on the arguments
these thinkers make about Nietzsche’s conception of truth.
Origin
The discussions of rhetoric, truth, and origins are mutually implicative. For
example, in describing Nietzsche’s rhetorical detour, Lacoue-Labarthe notes that the
detour makes the obtainment of origins impossible. In her claim that Nietzsche
abandons investigation into metaphor for stylistic use of metaphor, Kofman links the
impetus of this abandonment to Nietzsche’s disavowal of the metaphysical tinges of
origin, and ground, implied in traditional views of metaphor as trans-fer or trans-lation.
Physiology and Perception
Klein, Schrift, and Gilman, et al., not only note an emphasis on physiology shared
by both the early and late work, but also connect the treatments of physiology to issues
related to language.
Interpretation and Perspectivism
Crawford suggests that later Nietzsche uses a new thinking of language as
interpretation, and Kofman suggests that metaphor, throughout the corpus, is a model
of interpretation. Schrift claims that in the later work interpretation and will to power
reassert points in the early work arguing against a correspondence version of truth.
Gilman, et al. and IJsseling find perspectivism and interpretation to be closely
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interrelated concepts that, while explicitly mentioned more in the later work, are yet
central concerns in the early work as well, and closely related to Nietzsche’s treatment
of language. The close connection between interpretation and perspectivism to will to
power shows for all these thinkers the continuity between Nietzsche’s early work on
language and his later work on these concepts.
The Work of Critique
Schrift’s reading finds a commonality across the corpus in that though Nietzsche
abandons explicit treatment of figures of language, he yet focuses on words and
grammar in the later work, indicating their contributions to epistemological illusions, a
focus also found in the epistemology critique one can read in the early essay OTL.
The Use of Language
Kofman’s reading calls our attention to the distinction between direct claims and
performance, through her focus on Nietzsche’s transition from work on to use of
metaphor, the ways that Nietzsche may be using, rather than directly analyzing,
language.
II. Unworking Unities
To say that language is constellational is to already open the door to unworking.
By “unworking,” I mean only the most general sense that this term has, as a contrast to
Aufhebung, resolution into a higher unity without remainder; I mean it as a disruption
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that prevents resolution into a unity.39 The constellational view on language is already
on the path to unworking in that this view displaces the unity of language onto a
number of points that themselves change over time, that are not reducible to one
another.40
Interestingly, what we find is that Nietzsche’s discussions and uses of the
concepts in the constellations of language, regardless of which ones they are, are
involved in the unworking of a presumed unity, showing it not to be a unity—the
elements within the constellation of language are so frequently employed to unwork
not simply language itself, but other presumed unities. Thus, language is not only
constellational, but the site of unworking. I will point out in the course of my readings
that, even in the midst of finding the constellation of language at a given juncture, we
can also find the nodes of the constellation involved in the unworking of some
presumed unity.
Outline of the Project
Emerging from this background, let me give a brief summary of the structure of
the project.
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The use of the term “unworking” can have a much more nuanced and rich set of meanings, as, for
example, when used as a translation of Blanchot’s notion of “désoeuvrement.” As an example, see Simon
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corpus. Is that not, in fact, the demonstration of the unworking of the presumed unity of “language,”
whereby the unity of language is unworked in its refraction across the various nodal points, throughout
the corpus?
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Part I, comprising Chapters 1 and 2, works within the finding that in Nietzsche’s
early work—texts and notes from the early 1870s—there is not a unified depiction of
language, but there appear to be two kinds of account of language proffered. I will
frame my treatment of language in Nietzsche’s early work around this basic distinction
between two accounts of language, genetic accounts and expressive accounts. Chapter
1 treats the former; Chapter 2 treats the latter.41
In Part II, comprising Chapters 3 and 4, the issue of the changing constellation of
language meets up with another issue that at first seems largely relegated to the later
work, the relation between the critique of the Subject and the narrative self in the later
texts.42
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A more extensive introduction to Part I is found in the following section.
A more extensive introduction to Part II is found prior to Chapter 3.
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Part I

Introduction to Part I
Language in the Early Work
In the first two chapters, I want to work from the ground up in a certain way, to
approach the texts looking for what they offer in terms of thinking about language for
Nietzsche. Already, as indicated in the previous chapter, this approach presupposes
both the question of whether there is reason to find a unitary approach to language
within this early work, and the sense that part of answering that question will involve
unearthing the concepts and themes that serve as part of the constellation of language.
So we begin, noting that, in Nietzsche’s early work, language is not infrequently
an explicit theme, whether this be language in general, words in particular, or uses of
language ranging from the lyrical to the rhetorical to the figurative.
Now, the above might seem a somewhat controversial claim. The popularity of
OTL as a reference point for Nietzsche’s early work on language is clearly demonstrated
in the secondary literature, given its presentation of a genealogy of sorts of words.
Because BT is, foremost it would seem, a work on tragedy, or, according to 1886’s
Preface, a work on scientific culture through the vantagepoint of art, it might seem
strange to treat BT primarily in terms of the view of language that it expresses.
It is, further, easy to get the impression that OTL represents a turning away from
BT, turning away from the priority given to music and the metaphysical overtones
therein, such that the focus on language in OTL seems even further a mark of distinction
from the latter text. This is supported by appeal to those unpublished notes written

around the time of OTL’s composition for an undelivered course on Ancient rhetoric.
This course makes the claim that all language is rhetorical, which seems to shore up the
claim in OTL that words are metaphors, and concepts metaphors of metaphors.
Yet, BT does contain a discussion of language, as words, as the Apollinian
translation of a Dionysian exposure, especially in its account of the lyric poet. When we
read BT with the unpublished notes written just prior to the composition of BT, we find
therein that the unitary phenomenon of Dionysus-Apollo is maintained by the unitary
phenomenon of music-words. Despite the surface differences, there is reason, then, to
read BT for a view of language, and, to ask the question of whether and how that view is
different from that of OTL.
It seems that we could say, then, that Nietzsche has two distinct accounts of
language in the early work, that the later one in OTL is a rhetorical account of language,
and that the earlier one in BT, if there even is one, is dominated by the depiction of
music and the metaphysical conception within which music itself seems to be
articulated.
I will frame my treatment of language in Nietzsche’s early work around this basic
distinction between two accounts of language that I find therein, which I will call genetic
accounts and expressive accounts. Chapter 1 will treat the former, Chapter 2 will treat
the latter.
The Initial Grouping: Genetic and Expressive Accounts
The genetic accounts are found in the texts “On Truth and Lies in an Nonmoral
Sense,” in notes of 1872 posthumously published as The Philosopher, and in lecture
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notes from a course on rhetoric in 1874.1 The genetic accounts initially seem to dispel a
view oriented around an origin, as they place all aspects of human experience within a
series of translations outside of which access to an original is denied. These discussions
of language involve genetic schemas of development, thusly named because they depict
the emergence of language, or of words, from within the context of a developmental
process that comprises various stages of human experience, extending from
physiological stimulation, to mental images involved in perception, to spoken words as
names for perceptions, to concept formation. In these accounts, words emerge as one
stage in this process. Further, the logic of development between all stages is not
necessary, but is based on a contingent relation that Nietzsche calls “metaphor”: the
connection between the stages of development is itself a translation, metaphor, or
general representation of the material of experience which has already undergone prior
translations beginning at the physiological level. Thus it is suggested that there is
already a kind of language prior to the emergence of spoken language: spoken language
translates, creatively re-presents in an arbitrary rather than necessary fashion, but
never for the first time, always following prior translative work that has occurred,

1

A few words regarding these texts and their sources: As Daniel Breazeale explains in Philosophy and
Truth: Selections From Nietzsche’s Notebooks of the Early 1870’s, The Philosopher refers to unpublished
notes from summer, fall, and winter 1872, intended as the “theoretical” companion to Philosophy in the
Tragic Age of the Greeks in Nietzsche’s planned but abandoned The Philosopher’s Book. “On Truth and
Lies in a Nonmoral Sense,” composed in 1873, was begun as the introduction to The Philosopher’s Book,
and while it was unpublished in Nietzsche’s lifetime, a clean copy was prepared. This and further
information on these two texts can be found in Philosophy and Truth: Selections From Nietzsche’s
Notebooks of the Early 1870’s, edited and translated by Daniel Breazeale (Amherst: Prometheus Books,
1979). The lecture notes for a course on rhetoric come likely from a proposed but undelivered 1874
course at Basel on Ancient Rhetoric. For more on the history of these notes, see Carole Blair, “Nietzsche’s
Lecture Notes on Rhetoric: A Translation,” in Philosophy and Rhetoric 16, no. 2 (1983). References to
these texts of Nietzsche’s, unless otherwise indicated, come from the sources cited in this footnote.
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unconsciously, at the physiological level, and that is followed by further works of
translation that result in abstraction or conceptualization.
The expressive accounts, such as those found in The Birth of Tragedy, Philosophy
in the Tragic Age of the Greeks, and notes later published as “On Music and Words,”
describe language in terms of its origin in what Nietzsche will later call an aesthetics of
existence.2 The expressive accounts of language do not take their grounding from a
figure of language itself—that of translation or metaphor—but take their grounding
from a posited “original,” this original being the tragic vision, which is referred to
sometimes as “Urgrund” and sometimes as “Ur-eine,” that is said to be at the heart of
Greek tragic culture and to be that out of which language is developed. This background
aesthetics utilizes the figure of the Dionysian and of tragic knowledge that Nietzsche
contends was available to the ancient Greeks, and is one in which music is privileged as
an expression of the Dionysian. Language is described in these accounts in its relation to
music, and hence, in its relation to tragic knowledge. Thus the expressive accounts
invoke the trope of origin:copy, by privileging an origin—the Urgrund, tragic vision, or

2

A few words regarding these texts and their sources: “On Music and Words” is not Nietzsche’s title but
refers to notes of 1871 posthumously published as: “On Music and Words,” translated by Walter
Kaufmann, in Dalhaus, Carl, Between Romanticism and Modernism: Four Studies in the Music of the Later
19th Century (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 103-120. Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the
Greeks, composed in 1873, was, as Daniel Breazeale points out, intended as a companion to The
Philosopher in The Philosopher’s Book, and was also only posthumously published (Daniel Breazeale,
Philosophy and Truth, li-lxi). Citations are from Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks, translated by
Marianne Cowan (Washington, D.C.: Regnery Publishing, 1962). The Birth of Tragedy was published in
January 1872; references are to The Birth of Tragedy, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York; Random House,
1967).
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music—out of which language is a development, on the order of a copy in relation to its
original.3
The Issues to Be Pursued in Reading these Accounts
Reading the texts in which we find these two accounts, and asking the question
of continuity, provides an understanding of Nietzsche’s work on language that may
suggest the constellationality of language, but that also suggests the significance of
unworking. In asking whether and how the two accounts are continuous, we end up
isolating themes and phenomena that might form part of the constellation of language.
It may be the case that we find the very initial grouping into two ‘separate’ accounts
overturning itself, or, there may be reason to retain this grouping. We can lay out some
initial questions that will emerge.
The first has to do with the rhetoric of translation, art, and the central trope of
metaphor used in the genetic accounts. Does this announce a turn away from the
chronologically earlier expressive accounts, as a reader such as Lacoue-Labarthe
suggests?4 Because the genetic process described by these accounts is one guided by
“translations” or alterations, they interrupt the connection at all levels of human
experience to something like “untranslated” truth and knowing of that which is
“outside” the human. Hence these accounts are part of the general critique of the
related epistemological concepts of essence, truth, and knowledge, engaging
Nietzsche’s critique of Western epistemology and notions of scientific and philosophical
3

In one way, the differences between these two accounts of language may beg the question of continuity
even here within the early work. In asking whether and how the two accounts are continuous, we end up
isolating themes and phenomena (or, nodes) that might form part of the constellation of language.
4
See Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, “The Detour.”
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truth by depicting language as an aesthetic creation rather than what such epistemology
understands language to be, an innocent and transparent technical apparatus for the
delivery of what is.
Yet, the critique of epistemology found in these accounts of language owes itself
to what we might call an aestheticization, a hermeneuticization, and a rhetoricization of
all levels of experience. This occurs when figures of language—translation and
metaphor—are taken not as symbols but as names for the work involved in various
levels of mediated human experience. Language itself consists in such a translation or
metaphorization of the elements of apperception: all language is figurative, all language
involves Übertragungen, carryings over, translations, but so is all physiological
experience, all apperception, and all conceptualization, because they all involve this very
work of translation.
This means that all language, and physiological experience, and
conceptualization, is constituted by developments not symbolized by but of the very
character of the ‘linguistic’ phenomena of translation and metaphor. Thus we find in
these accounts not only the view that language as a particular development of humans
is artful translation, but the view that the specific, artful work of language—the figures
of translation and metaphor—is the appropriate representation of the products of the
power expressing itself through all stages of human development, whether we are
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dealing with physiology, apperception/self-awareness, language proper, or
conceptuality, and by extension, science.5
Now, in what ways is this aesthetics of existence continuous with the aesthetics
of existence expressed in the earlier expressive accounts? The initial elements of those
expressive accounts that seem to provide ground for a discontinuity here are the role of
music and metaphysics. Nietzsche repeatedly calls what he sets out in the first few
sections of BT an aesthetical or artist’s metaphysics. Not only this, his account, as he
later notes in the 1886 Attempt at a Self-Criticism, is populated by references to the
metaphysics of Schopenhauer. And the language of “primal ground,” “primal unity,”
“heart of the world,” and “world will” [Urgrund and Ur-eine] traverses the depiction of
music and language herein. The centrality of music in these “expressive” accounts, and
the metaphysical implications of their descriptions, raise the question of how such stark
differences in the context of accounting for the same phenomenon, language, can be
squared even in what we call the early work. Are they in tension or agreement in their
accounts of language? What do these very different contexts tell us about Nietzsche’s
early view of language?

5

Nietzsche herein implies that it is out of a failure to acknowledge this aesthetic constitution, the evertranslated and translating work of physiology, language, and concept-formation at the heart of the
scientific view, that is the force of the critique here. Modern, scientific culture is blind to, and must be
blind to, the myth, the aesthetic vision, that enables it. Nietzsche’s depiction of language in “On the Truth
and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense” is one way of expressing that critique. Thus, the genetic accounts of
language present Nietzsche’s early critique of modern scientific culture in nuce. This means that what
these genetic accounts of language amount to is a demonstration of the persistence of the aesthetic at
the root or heart of the scientific culture of modernity. And in this sense, these accounts of language
mirror Nietzsche’s early criticism of modernity in BT, for the scientific culture, birthed by Socrates, spelled
the death of myth for that culture on the face of it. But this departure of myth only seemed to be the
case, for scientific culture remained blind to the very myth, and thus the aesthetic view, on which it was
based—the myth of truth itself.
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On the other hand, is it the case that placing language within a process that
begins with a Dionysian vision consists in critiquing language itself for the failure to
achieve what the genetic accounts also mark, through use of translation and metaphor:
presentation of its ground, without remainder or difference? In such a process, language
fails to present directly the Dionysian visions that were the fount of myth in tragic
culture. This failure to achieve a self-grounding seems to be an element of both
accounts: a failure to capture truth or what is, in the genetic accounts; or to capture
Urgrund, in the expressive accounts. Is there a difference in the relation of the author to
those failures? While Nietzsche seems to work with this criticism in the genetic
accounts, he seems worried about it in the latter.
This gets us closer to a third issue, namely, that both accounts rely on a valence
of language that neither one seems to acknowledge: in both, there is a rhetorical and
performative valence that seems not to be mined by Nietzsche, or at least, not
accounted for. Thus I will suggest that what links both accounts, despite their
differences, is an attachment to origin that can sometimes cause the view of language
to carry a sense of lamentation; and, an unaccounted rhetorical and performative
dimension of the works themselves.
Finally, following from the last point, and as mentioned in the Introduction, I will
also be pointing out those moments of “unworking,” cases in which we seem to be
faced with a demonstration of the failure, irresolution, or ambiguity as regards a
presumed unity.
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Chapter 1
Genetic Accounts—Rhetoric, Perception, and Language in “On Truth
and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense,” “The Philosopher,” and the Course on
Ancient Rhetoric

Introduction
In the unpublished writings of the 1870s, many sections discussing language
involve what can be called the genetic schema, which locates the development of
language, or of words, within a process that extends from physiological stimulation to
concept formation, and within which the means of procedure is given the name of
“metaphor.”1 Such a schema that combines the physiological/perceptual and the
rhetorical in a discussion of language is found in OTL, and in notes composed around the
same time for a course on Ancient Rhetoric from 1872/74.2 In these schemas, language
is depicted as emerging within the context of perception. Yet, in OTL, we find that this
genetic schema, locating language’s emergence from out of perception, is already itself
plaited with rhetoric and linguistic form, as metaphor [Übertragung and Metapher] is
the name given to the means whereby this developmental process takes place. The
Rhetoric Course’s section on the tropological nature of all language seems especially
relevant given this plaiting, and thus the notes on rhetoric deepen the sense of what is
at stake in this valence of rhetoric in OTL. Further, other unpublished notes from around
the same period use the notion of metaphor and translation to describe physiological
1

Alan D. Schrift also refers to the “genetic” nature of such presentations. See Schrift, “Language,
Metaphor, Rhetoric.”
2
As Carol Blair indicates, most scholars hold the date of composition of these notes to be 1874, following
the Kroner and Musarion editors, though Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy suggest 1872. See RC, 94.

processes. In echoing the view from OTL that words are metaphors of physiological
occurrences, these notes promise to shed light on the relationship between physiology
and rhetoric implied in these schemas. Because the notes for the rhetoric course serve
to foreground most of these issues, I will begin there.
Ancient Rhetoric Course
In my reading of the 1872/1874 notes for a course on ancient rhetoric, I want to
draw out Nietzsche’s unworking of a series of oppositions regarding language—
persuasive versus true language, artful versus natural language—which centers on a
genetic depiction of language which itself unworks the applicability of the opposition of
origin and copy.
The third section of these notes, titled “The Relation of the Rhetorical to
Language,” is of particular interest for this question of Nietzsche’s early view of
language. This is the section of these course notes that is most often discussed in
literature, for it contains Nietzsche’s own claims about language, namely, the view that
all language is rhetorical. But in order to gather the full force of what is meant by such a
claim, Nietzsche has to clarify what he means by rhetorical, and this is done in part by
returning to ancient conceptions of rhetoric. In the first two sections of these notes,
Nietzsche provides a recapitulative overview of ancient views of rhetoric. In the third
section, the reinvigorated ancient view of rhetoric becomes a tool for re-conceiving all
language, in a genetic account, as rhetorical. This reconception offers an extension of
the epistemology critique that we will find at work in OTL.
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Because the work Nietzsche performs in the third section is informed by his
findings in the first two, I will begin by recapitulating only those elements in the first two
sections that provide the force and context for Nietzsche’s claim in the third that all
language is rhetorical. The important points gathered from the first two sections regard
the ancient view of rhetoric as a power of persuasion, and the binary opposition of
persuasion versus truth in language, within which rhetoric is classified as persuasion,
starting with Plato.
The Historical Priority of the Value of Persuasion Over That of Truth
Taking us back to the ancient view of rhetoric, Nietzsche tells us that while
rhetoric is held in some disrepute in modern times, it is frequently held in high regard in
ancient Greek and Roman societies, in which “it is the highest spiritual activity of the
well-educated political man” whose education culminates in this art. Nietzsche suggests
that this difference is due to the fact that, in ancient Western societies, there was a
“need of men for forensic eloquence,” due to a political structure in which “one must be
accustomed to tolerating the most unusual opinions and points of view and even to take
a certain pleasure in their counterplay.” In even the earliest sources Nietzsche cites
here, rhetoric is considered a skill in, power of, or craft of persuasion (peithein). (RC, 97)
The development of this art in ancient societies as the means of public
competition of viewpoints by either various parties, as in Greece, or party leaders, as in
Rome, testifies not only to the need of those societies and their political structures for
public eloquence, but also indicates their lack of another need central to modern
Western culture, the need for truth: “Generally speaking, the feeling for what is true in
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itself is much more developed [in modern times]: rhetoric arises among a people who
still live in mythic images and who have not yet experienced the unqualified need of
historical accuracy: they would rather be persuaded than instructed.”3 Thus, given the
need for public eloquence in the presentation of issues and positions, and in the
absence of the need for historical accuracy that is concomitant with a valuing of the
“true in itself,” Nietzsche indicates that this valuing of rhetoric as the power to persuade
to a view, without the sense that it involves untruth, is historically prior to the valuing of
truth and the placement of rhetoric in binary opposition to truth. (RC, 97)
The opposition between rhetoric and truth emerges out of this historical
context, and we see it in philosophy’s self-articulation beginning with Plato. Nietzsche
notes that Plato already makes the distinction between two arts of speaking,
distinguishing true speaking from deceptive speaking. The art of speaking that contains
deception is said to be rhetorical and mythical, aiming toward inspiring an opinion: “The
mythic component in the dialogues is the rhetorical: the myth has the probable for its
content, and therefore not the aim of instruction, but one of inspiring a doxa [opinion]
in one’s audience, thus to peithein [persuade]. . . .” As such, it is a matter of “outward
grace,” subordinated to flattery. The art of speaking that contains truth and is a matter
of knowledge and teaching cannot take written or rhetorical form, because “. . . truth
3

Nietzsche references Kant’s writing on rhetoric and poetry from the Critique of Judgment, when the
former writes that “[r]hetoric is the art of transacting a serious business of the understanding as if it were
a free play of the imagination . . . the orator announces a serious business, and for the purpose of
entertaining his audience conducts it as if it were a mere play with ideas . . .” Nietzsche summarizes that
this characterizes “what is unique to Hellenistic life . . . to perceive all matters of the intellect, of life’s
seriousness, of necessities, even of danger, as play” (RC, 97). In the sense that free play of the imagination
indicates the engagement of mind as if it were moving toward a concept, without actually culminating in
the grasp of a concept, rhetoric engages the mind as does art. It conducts matters of the understanding as
if they were matters of art, or, it conducts matters of the understanding in the way that art does.
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can be articulated neither in a written nor in a rhetorical form.” But writing and
rhetorical language might be used as tools, like a ladder kicked away after climbed, for
Plato ultimately “holds rhetoric to be legitimate when it rests upon philosophical
education, and provided it is used for good aims, i.e., those of philosophy.” Myth and
rhetoric are thus forms of deceptive speaking that are justified by philosophical ends
only when used by a person of philosophical training. With Plato, rhetoric’s persuasive
power is now considered a matter of persuasion toward a doxa, which is, in contrast to
truth, always partial; and linked to a concern for the external appearance of the
speaking. Hence rhetoric gains a veneer of deception. (RC, 99-100)
Aristotle continues the distinction between rhetoric and knowledge, claiming
that rhetoric is neither episteme nor techne, but a power or ability of persuasion, and
adds that this power regards “all available means” of persuasion.4 In Nietzsche’s view,
we find that in Aristotle the rhetorical still regards that notion of viewpoint or opinion,
but in full opposition to truth—Aristotle’s account makes a distinction between
philosophy, on one hand, which treats matters with regard to truth, and dialectic and
rhetoric, on the other, both of which “can be comprehended as the art of being
victorious in discourse and conversation,” treating matters with regard to the opinion of
the interlocutor.5 After having touched on Plato and Aristotle, Nietzsche leads into

4

Rhetoric, for Aristotle, “. . . is the power (faculty, ability), about each thing to observe all possible means
of persuasion … thus it is neither episteme . . . nor techne . . . but dunamis, which, however, could be
elevated to a techne” (RC, 100). This power is the ability tou theoresai, to observe/contemplate, and in
this sense see or calculate, all available means of persuasion about each thing.
5
We see this distinction between philosophy and rhetoric emerge in other ways that Nietzsche traces.
Knowing the means of persuasion is sufficient for seeing the means of persuasion. Nietzsche says that this
means the speaking is not essential to this dunamis, but rather, the focus shifts to this seeing/calculation:
one knows and thus sees, in the sense of inventing, what is persuasive in a given case, and it is
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further developments with the claim that “[n]ow come centuries of embittered
struggles in the schools of the rhetoricians and philosophers.” (RC, 100-101)
While there is much more to be said about the ancients in relation to rhetoric, I
want only to emphasize the parts of the ancient view that Nietzsche will work with or
against in the next section when he attempts to claim that all language is rhetorical. In
what we have considered above, Nietzsche has emphasized that in emergent
conceptions of and surrounding rhetoric in both non-Platonic and Platonic
characterizations, we find that peithein, the persuasive, is central: it is at least
considered the goal of the art or craft or knowledge constituting rhetoric—it is a craft,
art, or knowledge of persuading. But, what is the sense of this “persuading”? Nietzsche
has, perhaps unfortunately, not provided any description of what persuasion itself
consists in, but we can build this out in considering his references. In those prior to any
distinction to truth, rhetoric was a standard part of a political sphere involving the
communication of competing views; with Plato, as truth emerges as a contrast, rhetoric
involves the communication of doxa, again with the connotation of view. It seems that
the sense of persuasion here involves a sense of the force of movement toward a view
on something. In the absence of a strong social imperative toward the true, the goal of

“contained” Nietzsche says, or implied, that what is thus seen is seen through the lens of its being to be
presented. Nietzsche says of this here that “Aristotle . . . views the rhetorical as one finds it in books”:
elements of “delivery” are not essential, including speaking. While Aristotle attended only to invention in
his definition of rhetoric (in the tou theoresai), the Stoics after him attempt to find a place for eloquence,
culminating perhaps in Quintilian’s definition that “[r]hetoric is the science of correct conception,
arrangement and utterance, coupled with a retentive memory and a dignified delivery” (RC, 102). Added
to this is the limitation of the matters to political affairs, “so as to exclude philosophical investigations as
well as those of the special branches of learning” and instead to regard “those concepts, found in all
human beings, which are concerned with what is good, right, and beautiful, and for which special
instruction is not necessary… common knowledge as opposed to a special study or skill” (RC, 102).
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speaking is in this sense of moving toward the view presented in one’s speaking.
Persuading is speaking so as to present and move the hearer toward a position that
mirrors the point of view being presented, compelling, through one’s presentation, to
the view presented, and Plato’s doxa repeats that notion of point of view, given doxa’s
connotations of how things appear to one. What is historically prior is the value of this
peithein, the compelling or moving; the power to be good at this agon is distinguished,
starting with Plato, from either seeing, grasping, or instructing about the true, and thus,
from true speech.
It is also noteworthy that, for Plato, with the emergence of the value of truth,
non-truth speaking—rhetoric and myth—is compatible with writing, while truthspeaking is not. Thus, on the side of the pithanon, persuasion, compulsion, we have
rhetoric, writing, doxa. This is the side of the one among many, the agon between the
many sides, the attempt to pull over to one doxa, a way of appearing. On the contrary
side is truth, knowledge (episteme), ideas, and essence, with their connotations of unity
and subsumption of the manifold of appearances within the unitary forms.
The Entry of Language: Section III—The Relation of the Rhetorical to Language
Drawing from the Ancients, in the first two sections of the course notes
considered thus far, Nietzsche has highlighted two elements: first, the originary sense of
rhetoric as peithein/pithanon, persuasion in the sense of moving toward a view; second,
the later ancient distinction between rhetoric/persuasion and truth.
In the third section of the course, “The Relation of the Rhetorical to Language,”
we find the first appearance of “language” (Sprache), and, Nietzsche’s main claim of his
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own, that all language is rhetorical. But part of what is required here is to understand
just what Nietzsche means by rhetorical, and we see that this section continues to lay
out the sense of rhetoric by drawing on the earlier points.
This general claim that all language is rhetorical is demonstrated through the
three organizing points of the remainder of this third section of the course notes: 1) All
language conveys doxa rather than knowledge (episteme); 2) All words are tropes; 3) All
language is figurative (there is no proper vs. improper, or literal vs. figurative, distinction
in language).
The First Organizing Point: All Language Conveys [Übertragung]
Doxa Rather than Episteme
This first should immediately call to mind Plato’s view of rhetoric as conveying
doxa rather than the episteme conveyed by its other, truthful language. Nietzsche is
thus collapsing the distinction between rhetoric and “other” language, by placing all
language on one side of this binary opposition: all language is rhetoric, on Plato’s own
terms, because all language conveys doxa rather than episteme. There is a denial
implied here—that language could convey episteme, could be “truthful” in that Platonic
sense—as well as an assertion, that what all language does convey is doxa. How does
Nietzsche set about demonstrating this reworking of Plato’s opposition?
He begins, interestingly enough, by introducing yet another binary opposition
within which rhetoric is opposed to an “other” kind of language—the binary opposition
favored by modern thinkers. In modern Western culture, the distinction taken to
characterize rhetoric is no longer persuasion versus truth, but artifice/unnaturalness
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versus naturalness of language. While Plato introduced the binary opposition of rhetoric
and truth, the moderns introduce the binary opposition of rhetoric versus nature. In this
section, Nietzsche will claim that the possibility of the second element in both
oppositions, either natural language or truthful language, is an impossibility, or rather,
simply the other element in the opposition masquerading as other to itself.
Nietzsche thus begins this section laying out the new opposition within which
the moderns place rhetoric: artful versus natural language. He goes on to critique this
modern distinction by showing that the natural is actually conventional, and that the
presumed ‘natural’ form of language—writing—is actually unnatural.
The Artful-Natural Opposition and its Deconstruction
Nietzsche contends that we moderns use the term “rhetorical” about written
texts, or their styles or authors, to criticize their conscious use of artistic as opposed to
natural language: “We call an author, a book, or a style ‘rhetorical’ when we observe a
conscious application of artistic means (Kunstmittel) of speaking; it always implies a
gentle reproof. We consider it to be not natural (naturlich), and as producing the
impression of being done purposefully.” The contrast between true speech and
persuasive speech has been replaced with the contrast between natural speech and
unnatural, artful speech; the contrast between philosophy and rhetoric has been
superseded by the contrast between language as an outgrowth of nature and language
as artifice.6 (RC, 106)

6

This gets at Nietzsche’s claim herein that moderns see the ancients as rhetorical in the sense of artificial
because they are “unrefined speech empiricists,” meaning, they assume a correspondence between
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Nietzsche critiques this modern view, however, first, because this conception of
the “rhetorical” uses the concept of the natural to obscure the element of culture
involved in the establishment of linguistic conventions. Because “very much depends on
the taste of the one who passes judgment and upon what he prefers to call ‘natural’,” it
is the perception or lack of perception of what strikes one as natural in an author, book,
or style, that is at work in determining whether something is or is not deemed
rhetorical. But how do we get such determinations of what is natural or unnatural?
Nietzsche indicates that our sense of what is natural in language is itself only a matter of
convention, of social habitus in the reception of literature.
The example used to illustrate this view is that of the modern opinion that
ancient literature is rhetorical. Ancient prose was, for reasons discussed above, modeled
on public speech, as “an echo of public speech and built upon its laws,” and hence
perceived through the ear. Modern prose, due to the advent of publication and the
widespread dispersal of its productions, is tied to the written form, perceived through
the act of reading, not hearing. This difference in habituation with regard to prose form
matters because “[h]e who reads, and the one who hears, desire wholly different
presentational form, and this is the reason that ancient literature seems ‘rhetorical’ to
us; viz., it appeals chiefly to the ear, in order to bribe it.” Ancient prose is not unnatural,
only culturally different, of a culture of the public speech rather than a culture of the
book. The public speaking model for prose strikes us as artificial, as departing from the
proper form of perception through reading; we can only experience the style of that
words and things, such that a deviation from conventional linguistic form appears as a deviation from
nature.
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which appeals to the ear as improper because we have been habituated to desire a form
that appeals to the reader; we thus feel that in ancient style there is an impropriety,
that the ear is paid off in order to circumvent the official gaze of read perception.
Because the issue is one of habituation, and the shaping of expectations and desires
based on historical and cultural modifications, then, the artful versus natural distinction
is itself inappropriate—our habituation underwrites and makes possible any
determination we might have of what “appears to us” as either natural or artful. (RC,
106, emphasis added)
Having shown that the artful-natural distinction rests on cultural differences in
convention and habituation, Nietzsche now circles back to the very modern relation to
the written text that seems to define our different habituation to language. Again
focusing on the sense of the natural, his claim here will be that writing is less natural
than speech. Now this seems curious given that Nietzsche has just questioned the very
use of the category of the natural. My reading is that Nietzsche is hereby marking his
own critique as decidedly modern—even he is at the mercy of this predilection for the
natural/artificial distinction.
This criticism of our valuation of written form over spoken form, at least in
poetry, hinges on Nietzsche’s use of two terms conceptually related to the notion of
naturalness: wirkliche (real) and blasser (more pale). He suggests that the modern
relation to poetry in written form represents a loss of “reality” in relation to the
ancients. When speaking of poetry here, Nietzsche refers to the book as “mediator,”
and he calls Greek poetry that lacks such mediation “real [wirkliche] poetry.” He claims
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that our current preference for “literary” poets, who write what will be read, renders us
“more pale and abstract” than the Greeks who listened to “real poetry” in spoken form.
(RC, 106)
As regards the first of these terms, Nietzsche suggests that writing performs a
work of de-realization, abstraction, or loss, through the mediating process; writing is a
mediation of speech that loses some of its fullness, or reality. Only by viewing the text
as a mediation of spoken poetry can Nietzsche assert that spoken poetry is real poetry
without mediation, and call written poetry less real, and connected to the senses of
paleness and abstraction. Nietzsche thus asserts the primacy of speech over writing. The
book, and the culture of writing and reading, is the culprit, imposing the habituation
that undergirds our incorrect use of “artful” versus “natural” terminology.
The second term, blasser, is rendered in Blair’s translation as “more pale,” and
its connotations are related to sickness. The sense of nature here is from the
perspective of life, or of health. If one considers health to be the fulfillment of a natural
condition, then this term blasser is in conflict with the sense of “nature,” the term which
informs our understanding of the judgment of “rhetorical” as unnatural—it connotes
unnatural in the sense of sickly, deviating from health. Nietzsche implies here that the
ancient literature that we judge as “rhetorical” because it is not mediated through the
book, has actually not lost the lustre and color of the spoken form, and thus is the more
healthy, and in that sense, the more natural form of poetry. Thus, our modern
predilection for writing is a mark of our misjudgment of the natural, and thus not only of
the conventionality undergirding this misjudgment, but of a sickness undergirding it—
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for it is “we” moderns who become more pale and abstract through this relation to
poetry that privileges its written form. This complicates the purported modern sense of
what is natural, then, since real poetry, poetry not mediated through the book, thus not
tending toward paleness and abstraction, strikes us as “artificial and rhetorical,” as not
natural.
Our preference for the written-read form of speaking, at least with poetry,
represents a loss of the fullness of poetic language, and renders us “pale and abstract.”
Yet, because this predilection determines our habit-based desire as “natural,” we
estimate prose oriented to its spoken form as artificial, and we call this “rhetorical.” The
orientation to the written form thus impacts our understanding of “rhetorical” itself. In
using this preference for writing to guide our application of this term, we understand
rhetoric only as conscious application of art to language, in opposition to natural uses of
language—ancient spoken literature strikes us as artificial/unnatural because departing
from the written form.
We should notice three important implications of Nietzsche’s reading of the
modern preference for writing thus far. First, Nietzsche gives a priority to speech when
the relevant category is to be nature—we see this in his linking writing with less reality,
with more abstraction, with growing paleness. Second, in weighing in on the ancient
versus modern valuation of form here, and expressing speech as having natural priority,
Nietzsche is also marking himself as modern, as having a preference for the category of
the natural. Third, there is an implied irony in this modern preference for the category
of naturalness in characterizing rhetoric.
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Regarding this third point, the resuscitation of the ancient sense of rhetoric as
opposed to truth makes this irony clear. Modern Western culture is the culture that is
constitutionally concerned with truth, in which, as Nietzsche noted at the start of these
notes, “the feeling for what is true in itself is much more developed,” and in contrast to
which the ancients desire persuasion rather than instruction. But in failing to contrast
“rhetoric” primarily with “truth” rather than “nature,” the latter of which is undergirded
by habituation, we obscure the actual impossibility of truth in all language, and the
history of language’s always having been thus characterized. And it was in fact the
ancients, who valued “the true in itself” much less, who were on to this sense of
rhetoric as oppositional to truth, rather than to nature.
In these comments on the modern view of rhetoric, Nietzsche has thus far called
the modern preference for naturalness as regards language, and specifically written
language, into question because purported naturalness is undergirded by convention
and habituation. What about the other term in this oppositional pair, the “artful”? In
modern parlance, recall, the term “rhetorical” is used to mark the “conscious
application of artistic means of speaking,” or, given the modern focus described above,
means of writing. Rhetorical uses of language are thus understood as those that involve
the conscious application of artfulness to the use of language, in contrast to which we
imply that uses of language that do not involve this conscious use of artful means are
“natural” uses of language.
Nietzsche’s claim is a rejection of the opposition between artful and natural as
regards language:
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. . . it is not difficult to prove that what is called ‘rhetorical,’ as a means of
conscious art, had been active as a means of unconscious art in language
[Sprache] and its development [Werden], indeed, that the rhetorical
[Rhetorik] is a further development, guided by the clear light of the
understanding, of the artistic means which are already found in
language.7
So all language is artful, and there is no such thing as a natural, non-artful
language. This involves changing the way we view the other-to-artful uses of language:
this other is not “natural” language, but is un-consciously artful language. The
appropriate opposition here for characterizing the subset of language that moderns
name “rhetorical” is that between two types of artfulness, conscious versus
unconscious. All language is artful, employing artistic means, it is simply the case that
we are conscious of only some of this, and that of much of it we are unconscious. That
the artfulness in what we consider “non-rhetorical” uses of language is unconscious
marks the having been forgotten of this fact by us, and means that the art in language
goes deeper than what we attend to when we customarily deem language “rhetorical”:
the rhetorical seems artificial to us because we dwell in a forgetting that all language is
artificial in the same way. In fact, the conscious use of art in language, what we call
“rhetorical,” is epiphenomenal, only a further, more surface-dwelling development of
the artfulness of all language.8 “There is obviously no unrhetorical ‘naturalness’ of
language to which one could appeal; the language itself is the result of audible (lauter,
also meaning ‘unsophisticated’) rhetorical arts.” Indeed, the specification of rhetoric or
rhetorical drops out here—instead of a dichotomy, there is a unity, that of all language
7

RC, 106.
To say that we are speech empiricists is to point out this ignorance of language’s artfulness. And these
artful means themselves, unnoticed by us in our use of language, are at the heart of all language, are what
language itself is.
8
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as the employment of artful means. When we speak of rhetoric or the rhetorical, we are
speaking of that which characterizes all language, and hence, eradicating the
specification of rhetorical. Hence the claim that “what is called ‘rhetorical’ . . . is a
further development . . . of the artistic means which are already found in language.”
And so the focus of our interest is not really “the rhetorical,” but ‘the artistic means in
all language.’ Indeed, the remainder of this section is meant to remind us, or bring to
our view, or compel us to the view, of the artfulness in all uses of language that we have
forgetfully consigned to only one subset of language. (RC, 106)
So rhetoric is an extension of the artistic means in all language, and there’s no
“naturalness” of language that doesn’t have this art. An implication here is that the
opposition between artful and natural is eradicated.
If all language employs artful means, then we can infer from the consciously
artful means, rhetoric, to all language. Following the ancient conception, rhetoric is the
power to persuade, and after Aristotle, with regard to each thing. If one can persuade
with regard to each thing, one can, in Nietzsche’s terms, “make operative that which
works and impresses.” This is not only the essence of rhetoric, but the essence of all
language, for “[language] is based just as little as rhetoric is upon that which is true,
upon the essence of things . . . [and] desires to convey to others a subjective impulse
and its acceptance.” Here, we have entered the territory of that ancient opposition,
persuasive-truthful, in which truth and episteme are aligned, and rhetoric, doxa, and
persuasion aligned in opposition as non-truth speaking. Nietzsche’s point here: All
language is rhetorical in this sense of counter to truth. (RC, 107)
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The Persuasion-Truth Opposition and its Deconstruction
Here Nietzsche appeals to those early ancient senses of rhetoric as persuasion
toward a view, in the absence of a contrast with truth. Language is rhetorical because it
is persuasive in the pre-Platonic sense: “[language] is based just as little as rhetoric is
upon that which is true, upon the essence of things. Language does not desire to
instruct, but to convey [Übertragung] to others a subjective impulse and its
acceptance.” Nietzsche highlights the connotations of “work[ing] and impress[ing]” in
persuasion. Notice that Nietzsche does not reject the category of truth. Rather, just as
with the previous opposition, he takes up the opposition between persuasion and truth,
and claims that the side to which rhetoric belongs is also the side to which all language
belongs. There is no “true” language. This is not so much a dismantling of the
oppositional element of truth, as the claim that the opposition between persuasion and
truth cannot describe language, because language could never be categorized as true.
(RC, 107)
To demonstrate this, Nietzsche appeals to a genetic schematization: he presents
a developmental and progressive process uniting various levels of human experience,
starting with our sensory contact, moving through our apperception, finally to language,
and sometimes, in the end, to conceptuality. This genetic account of language dislocates
language from a connection to truth, and thus, rejects the binary opposition between
persuasion and truth as applying to language.
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The Genetic Schema
Because this genetic schema involves a depiction of sensory processes, and
utilizes the central image of “copying” in constructing the demonstration of all language
as rhetoric, we might lay out some basic features of Platonic and Aristotelian views that
seem to be held in relief in these of Nietzsche’s remarks, before proceeding further with
Nietzsche’s account.
Interlude: Plato and Aristotle
Plato: The Origin:Copy Trope, and the Sad Aspect of the Painter
The linking together of the various progressive elements of experience detailed
in this genetic schema is achieved through exploiting a Platonic trope, that of the
original:image or original:copy. Nietzsche uses these terms, which play such pivotal roles
in Plato’s description of knowledge’s priority over art, and of ideas over their empirical
likenesses, in such a way as to overturn the very opposition between original and image.
If we look at Plato’s description of art in Republic Book X, Socrates suggests that
the painter of a thing presents a likeness (the painted thing) of a likeness (the manifest
thing, which, as manifest, is only like, but is not itself, the idea of that thing which is the
cause of the manifest thing).9 But those first-mentioned elements—what it is that is
painted by the painter—are “phantoms” or “aspects,” with the connotation of a point of
view. Not merely likeness of a likeness, what the painter paints is a copy of her point of
view on a thing. This is denigrated by Plato at this point because of its paltry relation to
what knowledge of the object would be, and this is because of what accrues to points of
9

All references are to Plato, Republic, translated G.M.A. Grube (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1992).
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view—partiality, determination by how one stands in relation to the object,
incompletion. Such a presentation could not present the essence, the whole of the what
it is to be a thing found in the idea, and in this sense, pales in comparison to the
complete view provided by knowledge, not to mention paling in comparison even to the
likeness of which it is one aspect.
Language, both in the Rhetoric course notes and , will occupy the structural
status of painting in this section of The Republic, for it is copy of a copy, or as Nietzsche
will have it in the latter text, metaphor of a metaphor, with that connotation that what
is at issue is one aspect, already in a derivative relation to a likeness, rather than the
whole.
Before we go on to remark the ways in which Nietzsche exploits this Platonic
reference for his own purposes, we will do the same laying out of Aristotelian points.
Aristotle in De Interpretatione
The concern with truth structures the very organization of De Interpretatione.10
Upon arriving at the nature of the sentence as a unit of meaning, Aristotle specifies that
there are three kinds of sentence: propositional, rhetorical, and poetic. The text goes on
to treat only propositions, those sentences which “have in them truth or falsity,”
meaning that they make either an affirmation or a denial, a single proposition
“indicat[ing] a single fact.” Propositions can be either true or false, according to whether
they correctly affirm or deny what is the case, was the case, or will be the case. In other

10

All references are to Aristotle, De Interpretatione, in Aristotle, translated by Richard McKeon (New York:
Random House, 1941), hereafter referred to as DI.
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words, propositions are true when they represent facts or what is the case. This
correspondence of propositions to facts is underscored in the complexity of
considerations of propositions regarding future events, that which will or will not be the
case. With these propositions, our ability to say whether they are true or false requires
our ability to judge whether they do or do not accord with facts: hence, we must admit
our inability to judge certain propositions regarding the future. So rhetorical sentences
and propositions are not even in the same category of sentence, as rhetoric is not a
matter of truth or falsity. (DI, 16b26-17a8)
Further, Aristotle opens the text with the claim that “spoken words are symbols
of mental experience and written words are the symbols of spoken words.” The notion
of writing deriving from speaking will, as we will see, not be a point of contention for
Nietzsche in these texts. However, Aristotle further claims that “[j]ust as all men have
not the same writing, so all men have not the same speech sounds, but the mental
experiences, which these directly symbolize, are the same for all, as also are those things
of which our experiences are the images.”11 Notice that here, Aristotle has linked
idiosyncrasy with writing and speech sounds, but not with that which both are said to
symbolize, mental experiences and the ‘things’ imaged in those mental experiences. The
mental images are the same for all, as are the things of which they are images. Hence,
the aisthetic aspect of experience image-s—universally, non-idiosyncratically—the
elements of experience. Convention enters when the force of the symbol enters, and for

11

DI, 16a3-8, emphasis added.
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Aristotle, this begins with naming, followed by propositions, followed by symbolizing the
former in written form.
Truth, Likeness, and Time in Aristotle’s Aisthesis
There are clear resonances between the depiction of perception in the above
schematic description and Aristotle’s general view of aisthesis. We might recall that in
De Anima II Aristotle claims that all perception involves a being acted upon by
something which is both unlike and like to us.12 Perception is thus a passivity (paschein),
being acted upon, and an activity, in which, in being acted upon, we become like the
thing we perceive in terms of what we are perceiving about it: “perceiving is a way of
being acted upon, in which what acts makes another thing, which is potentially such as
it is, be of that attribute that the former has actively.” So in the state that results from
perception, the perceiver has become likened to what is acting upon it. The fact of
perception indicates this likeness or this having been likened. (DI, 424a 1-2)
Regarding this likeness, when we perceive—for example, when something is
heard—there is a mirroring not of the entire being that is sounding, but only of its
sounding, its being-at-work sounding; the one hearing is acted upon and made like the
sounding. The likening here regards the form, or better, the active condition, of the
thing sounding, but not its materiality: each sense “is receptive of the forms of
perceptible things without their material, as wax is receptive of the design of a ring
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without the iron or gold, and takes up the golden or bronze design, but not as gold or
bronze. . . . ”(DI, 424a18-21).
As a result, perception is a twofold unity, in which the perceived activity and the
perception of the activity are the same: “the being-at-work (energein) of the perceptible
thing and of the sense that perceives it are one and the same, though the being of them
is not the same . . . when the thing capable of hearing is at work and the thing capable
of making a sound is sounding, then the hearing in its being-at-work and the sound in its
being-at-work come into being together, and one might call the former the hearing
activity and the latter the sounding-activity.”13 This activity comes to be in the one
perceiving.14 Finally, there is a truthfulness in perceiving, as “sense perception when
directed at its proper objects is always truthful,” while only with thinking, and speech,
comes the possibility of not being right.15
There seems to be a direct connection between the way that likeness functions
here and truth. The perceiver becomes like what they perceive, but also, the very fact of
perceiving thus proves, or enstates, a likeness: if perceiving occurs, there is a likeness
between the act and the perception of it. This likeness consists in the fact that the
activity has come to be in the perceiver, even if not the entire being of the acting thing:
it is the form that is impressed upon the perceiver—the activity—not the entire being
engaging it. There is an affinity of form between the perceiver and the perceived, an
affinity that is attested to by the perceiving act itself. Hence, perception cannot be
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untrue, because it either occurs or does not occur. When it occurs, there is an
“impressing,” an immediate repetition of the form of the active thing in the perceiver
such that the sense of “repetition” collapses: the occurrence of the active sounding is
the same as the occurrence of the perception of the sounding. The moment of
perceiving is the moment of activity of the activity perceived; to this extent, the being as
perceiving and the being as in-activity inextricably comprise the one content of aisthesis.
Aisthesis is thus always true.16
Nietzsche’s Genetic Schema: Language Copies the Rhetoric of Physiology
Our formation of language, by which we express our experience, rides on the
back of the complex work of impulse and sensation, described by Nietzsche thus:
Man, who forms language, does not perceive things or procedures, but
impulses (Reize): he does not apprehend (auffassen) sensations, but
merely copies of sensations. The sensation, evoked through a nerve
impulse, does not take in (aufnehmen—absorb, assimilate) the thing
itself: this sensation is presented externally through an image.17
First, the nerve receptors, say those of the skin, experience an increase in the force of
excitation. This excitation, to yield a sensation on our part, must be translated. As the
similar genetic schema depicted in OTL will indicate, this suggests the transmission of
nerve stimulation to the brain, and the brain’s transmission of the nerve’s message into
something of a different nature, a mental image, comprising the feeling or sensation,
16

So, for Aristotle, perception is always true, because the content of perception is a direct impression of
the activity perceived; thinking and speech are not. Propositions can be true [when they mirror that which
they are ‘of’]; rhetoric is never possibly true. For Plato: Perception is never fully true, because truth is
found in the ideas, and the manifestations we perceive are always mixed with some untruth [that which is
not of the nature of ideas—matter, activities, temporal beings (logos is a special case that yet belongs
here)]. Propositions are never fully true for the same reason, mixed with temporal manifestations (breath,
linear relation of words in statements.
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RC, 107. In OTL, Nietzsche describes this movement in fewer steps, with the same basic result, that: “To
begin with, a nerve stimulus (Nervenreiz) is transferred (Übertrag-) into an image: first metaphor” (82).
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projected onto the area of the body that received the initial force. This means that our
sensory awareness, which seems to be immediate, is made possible by processing of
nerve information that is always, once apperceived, already having been transmitted to
the brain and re-rendered as a sensation of what occurred. So our apperception literally
occurs as mental images of what has happened at various parts of our body.
Because there is a process of re-rendering or re-working, we are not dealing with
direct assimilation of externalities, but with the internally worked images that are then
projected as externalities. The mental image in being an externally projected image,
marks its distinction from anything like a ‘thing in itself’ that is taken to be its cause.
If our bodily apperception is always a translation into a form different from the
nature of the initial nerve stimulation at a particular location on our body, the key is that
there is a transfer from one form to another.18 There is an image, copy, which becomes
our own initial, conscious experience, which is in fact itself a conveyance or carrying
over [Übertragung] of the stimulus into the form of the image. Our awareness of the
occurrences at the level of our body—all of our sensations—are thus translations,
copies, re-renderings in a different form, which do not capture and take in the “things
themselves” that may be said to be involved in these stimulations of our nerve
receptors, nor do we even apperceive the nature of the nerve stimulation itself. We can
only go as deep as the depiction of a sensation or feeling caused as by the stimulation—
the image. Our ‘brute’ physical experience is already a translation into such images. We
do not perceive “things or procedures, but impulses,” which is to say, we perceive
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Or as Nietzsche says in OTL from one “sphere” to another (82).
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always within the context of what has happened to the body as redepicted it in these
images.
But this is just the first step in our experience. If our very physiological
experience is in this way always already a translation into another form, once we have
become aware of it, what of our attempt to think of or speak of this experience? This
requires a second translation:
. . . [T]he question of how an act of the soul [the ‘image’ of step one, the
apperception of a sensation] can be presented through a sound image must be
asked. If completely accurate representation is to take place, should the material
in which it is to be represented, above all, not be the same as that in which the
soul works? However, since it is something alien—the sound--, how then can
something come forth more accurately as an image?19
Just as impulses are re-rendered into mental images that constitute our
sensation, speech is another re-rendering of this already rendered material. What
follows for language is that it can never depict anything like external causes of our
impulses, but it is set to depicting the image that we have already rendered of that
experience. The limitation imposed by our embodiment, the fact that all of our
experiences of things must come to us through the initial translation into nervous
excitation, is copied into new forms at the progressive levels of mental images, words,
concepts.
This genetic schema is, first, a demonstration regarding the impossibility of
episteme, in which our mind is made equal to the whatness of things. Language emerges
out of this epistemic impossibility; as neither sensation nor language can achieve that as
19

RC, 107. The same point is expressed in OTL: “The image [the first metaphor: from stimulus into image],
in turn, is imitated in a sound: second metaphor. And each time there is a complete overleaping of one
sphere, right into the middle of an entirely new and different one” (82).
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which we understand episteme, neither renders the “true.” Now, if the relevant other in
this binary opposition is doxa, in what sense are sensation and language here shown to
be doxological? Doxa, that which is linked to rhetoric, in the Greek sense has the
connotation not simply of opining, but of how something appears to us. Doxa regards
idiosyncrasy and partiality, in the sense of how something appears to one. This schema
emphasizes both. Sensation is comprised of an idiosyncratic depiction to the mind,
projected externally—it is how something appears in the mind of this one. What
Nietzsche describes at the level of physiology, and as translation into nerve impulses of
all sensory contact with externality, is how things appear to us, how they strike us.
Nietzsche will actually call this “the first aspect [Gesichtspunkt],” connoting angle or
point of view, as well as Merkmal, an attribute or feature. Both of these terms connote
the way that something is in our sight, only ever partially, and determined by how we
stand in relation to it.
This should call to mind Plato’s reference to the aspect that the painter recreates
in the painting. In fact, this is just what words go on to do with these ‘aspects’ as which
we perceive our experience: it “conveys” them [Übertragung], and here Nietzsche ties
this directly to doxa, for language “desires to convey only doxa [opinion], not an
episteme [knowledge].” Language conveys doxa because it expresses the appearance to
this human, bodily frame of reference, to which there is no larger, grounding frame of
reference we could gain access.20 Doxa, then; but not in contrast to an opposing truth.

20

Doxa comes from a Greek root that connotes appearing and seeming. Not only does our sensation
translate things into a human form (first impulse, then image, then sound), it also does so in an
incomplete way, taking in only “the manner in which we stand toward them.” There is both obfuscation
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This first aspect/view on the proof of language’s rhetoricity is based on
articulating this aspect-character of language, the demonstration that language presents
features of things that strike the speaker, rather than the things themselves. This, an
affirmation of that on the basis of which Plato denigrated painting in Republic X, is its
‘aspect’ character.
A Summary of the Unworking in the First Organizing Point
The subjectivity, or what I have called above, doxological nature, of language is
indicated here in two senses: not only does language represent an individual process of
translation, through which experience is translated in the individual through
physiological, mental, and finally oral processes; what remains untranslated in the
process is the standpoint-nature of the individual. There is always a standpoint, and
hence, what is taken in, what is translated, is one aspect alone, never the wholeness of
anything we might be said to experience. This is what is necessarily denied by the very
nature of language’s conventionality in the forms of semiotics and semantics, and by the
development of concepts out of words. The general point here is about the subjectivity
of language considered in the sense of discourse, speaking about something to
someone, rather than in the sense of structures of semiotics and semantics: “language
does not desire to instruct, but to convey to others a subjective impulse and its
acceptance.”

caused by translation, and partiality caused by standpoint of contact. Not only does our perception of
things translate the form of those things, (impulse, image, sound), it does so in a limited fashion because
of this standpoint nature of our contact with things. And the result is that “[instead] of the thing, the
sensation takes in only a sign.” This gets at the “Merkmal,” how in words we represent only one view or
one aspect of something, which is the one view that has come to us in our sensory perception. (RC, 107)
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Hence, both our apperceptions and our “utterances” emerging from them
engage in this process of becoming more and more worked by us, as if being siphoned
through a funnel growing ever more narrow before the word is churned out. What we
see here is the doxological or idiosyncratic nature of this process: all perception is
always an appearing to one. The result of this process is expressed in OTL as “metaphors
of metaphors,” copies of copies, which gets us back to the Platonic criticism of painters.
To use language is to be the Platonic painter, presenting an idiosyncratic, one-sided
view of a likeness, of only one feature, of only one-side.
This first point, that all language is rhetoric, falling on the side of doxa rather
than truth, troubles a particular conception of truth and its oppositional relationship in
the tradition to doxa, how things appear to one, or what is often called ‘opinion.’ Truth
is said to be opposed to opinion, and hence, with regard to language, persuasion is on
the side of opinion, while instruction and truth-telling are on the side of truth. Finding
what works and impresses the view to which we want to win others is associated with
persuasion, distinguished from truth, and carries connotations of force and pressure.
When Nietzsche claims that the essence of language is in fact what characterizes
rhetoric, seeking what “works and impresses,” the implication is that this distinction
between true language and rhetorical language cannot hold, because what we call true
language or truth-telling language reduces to the very same thing as rhetoric, on this
genetic model of experience: “The power to discover and to make operative that which
works and impresses with respect to each thing, a power which Aristotle calls rhetoric,
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is, at the same time, the essence of language: the latter is based just as little as rhetoric
is upon that which is true, upon the essence of things” (RC, 106-107).
Now, to hold that there is truth-telling language as opposed to opinionconveying language, means holding that there is truth to be revealed through this
language. And for Plato, connected to that hierarchy in Republic Book X, both nous and
ideas involve the sense of vision: they are mentally sighted, and following the
description in the Republic, we are led to that noetic vision of the ideas—the truth of
things—by following the logos. The logos is not the same as the truth of what is, but can
be followed in order to obtain a vision of the idea of each thing, until we get completely
beyond logos, propelled to a noetic vision of the full essence, the what it is to be of each
thing, which is how a thing shows itself when it stands in truth, just as real things show
themselves as what they are when they stand in the full light. Truth is the provision of
this view of what it is to be of each thing.21
Against this conception of truth, part of what Nietzsche does in this section is
demonstrate how any access to this kind of truth is impossible. If truth is used in its
traditional sense, as essence, as the what it is to be of each thing, it cannot ever be
accessed by our language because it cannot even be accessed by any level of experience
that we might apperceive. Any kind of knowing contact with things in themselves, what
they are in essence, is made impossible by the way that we know, which starts in the
body, moves to language, and ends in concepts.

21

My reading of these passages in the Republic owes much to John Sallis’ reading of the Republic in John
Sallis, Being and Logos: Reading the Platonic Dialogues (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996).
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That great Platonic trope corresponding to this notion of truth, the trope of the
original and the copy, is used by Nietzsche here to dismantle the very opposition it is
said to uphold—the opposition between truth and appearance. While in Platonism, the
copy or the appearance is such as its dehiscence from the fullness of how it would show
itself in truth, Nietzsche employs the trope of the copy here in such a way as to suggest
the impossibility of access to any original—the original is undercut by the copy which
brings it into the only kind of being we can access. The genetic description of the
development of language, here and in OTL, demonstrates this undercutting. Nietzsche
takes that trope of original-copy, and demonstrates language as a copying, but rejects
the possibility of access to the original, because it is a copy that gives to experience for
the first time. He takes that sense of doxa as appearance and demonstrates language as
appearance, but rejects the possibility of access to the true being of something beyond
this appearance.
The genetic description interrupts that notion of natural belonging between
words and things by use of the trope of copy, in the sense of creative copy or metaphor:
words are metaphors, copies, and Nietzsche emphasizes the break, the “leap into an
entirely different sphere” here. The copies and metaphors occurring at each level of
movement in the genetic description is an “Übertragung,” a carrying over, and it is in
the sense of translation. Not only are words found deep within this process, and not
only are concepts last to be created, but the physiology of the body is emphasized as
our initial and least translated/corrupted contact with experience, though even it is
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impossibly translated, linguistic experience and conceptual experience being the most
“worked-over.”
Given that at the most basic level of physiological experience, we are never
outside of ourselves but can only apperceive that which our body has already copied,
worked over, into sensory excitation that fits the body’s horizons, our most brute
contact with the world is itself already copy. Given that language is ever pointing to
experience, ever pointing to a world that we experience primarily or firstly in a
physiological way, language is ever copy. To say that language is rhetoric in this first
sense is thus to acknowledge our situatedness: that all of our use of language cannot
eradicate our being embodied, and the emergence of all of our use of language out of
that horizon; and that prior to any use of language, there is already a realm of our being
worked and impressed by an encounter with all that impacts us sensorily.22
But there is another feature to consider here: language is copy in the sense of its
emerging from an experience that we are compelled to express.

22

Yet, we might wonder how language is being figured here in terms of the interior and the exterior. It is
hard not to read this entire process as one of ever growing interiority. It is as if, from the “nerve-impulse,”
we move, through these layers of translation, ever further inside an interior physiological process. The
difficulty here is that Nietzsche has claimed, above, that in sense perception there is no internalizing of
the thing itself—we do not hereby assimilate the thing. Rather, the sensation is presented externally—by
which I take it, presented both as if external, and, presented in distinction to the thing, in an image. Hence
even our relation to this mental image involves a translation, as if what is depicted in that image is an
external being. But this translation as if external is a projection, and this indicates interpretation. As we
get further in Nietzsche, I will argue that interpretation is a form of assimilation, for conscious beings. In
fact, in OTL, Nietzsche will clarify that this translation is actually a form of appropriation. I think that this
means that at this point, Nietzsche is marking that due to the contours of the interior work that gives rise
to language, notably language which purports ‘externalities,’ language can be an interiorizingexteriorizing, a process of taking inward and moving inward within which part of the work is to project the
form of exteriority. This doesn’t mean there is not already exteriority to this internality, only that
whatever we know of it is already covered in a layer of—copy, translation, projection, ultimately,
interpretation.
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Recall that it is the second member of these pairs, both naturalness and truth,
that Nietzsche calls into question. This is why the recuperation of the earlier ancient
sense of rhetoric as persuasion becomes important. What the earlier ancient view of
rhetoric has going for it is a view of rhetoric as a use of language oriented toward
persuasion. Originally, it was not counter to truth, because, this notion of truth required
a later articulation, which Nietzsche locates in Plato. The implication is that the traction
that truth was able to gain, historically, after the first ancient view, could only come
about because the language of truth was able to win the agon against the language of
persuasion by masquerading in the first place as other to persuasion, as non-persuasion.
Nietzsche’s return to the earlier ancient view of rhetoric even preceding the advent of
its opposition to truth thus brings this addition from his historical vantagepoint: that the
creeping agonistic partner, the language of truth, is just the language of persuasion
dressed in other garb.
As we move further into this third section of the course, we find that Nietzsche
ultimately rejects both of the second elements of the binaries as possible, the later
ancient and the modern, that is taken to be the preferred other kind of language in
opposition to rhetoric: he has rejected naturalness (natural language), and will go on to
reject truth (true language) as possible, and thus, as oppositions to rhetoric. Nietzsche
retains the first element of both pairs, artfulness (artful language) and persuasion
(persuasive language). In rejecting the second element of these binaries, he thus rejects
an other language to rhetoric—rhetoric is all language, all language is rhetoric—the
oppositions reduce to the first elements of both, artfulness and persuasion. All
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language/rhetoric is characterized by both artfulness and persuasion. This is the main
point of this section: that all language is artful, with an artfulness that comprises the
whole of language, and because of which naturalness and truth, the terms moderns and
ancients (starting with Plato) proposed as oppositional to rhetoric, are not only not
possible for any part of language, the very construction of their possibility rests on an
artfulness and persuasion that denies itself as such, and wears the mask of an other
language.
The Second Organizing Point: All Words are Tropes
There are the particular figures of language that we have come to name tropes,
and there is trope as the common name for all, by its derivation connoting a turn, which
involves a consequent alteration of vantagepoint and position. This second aspect of
proof that “the rhetorical is a further development . . . of the artistic means which are
already found in language” builds on elements in the first, but is focused on troubling a
different opposition: the proper and the improper. Nietzsche’s claim here is that though
we single out certain uses of language as obviously perspectival—as obvious deviations
from the standard or full meaning—not just some but all language consists in this tropic
turning. If all language is constituted by this turning, then there is no possibility for
language to fully accord with that of which it speaks; it is always at the remove of a turn
as soon as it emerges.
This point is found by consulting the tropes, in their three major forms:
synecdoche, metaphor, and metonymy. Tropes are considered “the most artistic
means” of language, and to be improper (uneigentlich), usually rendered as “non-literal”
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in English, language. The opposition Nietzsche uses here is that of improper versus
proper language, a distinction that can be traced back to Aristotle’s distinction between
words in current use and metaphors, which are alien uses of names.23 The central
notion in such a view is that there is proper usage of terms, terms in their “current”
usage, and improper usage. Tropes name usages of terms that make them depart from
their standard or “current” meaning, that “twist” them out of that standard use, and
hence are not-proper. In the history of rhetoric, then, tropes are improper, as opposed
to proper, uses of words from which they derive as a turning away. The opposition
implied here builds both on the artful versus natural characterization of rhetoric, and
the original:copy trope.
Nietzsche’s claim here is that “the tropes are not just occasionally added to
words but constitute their most proper nature.” The exemplary improper use—the
tropes—are actually the basis of all words, and hence, of their proper use. Hence, there
cannot be a proper within language; there is no proper-improper distinction, but rather,
an underlying unity: every word is what the tropic use of a word is, what we have come
to call improper. The distinction between proper and improper is a distinction
established to cover the lack of distinction. Hence, the opposition proper use-improper
use is dismantled, as are artful versus natural uses of language. And this requires our
looking anew at what those terms were said to speak for. (RC, 108)
In describing how all words are tropes, Nietzsche works through the three tropic
forms. Synecdoche is an improper use of words in the sense that it deviates from the
23

This takes up Aristotle’s reading of tropes as deviations from common usage of terms. See Aristotle’s
Rhetoric III.2.

75

standard use of words by substituting a word indicating a part of the standard word that
is meant, or substituting a word indicating a whole of which the standard word used in
this place can be considered a part. Nietzsche here considers synecdoche involving
substitution of parts for wholes. Hence he builds on the point just made in the first
section, that of the limitation of human perception and all that comes after it, including
words and conceptuality. All words express only a part for a whole—an aspect, just like
the Platonic painter--or, that which is expressible by so many more aspects. For
example, we might illustrate the trope of synecdoche with the use of the term “sail”
when we mean “ship,” thus actually expressing a part when our meaning is the whole to
which the sail belongs. But language is always caught in this expression of parts instead
of wholes: “language never expresses something completely but displays only a
characteristic which appears to be prominent to it.” Here Nietzsche points to words
whose derivations are clearly tied to a perceived aspect of things, such as the derivation
of serpent from serpens, that which crawls, which is only one aspect of a snake, and
further, which can’t at all be said to express what makes snake unique to all other
things, hence cannot be its essence, because crawling could just as easily render what
we call “snail” or anything else that appears to crawl. (RC, 107)24
Metaphor is the trope of deviant naming, whereby a word in standard use is
given a new meaning by its being used in a non-standard context. The prime example of
this would be describing a mountain as having “feet” or “veins,” or rivers having mouths

24

Nietzsche makes similar claims in OTL, such as the claim that adjectives express how something appears
to us, not what something really is, these subjective experiences only erroneously attributed to things
(82).
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or “lips.” Metonymy, the substitution of a word with another closely associated with it,
as Nietzsche cites here particularly substituting causes and effects, examples being using
“tongue” when we mean “language,” substituting the cause of speaking, the tongue, for
the effect of speaking, the language; and the use of adjectives, substituting the effect
had on us by something—the perception of greenness in looking at grass—for the
cause, the greenness of the grass. (RC, 107-108)
Thus, language, the instituted use of words such that usages become common or
standard, is of the order of the nature of rhetoric as working or impressing, compelling
us toward one aspect of things, that picked out by the term of standard use. In
language, “[a] partial (einseitige, one-sided) perception takes the place of the entire and
complete intuition (Anschauung, view or outlook).” This is a critique of the view of the
connection of language to essence, for the partiality and human character of these
aspects or views on things expressed by the words conflicts with that sense of the
fullness of what it is to be something as distinct from other somethings that is the
traditional understanding of essence. (RC, 107)
There is no proper versus improper meaning of words, a belief which has shored
up the very definition of these terms as tropes, because if we understand the tropes as
“improper” in the sense of “turning” from one view to another by “carrying over”
(Übertragen) a new use, all language does this, and focuses on one view of things by
carrying over that view by use of the word. All words involve a carrying over of one view
from one “sphere” to another, an imposing of one frame of reference onto our
experience. Every description of a mountain involves a word that picks out one aspect of
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the mountain experience to emphasize, and every description of grass involves imposing
the effect on us of that grass experience—the effect of having a perception of green—
onto that of which we claim to be speaking.25
The Third Organizing Point: All Language is Figurative
Finally, this means that our literal-figurative distinction, which we use most often
to characterize the proper/standard-improper/non-standard use of language, cannot
stand either. This distinction seems to rest on convention, by the fact that “the taste of
the many makes choices.” Nietzsche begins this point by building on the last, saying,
“[t]here is just as little distinction between actual (eigentlichen, proper) words and
tropes as there is between straightforward speech (Rede) and (so-called) rhetorical
figures. What is usually called language (Rede) is actually (eigentlich) all figuration” (RC,
108).26 But this figurative background of language becomes obscured by the force of
convention over time. Everyday usage, the usage embraced by the taste of the many, is
what operates to deem a given schemata (figure) a “guide for the many.” Once it
becomes a guide for the many, it is accepted as “straightforward speech,” literal
25

In this text, Nietzsche’s claim is that all words are tropes, and in OTL, it will seem that metaphor
becomes the privileged trope. A few clarifications should be added. First, every trope mentioned in the
course notes is at least discussed, though not implicitly named, in OTL, wherein Nietzsche discusses an
example of synecdoche and metonymy through examples, the winding of the snake and the hardness of
the stone (82). Further, more importantly, Nietzsche’s use of metaphor [Metapher] in OTL makes clear
that by metaphor there he means more than a figure of linguistic use, but in the near synonymous use of
Übertragung and Metapher, what he has in mind there is an extension of this very point of the tropic
nature of language that allows him to read the physiological genetic schema as the work of a sense
metaphor in which physiological processes and linguistic processes are of a piece, part of the more
general work that by the later work we will have reason to call interpretation. Further linking of this tropic
character of all language to the tropic character of all physiology will be found when we consider OTL and
“The Philosopher” in the next section.
26
Further, all speaking involves figuration: “the forms of enallage [substituting equivalent expressions],
hypallage [interchange of two elements), pleonasm [use of more words than needed for sense] are
already active in the development of language and the proposition; the whole grammar is the product of
this so-called figurae semonis” (RC, 109).
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language that does not deviate through the figure, which does not use language in a
non-straightforward way, which uses it to figure rather than indicate. But every means
by which someone deviates from standard usage, “straightforward speech,” is the
means whereby those elements of standard speech were themselves developed. The
difference is in the conventionality and its force of forgetting of the origins of its
development. (RC, 108)
Recapitulation of the Rhetoric Course Notes
We began with the conventionality that indicates to the modern mind that
rhetoric is artful as opposed to natural language. What this view hides is the
conventional nature of this conception of the natural—that it is subtended by a
habit/convention determined by a historical exigency, that of knowledge’s eclipsing of
persuasion as the ideal of speech, and that of the written form eclipsing the spoken
form in value. We have proceeded to the conventionality that indicates that language
transmits knowledge, rather than doxa—again, we have found this subtended by the
ability of a correspondence view of language, the handmaiden of epistemology, to cover
over the physiological processes at the root of words. We have gone on to the
conventionality that indicates that only some words are tropes, turning away from the
original proper uses, to find that the sense of ‘proper’ here is undergirded by the same
forgettings as listed above—the ‘proper’ is itself established by convention, and, if
words name, they must name idiosyncratically, as the very experience of what they are
taken to name is not “the same for all.” In fact, language, as convention, allows
physiological idiosyncrasy to hide itself.
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With these points in the foreground, we will move on and find many of them
repeated and extended in the following two works.
“On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense” and “The Philosopher”
The account in “On the Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense” (OTL) utilizes the
language of image (Bild), translation (Übertragen), and metaphor (Metapher) to express
the alterations resulting in our concepts, words, and apperception of all sensations,
mirroring that schema of development also presented in the rhetoric course notes, in
which the argument that rhetoric is at work in all language is at issue.27
Reflecting much the same schema as presented in the notes, as every bodily
nerve stimulus yields a translation into the form of excitation required by the body for
its processing, we are constitutionally prevented from untranslated access to any cause
of that stimulation by the body’s requirement that even the most primitive experience
must be the result of a prior translation into a form it can process. What we have first is
the bodily excitation that is already a translation, from which is derived our
apperception of what may have occurred to our body, in the form of a mental image,
which is then translated into a word if we wish to speak of it, and, later, into a concept if
we wish to think it, abstracted from the experience. If we were to speak of the “real”
that impacts us in experience (the answer to the question of what is the real ‘x’, the
question of essence), we could speak only of this outer limit, and hence only of the
“mysterious ‘x,’” but not of anything like its true nature. All we have access to are the
images and translations that we ourselves produce, a claim which allows Nietzsche to
27

See Abbreviations list for citation information.
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call those great columbaria constructed by science and language human artistic
creations, presenting not that of which we have knowledge, but our creative, aesthetic
work. (OTL, 83)28
This text makes many of the same points as the rhetoric course notes, but with
some differences of terminology. What the texts share is the claim that this process is
an aesthetic one, an artful process; that sensory experience is composed of the images
we project, rather than absorption of things, hence creation rather than representation;
the claim, contra Aristotle, that the projected mental images are marked by the
idiosyncrasy of the event, rather than a universality; and the claim that words are
initially the attempt to name those projected, hence external, images. What
distinguishes this text from the course notes is the entry of Kantian language, as the
impossibility of our access to anything beyond the physiological stimulation of our own
bodies is marked with the “mysterious ‘x’,” indicating the fact that we will never
encounter the essence of ‘things’ involved in our experiences.29 Another difference is
the addition of a consideration of how this schema impacts the formation of concepts,
enabling the critique to extend to scientism; and the use of metaphor [Metapher and
Übertragung] as the term to describe this process.
28

It should be noted that this illustration renders knowledge of the essence of even ourselves impossible
for the same reasons—the processes of our body are represented to us as mental images, and further, the
concepts that we would use to render knowledge of ourselves are at the latter end of this process,
themselves effects of layers of translation and, hence, loss of something like an “original.”
29
In general, this is a variation on a basic Kantian premise. While, unlike Kant, Nietzsche feels that going
so far as to posit a “thing-in-itself” is an abuse of the principle of sufficient reason, the aspect of
Kantianism that Nietzsche repeats here is the basic position that all knowledge of experience is
irrevocably always already mediated through that which fulfills the human conditions for experience.
While for Kant, there is great specificity in the conceptual content of this mediation, namely space, time,
and the twelve categories, for Nietzsche, there is the same general structure, the same claim that human
experience is already shaped into a human form and we are irrevocably severed from direct knowledge of
the essence of things, but this occurs even behind the back of concepts.
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We might ask, then, what this use of metaphor as, not simply one rhetorical
figure, but as a more general synonym for translation, and as the name for a procedure
that begins in physiology and prior to any considerations of language as speaking and
writing, achieves.
Metaphor and Physiology
Nietzsche’s rendering of all of the “translations” at every stage of experience in
OTL as “metaphors,” of which language is only one example, and an example that
follows more preliminary physiological “metaphors,” is given further explanation in
selections from his early notebooks, later published as “The Philosopher” (P). It is
important to read these sections together with the essay, because here Nietzsche
renders metaphor a basic physiological process as opposed to a specific work of
language, such that linguistic metaphors become epiphenomenal repetitions of this
physiological work. When the two works are read together, one is left with the sense
that Übertragung is used not simply to name a linguistic trope, enabling Nietzsche to
describe the physiological level of experience in another register. It is rather the kind of
work comprising all sensation, and it is linguistic tropes themselves that merely repeat
this physiological phenomenon.
The metaphor of causality seems to be a grounding metaphor of sorts, the one
by means of which most experience is processed. In calling causality a metaphor rather
than a concept, Nietzsche is interrupting the Kantian depiction of the derivation of
experience from intuitions and concepts. There seem to be two sources of the
metaphor of causality. One is the connection between will and act: “The only causal
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relation of which we are conscious is the one between willing and acting. We transfer
this onto all things and explain to ourselves the relationship between two alterations
that are always found together. The intention or willing yields the nomina; the acting,
the verba.”30 This calls to mind Nietzsche’s claims about the attachment of doers and
deeds in later work, an attachment that shores up our belief in the subject. 31 Nietzsche’s
indication here is that the relation of will-act is transferred onto other experiences as a
means of explaining them; it becomes a foundational metaphor or schema.
Yet there is also what Nietzsche calls “causal sensation,” which is when “a
stimulus is felt as an activity,” such as when the stimulus felt in the eye is referred to the
eye as the eye’s activity of “seeing.” What is given is only stimulation: “In itself all that is
given is a stimulus; it is a causal inference to feel this stimulus as an activity of the eye
and to call it ‘seeing.’” Nietzsche claims that “we ourselves continually experience
alterations of this sort,” whereby “[t]he inner connection of stimulus and activity is
transferred to all things.” So, there is an inner connection for us, given by the particular
as structure of our sensing, “when something passive is sensed as something active.”
Nietzsche says that the referring of passive stimulation to a source of action is a “primal
phenomenon,” and that “the first sensation already generates the causal sensation.”
We tend to sense, then, also in that form of the doer-deed structure. The suggestion is
that this causal perspective comes along with the way that sensation is processed: “[w]e
explain the world to ourselves in terms of our sensory functions” (P, 47, emphasis
added).
30
31

P, 46, emphasis added.
See BGE §16, §17, §19; GM 1 §13.
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Perceptions “produce” these imitations: “[s]timulus perceived; now repeated in
many metaphors. . . . A stimulus is felt; transmitted to related nerves; and there, in
translation (Übertragung), repeated, etc.” Nietzsche claims that “[o]ur sense
perceptions are based, not upon unconscious inferences, but upon tropes. The primal
procedure is to seek out some likeness between one thing and another, to identify like
with like.” Nietzsche indicates that metaphors are imitations whereby we are able to
“appropriat[e] an unfamiliar impression.” Causality is thus something like a primal
metaphor, a primal translation, with two roots, both the transfer of our conscious
experience of the seeming connection between willing and acting, and the transfer of
the seeming/felt activity of sensation on what seems to be sensed, a transfer which
occurs behind the back of consciousness. (P, 49-50)
Thus metaphor, thought to be one of the fundamental tropes of language, is
depicted as a primary physiological process. The transfer here is not first a transfer of a
linguistic structure. Sensation itself engages in this turning, imitating in the form of
another structure, rather than a capturing: “. . . there is no ‘real’ expression and no real
knowing apart from metaphor. But deception on this point remains, i.e. the belief in a
truth of sense impressions. The most accustomed metaphors, the usual ones, now pass
for truths and as standards for measuring the rarer ones.”32
We should note that, though in the rhetoric course notes Nietzsche clarified that
sensory processing does not involve assimilation or appropriation of “the thing itself,”
he here calls this metaphorical processing a means of appropriating the unfamiliar. The

32

P, 50.
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first point made in the course notes indicates that there is no literal ingestion or taking
in of an external materiality, echoing Aristotle, and he followed this claim with the point
that there is rather an external projection in the form of an image, the mental image as
which we apperceive sensation. Notice that, here, we get the same denial of a material
ingestion, and same dislocation from any “thing in itself,” but Nietzsche clarifies that
this kind of transfer is actually a form of appropriation. We “take in” no copy of the
form, but only by first translating the new into the form of the familiar. Thus we have a
projection into a familiar form, a creative production that reworks the new into a form
already prior for us. This element of creation seems to be the main way that an
Aristotelian view of aisthesis is critiqued, by Nietzsche’s version of aesthetic translation.
The aesthetic translation projects so that the experience can be given at all.
This procedure is also described as a means of the knowledge drive, and hence
Nietzsche is here depicting knowledge as a development out of this more primordial
physiological process of metaphorical transference. Knowledge operates by “mirroring”
and “measuring,” and metaphor is a means of this mirroring, measuring, making the
world human that we call knowing: “In the philosopher, activities are carried out by
means of metaphor. The striving for uniform control. Each thing gravitates towards a
condition of immeasurability.” Metaphor halts that gravitation toward immeasurability,
as the very providing of a measure: it serves as a means of appropriation through
translation of the unfamiliar to the familiar. We see the exemplary instance of this in the
connection between willing and action, which Nietzsche depicts as the originary
metaphor of sorts, continued in a chain of interactions within which the imitative basis
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of sensation is explained as the force of the power of “appropriation of an unfamiliar
impression” by the means of metaphor. This impulse to subdue the manifold is at the
heart of sense perceptions, based on the trope of “like” or the similar. This is thus not
merely a “linguistic” trope, it is a kind of grounding physiological tropic work. 33 (P 34,
148, 144).
Knowledge requires not only this metaphorical work, but its very concealment.
As Nietzsche describes in OTL as well, conceptual knowing emerges from a denial of the
transference involved here:
The impression is petrified for this purpose; it is captured and stamped by
means of concepts. Then it is killed, skinned, mummified, and preserved
as a concept. But there is no ‘real’ expression and no real knowing apart
from metaphor. But deception on this point remains, i.e. the belief in a
truth of sense impressions. The most accustomed metaphors, the usual
ones, now pass for truths and as standards for measuring the rarer
ones. . . . Knowing is nothing but working with the favorite metaphors, an
imitating which is no longer felt to be an imitation.34
This genesis of metaphor in physiology allows metaphor to become the focus of
a critique of epistemology. In other words, Nietzsche is grounding what is thought of as
a “linguistic” formation in a physiological formation; the work of language that
33

All of this means that metaphor—from the initial transference of the will-act ‘connection’ to sense
perception that seems to happen behind the back of consciousness—allows the world to become a mirror
of the human, and here it seems significant that Nietzsche has used the metaphor of mirroring to describe
knowledge throughout “The Philosopher,” a metaphor for appropriation, a model of making the
unfamiliar familiar, of expressing the other on the surface of itself.
Yet, in “The Pathos of Truth,” Nietzsche suggests that when a “heartless spirit,” as if seeing the
mirror as mirror, comes to take “truth” as a metaphor, he might claim the opening paragraphs of what
would later be published as OTL that the animals who invented knowledge, in discovering the
metaphorical nature on the back of which such “truth” rode, could only curse the truth—if indeed they
were “nothing but a knowing animal” (65). The philosopher’s reaction to the possibility that man’s
condition is as if hanging in dreams on the back of a tiger is to shout “Wake him up! . . . in the pathos of
truth” (65), as art cries “Let him hang!” The rejection of the deception within consciousness and the
relation to the body plunges the philosopher into deeper deception, a sort of second sleep into which the
pathos of truth leads, as if into the reflections within a mirror itself inside a mirror. As opposed to this
soporific, the artist finds a stimulus to life in lies.
34
P, 50.
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metaphor consists in is thus an extension of a typical human physiological kind of
work.35
Conclusion: Tying the Texts Together
First, there is the issue of how all of these texts are to be taken together. If one
were only to read OTL, Nietzsche seems to just be marking the limit of knowledge,
through use of the “mysterious ‘X’,” which cannot be gotten behind. The claim seems to
be only that we cannot reach the “true” cause of our projections, as if we are left only
with the surface of a mirror, without the access to, or ability to make claims about
necessary relations to, the “original” of our projections.
Yet, if one also reads the notebook sections in which Nietzsche discusses
metaphor further, there does seem to be invocation of a different kind of “copying” that
attempts to unwork that implied positing of a true cause. The original is not what OTL

35

While Nietzsche here locates metaphor beyond consciousness, prior to reason and language,
nevertheless, it is its very nature as “transference” and “imitation” that might seem to render it the same
falling away from the proper that metaphor has been since Aristotle. Kofman reads this early Nietzsche on
metaphor as operating within the “metaphysical” tradition. She suggests that the connection of
“metaphor” to such a tradition, given its understanding as “transference,” spelled the end to Nietzsche’s
thematization of metaphor, and that the later Nietzsche, rather than take up metaphor directly, instead
intensified a strategic use of metaphor, a use of metaphor as a matter of style. The metaphor of the
mirror might be appropriate for figuring the change in viewpoint on metaphor that Kofman attributes to
Nietzsche, in the sense that while the mirror shows the other in the form of itself, it shows their
difference as well, that the reflection is “of” the mirror in two senses, not just one, that it is in the form
made available by the mirror (on its surface) as well as in another sense “showing” nothing but the
mirroring nature of the mirror, in a surface form that cannot be gotten behind. The mirror indicates its
mysterious negativity, or not being there, as long as it is related to in its mirroring act, as the “imaginary
commentary” that is “all our so-called consciousness” on “an unconscious and perhaps unknowable,
though felt, text” (25, reference to The Dawn). In the sense that “the real mystery concerns that surface
upon which forms are sketched,” though Nietzsche uses that phrase to describe the surface for sensation.
But this makes the image seem more apt, as a mirror appears as a surface that is not one: the surface that
the mirror is, in the act of mirroring, is mysteriously unavailable, though, with the transference to seeing
the mirror as “a mirror” behind the mirroring, understanding it as composed of tain and glass, the mystery
is gone, its surface can be known as the workings of the tain and glass. That very transference is like the
activity of the metaphor of causality.
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might lead us to believe, an entity that takes the place of “the mysterious ‘x.’” It is what
Nietzsche calls “stimulus.” And this is important because stimulus doesn’t seem to imply
a cause. But part of his point here is that humans can never have only stimulus, or bare
stimulus, for the experience of stimulus gives rise to that primordial procedure of
imitation, the first of which actually invokes causality, as all stimulus experience is
always already experienced as an activity of “our” sense organs, or, as the effect of a
cause.
“The Philosopher” goes further than OTL here, because while the latter essay
locates the “first metaphor” at the level of apperception, “The Philosopher” locates the
first metaphorical activity within the reception of stimulus itself.36 We receive, feel,
stimulation as caused, and caused by an external object. The metaphorical work by
means of which we have experience generates the supposition that there is an element
of experience that we cannot have: the cause. This is more than saying we cannot get to
the true cause; it is saying that the notion of the true cause is an outgrowth of the
perspective generated by our physiology and its particular kind of work.
If this is correct, then I seem to be disagreeing with Kofman’s (and Derrida’s)
claims that Nietzsche’s very use of “metaphor,” and its sense of transference, to
describe this process necessarily invokes the spectre of the original. Their position
seems to imply the view that Nietzsche’s use of “metaphor” undercuts his very claim
that causality is a metaphor, because their view is that metaphor is a trope that only
works because it suggests and works within a causality actually undergirding it: that
36

Indeed, I believe this is implied, but not stated, in OTL. We have three metaphors, not two, as Nietzsche
states.
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something is there to be transferred, the transference always implying what it transfers
as an original cause. The question is whether Nietzsche succeeds in these early sections
in dislocating metaphor from a claim about the “originals” of our experience. Their
position would imply that Nietzsche’s attempt to make causality a species of metaphor
does not work, and metaphor always ends up presupposing a kind of causality it alone
cannot account for. It seems that Nietzsche is trying not to do that in “The Philosopher.”
What we have found in these accounts of language just considered is Nietzsche’s
critique of the pretensions of Western epistemology, achieved through depictions of
language as emerging within physiological processes of translation. Language extends
the work of translation already begun at the physiological level, and “feeds” its products
to the further translation of words into abstractions or concepts. And this process is
often read as one of loss and narrowing. The possibility of contact with or recapitulation
of things as they are, prior to engagement in the experience of humans, is the
unacknowledged myth of Western philosophy post-Plato, given the lie by this genealogy
of translation. It is really the artful process of translating creation that undergirds the
functioning of the very conceptualization of experience à la Plato. The human is thus
artful through and through. Language is just one instance of this process, which can be
turned toward certain ends, those of philosophy, to cover over and re-create the image
of its origins. This might be the special work of language in a scientific age, to generate a
myth of itself as a tool of consciousness, which disavows its own physiological and artful
origins, the son creating the myth of a brighter, more shining parentage. A scientific
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language is the disavowing child of the body’s art. This upsets the priority of abstraction
and conceptuality, substituting art and physiology in its rightful place.
Is it improper to add, as a final note, that what Nietzsche himself does not
explicitly acknowledge in these critiques is their own provenance within language. In his
own privileging of a use of language, that of metaphor or translation, as the figure that
erases its own figural quality in serving as the mere description of the genetic process he
describes? It is on this metaphor of carrying over that the destruction of epistemological
hubris and the resuscitation of artfulness rides. Does this mean that Nietzsche operates
here, in the nets of language, without acknowledgment?
It would seem, rather, that in this way Nietzsche enacts the rhetoricity of
language, in that sense of rhetoric he resuscitates, the use of language in prodding
readers toward one particular view, contesting the power of his use of language against
Western epistemology. This performance with and of language opens an alternative
view of that epistemology, such that the point is not merely the substitution of a
counter-epistemology, but the very possibility of doing this other thing with words.
Would the appropriation of this counter-epistemology be merely a deconstruction of
one and substitution of another? Or the enactment of a transfiguring power residing in
language, one that this account of language has not even begun to account for? This, it
seems, is the account of language provided in the other early accounts, an account
situated within the opposition of Apollo and Dionysus, in which language, exemplified
by the lyric poet, is a creative production that is in the family of the affirmative power of
myth.
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Summary of the Relevant Nodal Points: Perception and Rhetoric
One thing we have clearly gathered: Nietzsche’s interest in language in all of the
above texts cannot be said to simply be an interest in language as such. The work on
language only comes up in the context of Nietzsche’s treatment of a set of interrelated
themes. Within the repeated genetic schemas, language takes its place within a critique
of truth and knowledge, within which physiology plays a central role. Nietzsche’s
discussion of language is always within the context of his critique of truth and
knowledge, within which physiology is ever represented as the basis of the latter.
Language is depicted in its capacity of repeating a process that has already begun
in physiology, and is thus derivative of these more primary processes that truth and
knowledge further extend. Language translates, and language metaphorizes, following
upon the translation and metaphorization that is already at work in constituting
physiological experience. Translation and metaphor are not, primarily, processes
emerging within language proper.
But, translation and metaphor, as terms and concepts, are recognized by us in
their belonging to language proper, first and foremost. And this raises an interesting
consideration, that what is demonstrated throughout all of this is the ubiquity of
language, but language in a sense that is other to the very demarcation that Nietzsche
seems to apply to it in these texts. Notice that Nietzsche so often renders language as
speech, as sound, as words in their naming function, or as the conventional unity of
words at a given time. But what he has enacted is also an extension of elements that are
conventionally isolated to this kind of closed system of language—translation and
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metaphor—the province of speech, words in their naming function, and conventional
languages. To say that language is a further refinement of the basic physiological drive
to form metaphors is not only to depict language proper as an extension of bodily work;
it is at the same time to view bodily work as already language. The implication is that
physiology itself operates as a language, as a work with metaphors and a work of
translation. From this, we achieve sensation, then the more limited purview of language
proper, and finally ideas. The suggestion is that there is something in error about the
very demarcation that Nietzsche follows here, of language as speech, as conventional
unity of common usages of words at a given time, of the nominal function of language,
of language’s mimetic function of re-presenting experience. If the overarching point
throughout all of this is that experience, from the ground up, can never represent its
ground, because it is an always already having been rendered, is it not significant that
Nietzsche’s only means of addressing this rendered nature is in terms of language,
translation and metaphor?
So we might return to the first of those binary oppositions that Nietzsche has
troubled herein: artful versus natural, persuasive/doxological versus
true/epistemological. We have seen Nietzsche reduce the latter of both oppositions to
the former. All language is artful, all language is persuasive/doxological. But Nietzsche
presents this as if it simply follows from the fact, and is determined by the fact, revealed
in his genetic schemas, that all experience begins in the body, and all bodily experience
is artful, and is persuasive/doxological. Language is depicted as if it follows suit, and
repeats a process begun in the body. But why is this so? Is language being reduced to
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physiology, or is physiology being reduced to linguistic forms? After all, this physiological
process involves what can only be expressed in borrowing from language the images of
translation and metaphor, the rendering of one form in terms of another. Doesn’t this
suggest that, as thinkers, as Nietzsche is here, as he will claim ten years later, we are so
caught in the nets of language that we cannot think outside of it?37 Doesn’t this cause
us, not because of what he has said of language here but because of what he has
performed with the forms of language here, to notice the extension of language that
Nietzsche carries out here beyond every limit into which he has circumscribed it?

37

WTP §522.
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Chapter 2
Expressive Accounts: Language in The Birth of Tragedy, “On Music and
Words,” and Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks

Introduction
In his first book, The Birth of Tragedy, published in January 1872, Nietzsche
suggests that the goal of the investigation is to understand the “Dionysian-Apollinian
genius and its art product,” tragedy. The aesthetical metaphysics set out in the first four
sections of the text, and the description of the unitary phenomenon of lyric poetry as
the “germ” of the union of these two drives, together provide the context within which
tragedy as an art product is explained. For our purposes, focusing on language rather
than tragedy, the figure of the lyric poet obtains a certain pride of place, for the view of
language communicated in this text, and others around the same time, centers on the
description of the lyric poet and the relations between music and words, and the role of
vicarious metaphor, articulated in Nietzsche’s attention to this figure.
The texts covered in this chapter are selected because of similarities in their
treatment of language. BT provides the extensive version of the account of language in
which we are interested, yet points only contained in unpublished or posthumously
published material from roughly the same time period serves to amplify, extend, or
contextualize certain of its aspects, so we avail ourselves of both published and
unpublished material here, supplementing the published text with notes or posthumous
publications. It is within the context of the discussion of the lyric poet in sections 5 and 6

of BT that Nietzsche, for the first time in this text, gives a characterization of language,
but this discussion of the lyric poem and poet extends and modifies the discussion of
the relation of music and words which we find in notes written around the same time,
composed in 1871 and posthumously translated and published as “On Music and
Words” (OMW). The posthumously published Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks
(PTzG), completed in 1873, provides passages that extend Nietzsche’s references in BT
to vicarious metaphor, an important element in the description of the lyric poet’s
relation to language.1
I want to demonstrate, by the end of this chapter, that through the discussion of
the lyric poet, we see emerge an articulation of a valence of language that I would call
proto-performative, involving both working and unworking. The lyric poet shows us a
version of language that performs work, which, Nietzsche clarifies, involves a becoming
through uses of language. It is language as a performance that consists in the delivery of
experience to the poet as a result of its being performed. Though the lyric poet is said to
be already disposed in a Dionysian sense, that experience is only delivered to the poet
through the performance of lyric language. There is thus no simple “recasting,” but a
provision for the first time, and thus this depiction of language as a mode of experience
serves to undercut the very surface description in these sections whereby language
seems cast as only a repetition. Thus, what I also want to point out is that this very
discussion, surrounding this figure of the lyric poet, which seems strangely oblique to

1

A brief description of the history of these early works can be found in Breazeale’s Philosophy and Truth:
Selections From Nietzsche’s Notebooks of the Early 1870’s, edited and translated by Daniel Breazeale
(Amherst: Prometheus Books, 1979), xiii-lxi.
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the dominant thread of the text regarding tragedy, consists in an unworking of a certain
reading of the aesthetical metaphysics at the beginning of the text. The complexity of
the experience of the lyric poet gives us reason to question a certain reading of this
“aesthetical metaphysics” as metaphysical in the traditional sense.
This chapter will work up to this figure of the lyric poet and this view of language
as interpretation and, perhaps, a proto-performativity, that is laid out in reading BT and
OMW together as regards the lyric poet, and in reading the BT description of metaphor
as vicarious image together with sections on metaphor in PTzG.
Beginning with the Supplement: From OMW to BT
While both OMW and BT involve a discussion of lyric poetry, there are
differences in the context of this discussion. Yet the very inclusion of lyric poetry in
notes from the period helps to underscore the sense we have in reading BT, that
something very important is happening around this figure, that there is a way in which
the lyric poet is a center of BT. OMW contains general comments about music in
relation to words that I believe are implied, but not rearticulated, in BT. On the other
hand, while OMW merely gestures to a discussion of the Apollinian and Dionysian art
impulses, Nietzsche’s BT discussion of the lyric poet, and of the relation of music and
language exemplified therein, is prefaced by an aesthetical metaphysics in which the
Apollinian and Dionysian impulses become the frame for the entire discussion not only
of lyric poetry but of tragedy. While OMW introduces metaphysical considerations
through the language of Urgrund and Wille, and privileges the opposition of tone and
gesture, BT displaces these themes onto the grounding framework of the Apollinian and
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Dionysian art impulses. These central terms of OMW are all replaced by this register of
the Dionysian and Apollinian. In noticing these connections, we can thus see that
Dionysus and Apollo become not only the articulation of the duality at work in language,
but of the relationship of Wille and Urgrund to phenomenality. We can thus infer that
the unified displacement was preferred by Nietzsche, and that many of the questions
that are raised in response to the use of Wille and Urgrund in the notes are in fact
reconfigured into the aesthetical metaphysics that Nietzsche presents in BT, thus that
the metaphysical questions are moved into the valence of the Dionysian and Apollinian
impulses that serve at the same time as the articulation of the duality at work in
language.
I also want to consider three other key points that might, at the outset, help us
to situate what is at stake in reading these texts with this focus, and the possible
relation of them to those other accounts of language already considered, the genetic
accounts.
1) The description of the creative process of the lyric poet depicts a new use of
language: Nietzsche claims that a use of language begins with Archilocus, and it is one
of two main currents in the history of the language of the Greek people, one in which
language imitates not phenomena but music. We might wonder if this distinction itself
should be taken to explain the relation between the expressive accounts of language
and the genetic accounts already discussed—do the two accounts simply articulate the
two currents of language?
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2) Throughout the description, no less than in the rest of BT, we are confronted
with the question of whether Nietzsche’s aesthetic depiction of existence is
metaphysical—a question which we carry over from OMW. For Nietzsche himself uses
metaphysical terminology, specifically that of Schopenhauer, and even refers to his
aesthetics as “metaphysical.” Not only is this issue important for understanding how we
are to read the early Nietzsche in relation to the later, anti-metaphysical Nietzsche. The
very question of the metaphysicality of this account impacts how we read whatever
account of language Nietzsche is depicting here.
3) It also seems that the Dionysus-Apollo frame of this text brings with it an
emphasis on Schein [appearance, mere appearance, illusion] that was not included in
OMW. For the very unitary phenomenon of Dionysus-Apollo is that of an ecstatic
dissolution which is copied in music and then repeated in appearance [Schein], by which
Nietzsche means the images of myth and poetic language, and this dissolutionrecasting-imaging in appearance of the dissolution achieves two ends: the ability of the
observer to contemplate/recognize their own being as dissolution, and, the redemption
of this dissolution in the pleasure accruing to Schein [mere appearance]. It is this giving
to the poet that seems to initiate an unworking of the presumed preexistence and
priority placed on music.
It does not seem to me that the above three considerations stand or fall with
one another. As I will try to show, the metaphysicality of the claims in BT, specifically
regarding Urgrund, can be mitigated if we consider the Dionysian state as a
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psychological state of dissolution.2 But the role of Schein in this text does not seem to
imply a metaphysical view.
Further, more importantly, there is a way in which, even though language is said
to be the copy of a copy (the recasting of music in images), and, hence, there is an
apparent priority of music over language repeated in this text, as in OMW, at the same
time there is a potency to the Schein that language is which is required for a certain
potency regarding music and the Dionysian exposure to come to fruition: the poet’s
identification with what music itself is said to represent. In one way, Nietzsche calls this
the poet’s ability to interpret music for himself—this requires Schein. The Dionysian
exposure is not enough in itself, and its recasting in music already generates “image
sparks,” already calls for its copying in images, and it is only through these images that
the poet, already delivered to a state of dissolution, can come to see, contemplate, and
recognize this very delivery—the dissolution is, in a sense, delivered to the poet through
language. Now, the later self-critical Nietzsche will criticize the romanticism involved in
the insistence on redemption initially attached to the reception of this delivery. But,
does this mean that he remains equally self critical of any delivery made possible
through language? My view is that we can note the criticism of the redemptive power of
Schein, and hence, of language, but that the work of language as the delivery of the

2

As David B. Allison does in Reading the New Nietzsche (Lanham; Rowman and Littlefield, 2000),
discussed below.
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opportunity for interpretation actually enters here with the lyric poet, and it is not
necessary that it be tainted with the romantic notion of redemption.3
Finally, a question that might be taken up at the end. We will note that though
Schein has such an important role in the very Dionysian-Apollinian background of the
appearance of language in this text, this terminology is absent in the genetic accounts
covered in the previous chapter. We will need to wonder whether, in line with 1) above,
this simply indicates two distinct uses of language, or whether this represents a turning
away from the view of language in BT by the time OTL was composed.
“On Music and Words”
A Rhetorical Beginning
As stated above, this set of notes introduces many of the elements significant to
BT’s discussion of music and language; indeed, this text essentially begins within the
context of lyrical poetry, with the question of the relationship between music and
words.
It includes, like BT, a relative hierarchization of music over the texts that might
accompany it: contemporarily, opera; historically prior, lyric poems set to music. Both
BT and OMW assert that such texts are external to and derivative of the music, and can
only analogically, metaphorically, or symbolically represent the music, and, in the case
of the lyric poet, provide a means whereby the poet interprets the music to himself. It is
this implied prioritization of music in relation to words that needs to be interrogated, for
3

This repeats that ambivalence regarding the apparent hierarchy of music to words in OMW, a hierarchy
undercut by the fact that music itself is said to be an extension of one part of the duality of language, as
will be discussed further below.
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the complexity contained within the description can at times seem to subvert the very
hierarchy itself. What I will concentrate on in the diversion to OMW is that element of
complexity within the description of the relation between music and words that
troubles the assertion of the priority of music. It is this basic troubling of the asserted
hierarchy that we will find repeated in the figure of the lyric poet in BT.
It is immediately striking that, in order to present this hierarchical depiction of
the relation between music and words, Nietzsche uses the claim that music is a further
development of the essence of language, and of an aspect of words themselves. This is a
curious beginning, for it asserts that the essence of words precedes, and provides a
model for, music. This trouble cannot be accidental. Nietzsche is very clear here: though
we may call lyricism the expression of music, music itself is the extension of one part of
language. The discussion of music indicates that while music further develops one
aspect of words, that aspect, tone, also represents the essence of music that is prior to
language proper. In short, in saying that an element of language, in fact, the essence of
language, is the basis of what we call music, the distinction between language and music
on which the text depends is troubled, for music becomes an extension of language; and
language, as the lyrical element that accompanies music, becomes a supplement that
always already grounds that music of which it is said to be the supplement. Whatever is
meant by language here, it is both the genre within which music is included, as its
extension; and the supplement of music, extending music as an example extends a
concept.
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This is an appropriate start to this set of notes, for, throughout them, this
contrast remains—that between music with its power to express without images, and
gesture symbolisms, of which language is said to be one, which express what is internal
to music through image and externality—and this slippage between foundation and
founded remains, this ambivalence as to whether the clarification of language is meant
to serve an understanding of music or whether the description of music is meant to
serve an understanding of the role of linguistic products like drama and opera. The
priority and the order of derivation seems always to be turning back on itself. This
wavering sense of beginning, of the difficulty of untying the claims of relationality and
derivation to find where music and language are being said to begin, and where they
begin to differ, is echoed, or perhaps propelled, by the performance of the text. Despite
the imageless expression that music is said to be, the characterization of music and
gesture symbolisms is utterly dependent on analogies, analogies whose use raises the
same questions about priority.
Key Points Regarding the Relation of
Music to Language and Words
We might consider here at the outset the fact that in BT Nietzsche counters the
popular view that a text can be the source of music. The first distinction in OMW is that
between music and body symbolism, which includes mime, drama, and, he finally
suggests, language [Sprache].4 When compared to “the eternal significance”
[Bedeutsamkeit] of music, such gesture symbolisms are said to be “merely a [likeness,
4

OMW, 106. In the following, citations of the German refer to eKGW, NF 1871, Gruppe 12:
http://www.nietzschesource.org/#eKGWB/NF-1871,12[Gruppe]
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analogy (Gleichnis)] that expresses the innermost mystery [Geheimniß] of the music only
very externally.” Whatever music itself expresses, such body symbolism does so in a
more external fashion. But, historically, music and language, in the form of lyricism or
“primeval lyrical poetry,” appear together as a dual form.5 The ubiquitous association of
music and lyricism, which can be seen in “all people[s]” and which undergoes long
stages of development before music is found in separation from lyricism, suggests the
accuracy of Schopenhauer’s claims about their relationship, that the lyrical element
seeks to express the music in images that serve as illustrative examples.6 Music and
lyricism thus initially belong together in a duality that we are given to understand
analogically as like the relation between example, or schema, to general idea, in which
the lyricism expresses the music as if it were so many examples expressing a concept.
Thus the historical fact of music and lyricism’s initial contemporaneity is explained by
considering both as forms of expression, such that what is expressed in music “in a
general and imageless language” is to be re-expressed, analogically, in the lyric. (OMW,
106-107)
Nietzsche asserts that this Urlyrik, the primeval duality of music and lyricism, can
be understood “as an imitation of artfully-modelling nature [als eine Nachahmung der
künstlerisch vorbildenden Natur],” and thus that the “original model [Ursprünglich
Vorbild]” of this “association of music and lyrical poetry [is found] in the duality that
5

Nietzsche calls this initial form, the duality of music and lyricism, Urlyrik.
Schopenhauer had claimed that the addition of words to music provides “a visual image, a schema, as it
were, something comparable to an example that supports a general concept,” (Schopenhauer, Parerga,
vol. II, “On the Metaphysics of the Beautiful and Aesthetics,” §224; cited in OMW, 106-107). Thus
Nietzsche claims that “Schopenhauer was absolutely right when he characterized the drama and its
relation to music as a schema, as an example versus a general concept . . . [that] will heighten the
impression made by the music” (OMW, 107).
6
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nature has built into the essence of language [Wesen der Sprache].” It is in fact the
artistry of nature that is mimicked by the duality of music and lyric, and we might hear
here implication of the Dionysian and Apollinian, BT’s expression of the dual art
impulses of nature. Nature, an artistic prefigurer or modelmaker, has built the model for
the duality of music-lyric “into the essence of language” itself, and that means that the
initial duality invoked in the text has turned slightly on itself: In the opening statement,
Nietzsche claimed that language [Sprache] is an external likeness [Gleichnis] of music’s
inner secret; here, he claims that the dual relation of music-lyric copies another duality
figured in the “essence of language.” (OMW, 107)
But we cannot penetrate to that duality in the essence of language until we
“penetrate more deeply” into the relation of music and image [Bild], and here Nietzsche
makes a claim that he will repeat two years later in OTL, that “the multiplicity of
languages immediately reveals the fact that word and thing do not completely and
necessarily coincide and that words are symbols.”7 In fact, the main features of the
genetic account of language are already presaged here: the claim is a rejection of the
view that words adequate to external entities, and an assertion that they signify, or
“symbolize,” mental presentations [Vorstellungen], “whether these should be conscious
or for the most part unconscious.” (OMW, 107)

7

OMW, 107. And again, the multiplicity of languages is invoked to support the point. The claim in OTL is
as follows: “The various languages placed side by side show that with words it is never a question of truth,
never a question of adequate expression; otherwise, there would not be so many languages” (82).
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Non-correspondence: Vorstellung versus Übertragen and Metapher
Nietzsche goes on:
But what do words symbolize? Surely, only representations
[Vorstellungen], whether these should be conscious or for the most part
unconscious. For how could a word-symbol correspond to that inmost
essence whose images we ourselves are along with the world? It is only
through representations that we know this kernel; we are familiar only
with its expression in images; [otherwise, moreover (ausserdem)] there is
no bridge anywhere that might lead us to the kernel itself.8
As we have seen, in the previous chapter, the genetic accounts emphasize the necessary
difference between our representations and the essence of things. In OTL, the emphasis
is placed on our experience as comprised of a series of alterations, each stage in that
alteration process referred to as Übertragung, or Metapher, indicating a primary
separation—an unnecessary leap into “an entirely new sphere”—in our access to what
is called “the mysterious ‘x’,” that of which our translations are metaphors. This
depiction regards that which we do not have access to given the constitution of human
experience, with the addendum that all that we do have access to are human creations.
Nietzsche’s emphasis in OMW is slightly different: here, the issue is access, not
to, as in OTL, “the mysterious ‘x,’” or to what things really are, or simply essence, but to
what Nietzsche here and elsewhere in the text uses metaphysically-loaded language to
signify: Urgrund, kernel, heart of the world. At the same time, in this text, Nietzsche
prioritizes the terminology of Vorstellungen, rather than Übertragen, and Metapher.
What is the force of this difference? Vorstellung rather than Übertragen seems to place
the emphasis not so much on the work of alteration and hence disjunction performed in

8
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the myriad translations ranging from our physiology to our conceptuality, but on the
suggestion of a remaining connection: it seems as if Nietzsche here emphasizes not the
difference between an Übertragung and what it is of—that which it is carried over—but
the expressive power of a Vorstellung, for Nietzsche does not say that we do not know
this kernel at all, but that we know it only as Vorstellung.9 There is not merely a limit
marked here; the emphasis is placed on what we can know, that we can know the
inmost kernel of things but only through images or representations, and that what
appears to us, whether it be ourselves or what we generally call the world of
appearance, is itself image and representation of what is otherwise impenetrable to us,
otherwise than as representation.
But, there is an ambiguity here. The translation of ausserdem is crucial here, as it
could mean both “otherwise” and “moreover,” so in the passage under consideration,
Nietzsche could be saying either that our only access to Urgrund is through
representations, otherwise, we have no bridge at all, implying that representations are a
bridge to the Urgrund; or, he could be saying that our access to Urgrund through
representations is still not a bridge to Urgrund, reading ausserdem as “moreover.” John
Sallis reads this as “moreover,” and thus, as a passage that claims against Schopenhauer
that we have no access to Urgrund.10 Reading ausserdem as “moreover,” is the use of
Vorstellung only making the same point regarding lack of access as in the genetic
accounts?
9

“Although we must bow to rigid necessity and can never get beyond representations, we can
nevertheless distinguish between two major species in the realm of representations” (108).
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John Sallis, Crossings: Nietzsche and the Space of Tragedy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991),
67.
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It is by making a point about the nature of Vorstellungen themselves that
Nietzsche introduces the discussion of music and language, in which the issue of the
connection to “will” and Urgrund takes center stage: it is just this terminology of the
kernel of the world, and of “will,” which will follow on its heels, that sets the context for
Nietzsche’s discussion of music and language.
Two Species of Representation
Nietzsche follows his claim that we “can never get beyond representations
[Vorstellungen]” with the claim there are in fact two species of representation. The first
kind of representation “reveals itself as sensations of pleasure and displeasure that
accompany all other representations as a never-failing figured bass.” These will be given
the name “will” by Nietzsche. The second kind are those “other” representations,
ranging from sensory excitation, to our mental perception of our bodily states, to our
mental perception of “the world” or “ourselves,” to representations of these things in
language or concepts. We should note that what falls under this second species of
representation seems to be precisely all of the “translations,” “metaphors,” and
“images” mentioned in the genetic accounts of language covered in Chapter 1. So along
with all these “other,” or commonly understood, representations, there is an
accompanying sensation of pleasure or displeasure that is itself a Vorstellung.11 (OMW,
108)

11

It is clear that this bifurcation follows Schopenhauer’s, with the first kind of representation
corresponding to Schopenhauer’s “will,” and the second to “representation.”
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Yet it is important to note that Nietzsche is not merely repeating Schopenhauer
here. Nietzsche calls these sensations of pleasure and displeasure that accompany all
other representations “this most general manifestation [most universal form of
appearance].”12 This kind of representation is that “from which and in which alone we
understand all Becoming and all Willing.”13 Nietzsche says he will call “this,” the general
form of manifestation which is sensations of pleasure and displeasure in the face of
other representations, “will.” But he notes how this is different from Schopenhauer’s
notion of will: what Schopenhauer called “will” was actually itself “representation,” for
“Schopenhauer’s ‘will’ is nothing but the most general manifestation [allgemeinste
Erscheinungsform] of something that is otherwise totally indecipherable for us.” Thus
Nietzsche claims that even ourselves, our drives and feelings, are known to us “only as
representation and not according to [their] essence.” Nietzsche is, then, placing “will”
squarely on the side of representation. (OMW, 108)
But this raises the question of what the will is representation of, and this is what
Nietzsche here calls Urgrund: “All pleasure and displeasure are expressions of
(Ausserungen) . . . one primeval ground . . . [that] is the same in all human beings.”
Hence what we are calling “will” is itself a manifestation or form of appearance of the
Urgrund, which itself we cannot see through to. So, our sensations of pleasure and

12

Allgemeinste Erscheinungsform, the most universal or general form of appearance/manifestation.
Diese allgemeinste Erscheinungsform, aus der und unter der wir alles Werden und alles Wollen einzig
verstehen und für die wir den Namen „Wille“ festhalten wollen, . . .—This most universal/general form of
manifesting, out of which and in which we alone understand all Becoming and all Willing and for which we
will adhere to the name “Will”…
13
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displeasure are the basic form of appearance that expresses an Urgrund in that form,
which we access only in this form of appearing as “will.”14 (OMW, 108)
The Two Kinds of Representation and
the Dual Aspect of Words
In this text, the duality of Vorstellungen develops into a duality of the nature of
words. Since there are two kinds of representation, there are also two ways of
symbolizing those representations within language. In other words, the two kinds of
representation find their symbolic expression in the dual constituency of words.
Nietzsche claims that “all degrees of pleasure and displeasure—expressions of
one primeval ground [Urgrund] that we cannot see through—find symbolic expression
in the tone of the speaker, while all other representations are designated by the gesture
symbolism of the speaker.” So “will,” itself an expression of this primeval ground, is
symbolically depicted as tone. This is the musical element of language, the aspect of
language that receives its fuller development in music.15 This means that when
Nietzsche speaks of music alone, he speaks of an extension of the tonal element of
language. (OMW, 108)

14

Nietzsche also speaks in these notes of “a power that in the form of “will” generates a visionary world”
(111).
15
At the same time, tone is also said to echo these sensations of pleasure and displeasure. Hence, tone
seems to have the structural status that words, in the OTL account, have in general—it repeats, like a copy
of a copy—it repeats the sensations of pleasure and displeasure that express Urgrund. But words have
been split in two, the sensations of pleasure and displeasure are echoed or repeated in tone without
going through the aspect of image or gesture. Hence it is important that Nietzsche calls this an echo
rather than translation.
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Words thus contain two symbolic powers, which symbolize the two kinds of
representation, and the relationship of music to lyricism is the extension of the
development of those two powers. Thus Nietzsche claims that:
This primordial manifestation, the ‘will’ with its scale of sensations of
pleasure and displeasure, gains an ever more adequate symbolical
expression in the development of music, and this historical process is
accompanied by the perpetual striving of lyrical poetry to circumscribe
music in images. This dual phenomenon can be found performed in
language from its first beginnings, as has just been shown.16
Notice what this means: music itself is figured as a detour. Before anything like a
supposed “rhetorical” detour, Nietzsche is describing a musical detour, a detour of
language through music, for the duality of language becomes separated into music and
language proper as a development out of its ubiquitous unity—music is the further
development of the tonal aspect of language.
Summary: Implications of Depicting the Essence of Language
According to the Tone-Gesture Duality
Here it is important to note that, in the OTL account of language, words perform
the same work as all other elements of human representation of experience—
translation or metaphorization. Language, as words in their initially nominal function, is
shown to begin as a translation of a mental image of a nerve impulse, rendering it into a
“sound image,” which is then agreed upon for common use. Word is metaphor or
translation of a prior Vorstellung, which is itself a translation of a prior sensory
excitation. But this second kind of Vorstellung mentioned here, which accompanies
those words, like music, “as a never-failing figured bass,” the other element of the
16

OMW, 109.
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duality music-language, does not have a clear corollary in the genetic account of
language.17 There is no dual nature of language depicted in those accounts—there is no
symbolic sphere of will in the genetic accounts of language, and words are not
addressed in their tonal aspect. But what exactly is this second kind of Vorstellung
achieving in the present account of language?
Words symbolize only Vorstellungen, and this seems to be the same claim made
in OTL. But there are two types of Vorstellungen here. When Nietzsche says in this text
that “[i]t is only through [Vorstellungen] that we know this kernel,” the heart of the
world whose images we are, this is not the same as the claim in OTL that we cannot
access the thing-in-itself except through the series of translations, one of which are
words. For Nietzsche here asks the question of how “word-symbols” could correspond
to the “kernel/inmost essence,” whose images we are, and also [along with] the world.
(OMW, 107)
What he is talking about here is our own mysterious internality, that which
subtends and precedes our self-possession. From the position of self-possession, we are
only a representation of ourselves to ourselves. That which Nietzsche gestures to in
these notes as the “becoming and willing” to which will is our only clue, will be rendered
as the Dionysian in BT. Notice, already, that as this “kernel” is that which is said to
subtend and yet be knowable only as the representation (will) that is its expression, it is
difficult not to read the structure of future anteriority into this reading of ourselves: the
“kernel,” the Urgrund, is only what we will have been after the Vorstellung of the will

17

OMW, 108.
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has made it available to us as represented. The will seems to consist in a representation
of the self to the self—is this how the will is, and how we are in becoming? Does not
will, qua being, unwork itself here?
What, then, are the implications of Nietzsche’s use of the duality of words in this
set of notes? For if all Nietzsche wanted to do was articulate music’s priority over
language, it seems that he might have depicted language as fully gesture, as fully
translation or metaphor, as he does in other texts covered in Chapter 1. Why does he
depict the essence of language itself as half tone—as half of what is only further
developed in music, thus suggesting that music is only a further development of the
essence of language itself, of its tonal half, thus making music develop out of the
essence of language?
Consider Nietzsche’s claim in BT that, with the lyric poet, we get a second strain
in language, a use of language that mirrors not phenomena, but music. And this text
gives us to consider that language mirrors music, which means it mirrors will. But only
regarding one half of its duality: the other half of its duality is the basis extended into
music, tone.
We need to note that the characterization of lyrical language as gesture that
expresses music’s tone is interrupted by the depiction of the duality of words in this
text. Language, as word, is partly tone and thus expresses Urgrund, just as does music.
But it is not only tone, which music develops, because of what the body does to tone.
This splitting of language from a position of founding the tone element of music—as a
word—to a position of gesturing the content of music—as lyrical language, or language
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in its gestural sense—is already inseparable from the bodily valence of words
themselves. Words are always embodied, even as one of their elements, their
‘fundamental’ element, is tone. This is the other element in the duality that words are.
This shows us another implication of the dualization of words: the suggestion of
two ways of relating to language. In the first, following tone, we consider language as
the “outpouring,” the expression of will. But music becomes the privileged site for this
expression, because human language never could have been solely tone. If this
vantagepoint on language interprets the tone of words as cry, as primal sounding of
emotion, as expressing a hidden internality, there is no suggestion that this ever could
come without its accompaniment, the gestural element, which alters tone by forming it
into segments. If words split up into a musical element, that which is the fundament of
music, tone, and into a gestural element that copies tone, then music can be presented
as hierarchical to drama in the sense of original-copy, because drama becomes mired in
gesture symbolism and its use of image, analogy, and externality. So, while, on one
hand, we can say that this text consists in setting up a hierarchy between music and
language, arguing for the foundationality of music to the other arts, on the other, it does
this in such a way that music as a separate art is derivative of one aspect of language,
the tonal element of words. In this sense, music and language express will; the hierarchy
collapses.18

18

There is a problem, it seems—the problem that allows music to take on its hierarchical relation to lyrical
language. Human language is always dual, irreducibly tone and gesture. The two are separable only
analytically, for human language must always contend with the requirements of breath, and with its being
imparted through bodily organs that impose a shape on tone. That tonal element, that expression of
affect, is only “pure” in music. In language, it is always accompanied by the gestural element, the breaking
of tone into particular sound-units, on which their signifying (rather than expressive) capacity depends.
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But, when Nietzsche describes the lyric poet, who expresses music, he is not
describing someone who relegates himself or herself to the tonal aspect of language. He
is describing someone who uses the duality of language, its tonal and gestural elements,
to “interpret for himself” music. If human language is going to be used to recapitulate
the expression of will in music, it cannot do so by reverting to the pure tone of language,
because, as spoken, it could never thus be pure. But, then, how does the lyric poet use
language in this second way, in this way that expresses music rather than phenomena, if
not by reverting to a pure use of tone?19
What we find in these notes, beyond the entrance of questions of will, of how
Nietzsche is thinking of will and whether it is in a metaphysical sense, is also the
suggestion of an expressive power of language, that is an extension of tone/music, that
is not about recapitulating phenomena, but is about expressing music in the form of
images, in the form that language can impart to music and hence will. And thus it
becomes interesting that, in BT and PTZG, he describes this process as interpretation, as
the poet wanting to interpret music for himself.
There is another implied way to view language in this analysis, one that
privileges the other side of the duality—language as gesture, as indicating what is not
itself through itself. This is the side out of which signification develops. In the gestural
element of words, the body is used as substrate to express, cutting tone into segments
19

Here suggestions Nietzsche makes regarding “singing” become instructive, statements about how
singing is a being caught up in language without thinking about it calculatively, conceptually. And note
that he will claim, in BT, that the lyric poet is inspired by a Dionysian, or musical, mood. It is as if the lyric
poet uses language, but in a mood that makes it possible for him/her to be accessing the language in the
mode of singing, in a mode that is without calculation, as if that musical mood allows for a way of relating
to language that uses the gestural aspect (it cannot not) but is unconcerned with it. It is concerned only
with the affective element of words, with the singing of them.
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by altering the position of its lingual organs. When this happens, words are no more
fully tone, the sounded echoes of an internal representation. There is a kind of
fundamental splitting in the language function that comes with this bodily splitting of
tone into segments through positioning the lingual organs and the requirements of
breath—even the “first” word would have suffered this. For these segments into which
tone is cut—has to be cut in order to come out of human mouths—develop a
representing rather than expressing or echoing power—words take on the materiality
that their gestural element imparts to them. They become entities, no longer expressing
the affective apperception of the speaker but pointing to what is now seen as external
to them. The word is now a gesture—a name for what is other to itself—and later, a
gestural symbol, an indication of what is outside of itself.20
The implications seem to pull in two directions here. On one hand, as suggested
above, the tone element of words can only be separated analytically; given the
constraints of embodiment, human tone always emerges with a gestural element, even
if it is as minor as the breaking of tone into segments due to the necessity of breath. In
this sense, music would seem to retain a priority over words. But on the other hand,
Nietzsche seems to suggest that the tone element of words has priority, in being prior.
These questions are of priority and originarity, and indicate the role that the

20

We can read here, though Nietzsche does not venture this far in these notes, the criticism of writing as
a further extension of this privileging of one side of the essence of language, to the detriment of the
other. As he states in the Rhetoric course, the spoken language of the ancient poets is more “real” than
the written poetry of modernity’s book.
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original:copy trope occupies in this entire discussion. Which gets us to a third
implication.
This regards the role of figures of language throughout the discussion—what we
might call rhetorical features. Everything in the text is propped up by likeness, by
analogy, by a function of language beyond individual words. It is only by way of likeness
that Nietzsche is able to connect music to will, through the central image of words
“welling up” within a person, through taking this as an analogy for the relation of music
and will. There is no content given to Urgrund in these notes, the ground of everything
is only implied by the suggestion of this image: that, for any welling up, there must be a
source. Yes, this analogy plays on the trope of original:copy, source and effulgence.
In BT, the published text written around this same time, two features become
striking, given this background. First, all reference to music’s own provenance from a
power expressed in the tone of words is absent. Nietzsche does not refer to nature’s
artistic provision of a duality in the essence of language that models the duality of
music-lyricism; rather, the artistic duality of nature is figured by the Dionysian and
Apollinian art impulses.21 Second, more depth is given to the discussion of Urgrund.
This is particularly interesting for a number of reasons, but we might consider
Lacoue-Labarthe’s claim that, after BT, Nietzsche embarks on an interruptive, accidental
rhetorical detour that changes his view of language by allowing rhetoric to usurp the
position of music, a usurpation that spells the end to the ultimate ability to find an

21

This splitting of language into these two senses, thus, disappears, as well as the dependence of all of
this on a complex net of analogies. Hence, the analogy of words “welling up” from a source is absent as
well.
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origin of language. While this reading is certainly correct in noting that the analysis of
language within the context of music disappears after BT, it does not seem possible to
claim that the central role given to rhetoric comes after this text. It is difficult to read
OMW in isolation from the rhetorical techniques invested in the structure of the
analysis, as detailed above. The question of whether Nietzsche was “aware” of this
seems to be a secondary consideration. It at least seems much more appropriate to say
that we see in these early notes a variety of conceptions of language, pulling against one
another perhaps, or even, that we see an ultimately rhetorical view of language silently
propping up the central role given to music, in which the distinction between music and
language, through tone, threaten to dissolve. Does the eradication of these elements in
BT suggest that Nietzsche already sensed this tension, and already attempted a musical
detour as an escape?22
Finally, music expresses will as its subject, but not its origin, which has been said
to “lie beyond all individuation,” and “in the lap of the power that in the form of the
‘will’ generates a visionary world,” with reference to a discussion of the Dionysian that
does not take place in this text.
One thing we will find, extending from this discussion, as we enter BT, is
Nietzsche’s claim that the lyric poet introduces the second of two currents of language
that were part of the Greek history of language. And this introduced use is a use of

22

Again, the psychological question would be secondary. My point is simply that it seems difficult not to
see in a later interest in rhetoric not a new development, but an extension of elements that are already
here.
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language that mirrors music rather than mirroring appearances. And this is just what
we’ve seen happening, already, in OMW.
We want to now enter the text of BT, taking with us the questions that have
emerged from our foray into OMW. The major characterization that we garnered from
the latter is that Nietzsche called music, and the tonal aspect of words, both the
symbolizing and the echo of “will,” and he called will the “primordial form of
manifestation” that itself expresses Urgrund. One major question that emerges with this
description is what this Urgrund is, and whether it commits Nietzsche to a metaphysical
claim with regard to music and the tonal element of language. We left aside that
question of Urgrund especially for this next text.
The Birth of Tragedy
Background of the Aesthetical Metaphysics
In this section I will provide an initial gloss of the aesthetical metaphysics in the
background as a way of setting up Nietzsche’s discussion of the lyric poet.
The later self-critical Nietzsche, like the earlier Nietzsche composing the text,
refers to the presence of “an artist’s metaphysics in the background” of the reading of
tragedy.23 The artistic drives that Nietzsche takes himself to be describing in the opening
sections of the text can be thought, according to John Sallis, as both drives, or
impulses.24 They are most easily reachable by us through figuration, both through the
figures of the gods Dionysus and Apollo, and through the analogies of physiological
23
24

BT, 18.
See John Sallis, Crossings: Nietzsche and the Space of Tragedy, 17.
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experience—dream and intoxication—by means of which we can make those drives
clearer to ourselves.25
We are initially given to understand the Apollinian drive—or better, the artistic
drive of nature that is figured by the god Apollo and can be made clearer to us by the
analogy to the physiological experience of dreaming—as the drive toward Schein, or
appearance. This is the drive of “measured restraint” and individuation.26 The Dionysian
drive—or better, the artistic drive of nature that is figured by the Greek god of Dionysus,
and which can be made clearer to us through the analogy to the physiological
experience of intoxication—is nature’s force toward the destruction of measure and of
individuation.
On one hand, Nietzsche demonstrates the oppositional character of these drives
historically, by choosing an example within Greek history, the traditional understanding
of which stands in stark contrast to Nietzsche’s proposition that the oppositionality of
these drives gives birth to art. This first historical example of the drives in their
oppositional nature is the Homeric Greeks, traditionally held to be those “cheerful”
Greeks who naively mirrored a beauty that nature immediately shone all around them.
But their very Olympian gods, and characteristic epic poetry, Nietzsche claims, can be
understood not as based on innocent contact with and mirroring of a pleasant nature,

25

So this entire discussion, from the start, is imbued with a cover of figuration, and this implies that
Nietzsche’s reading of tragedy can only be reached through the figuration provided by these layers of
analogy—though Nietzsche does not thematize this as an issue in the text. We will return to this point
later. But note how this is similar to the construction of OMW, wherein it is only through the analogy with
words that we could approach the relation of will to corporeality. If we did not have this image of words
as welling up within the body and emerging through the mouth, the ability to express will in its
fundamental relation to corporeality would never have gotten off the ground.
26
BT, 35.

119

but only as a response to a vision of the horrors of individual existence. The early Greeks
were already exposed to what Nietzsche calls the “wisdom of Silenus,” a very real Greek
folk wisdom, reflecting an awareness of the misery, suffering, and continual threat of
nullification of individual existence, that “what is best of all is utterly beyond your reach:
not to be born, no to be, to be nothing.” It was this awareness that is reflected in the
Titan gods who preceded the Olympians. It is the contrast between this folk wisdom and
the Olympian gods of the Homeric Greeks that is key here, as it reveals that those
Greeks had to “first overthrow an empire of Titans and slay monsters, . . . must have
triumphed over an abysmal and terrifying view of the world and the keenest
susceptibility to suffering through recourse to the most forceful and pleasurable
illusions.” That awareness of the misery in individual existence “was again and again
overcome by the Greeks with the aid of the Olympian middle world of art; or at an rate
it was veiled and withdrawn from sight.” (BT, 42-43)
Thus the images of the Olympian gods themselves rest upon a Dionysian
awareness to which they emerge in response, as a means of covering its fearfulness
with the “halo” of these new gods. The emergence of the Olympian gods thus depicts
the sense in which the Apollinian impulse is toward the saving power of illusion, toward
appearance as covering through a redeeming illusion, masking the terror and “seducing
one to a continuation of life” by re-depicting that life as glorious, in the figures of the
gods. Hence the beauty of the Apollinian vision, represented by the generation of the
Olympian gods, is the beauty of transfigured existence, of existence mirrored in a vision
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that imparts to it both a seductive and glorifying power.27 That we consider Homeric art
to present the, assumed, directly accessible beauty of nature shows that we miss the
underside of beauty, that suffering is the obverse of beauty, which itself emerges as a
response to that suffering, as nature’s means of seducing us to stay in existence. (BT, 43)
To the artistic talent for mirroring lived reality in a more glorious vision, there is
the “artistically correlative talent for suffering and for the wisdom of suffering.” The
Homeric Greeks must be understood as an Apollinian response to this Dionysian
wisdom. And these two impulses incite “new births ever following and augmenting one
another,” as the beauty created by the Apollinian impulse’s projection out of suffering
can continually be interrupted by its destruction, a realization of which will incite a new
projection to emerge.28 Nietzsche suggests that this relationship is the case for all
existence, which he calls his “metaphysical assumption”:
[T]he more clearly I perceive in nature those omnipotent art impulses,
and in them an ardent longing for illusion, or redemption through
illusion, the more I feel myself impelled to the metaphysical assumption
that the truly existent primal unity, eternally suffering and contradictory,

27

“How else could this people, so sensitive, so vehement in its desires, so singularly capable of suffering,
have endured existence, if it had not been revealed to them in their gods, surrounded with a higher
glory?” (43)
28
I have emphasized Nietzsche’s claim that an art form that seems impelled by only one art drive, the
Apollinian, is yet a response to a vision that is of the character of the other drive. This speaks to John
Sallis’ claim that we can view the art impulses as both drives and states. We might speak of the drives as
impulsions toward a certain way of encountering, or “viewing,” existence (Sallis, Crossings, 14). Allison
notes that the real difference between the two is in the role of individuation: the Apollinian drive is
toward illusions that cover the dissolution of individuation that is both part of the nature of life’s
possibilities of assault and threat to individuals, and is part of the genetic story of the development of the
individual through acculturation out of non-individuated states; while the Dionysian drive is toward the
dissolution of individuation, a dissolution upon which all forms of individuation rest (Allison, Reading the
New Nietzsche, 39-40).
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also needs the rapturous vision, the pleasurable illusion, for its
continuous redemption.”29
Hence, the necessity of suffering: “. . . how necessary is the entire world of suffering,
that by means of it the individual may be impelled to realize the redeeming vision, and
then, sunk in contemplation of it, sit quietly in his tossing bark, amid the waves.” (BT,
44-46)
Incipit Lyric Poet
With these aspects of the aesthetical metaphysics having been given an initial
gloss, we turn to the treatment of the lyric poet.
The lyric poem is the first historical example that Nietzsche discusses in this text
of an artwork or art form that emerges from both Apollinian and Dionysian
tendencies.30 Its composition is unlike that of epic poetry, which consists in an
absorption in images, and thus is composed in the Apollinian spirit alone. Thus the lyric
poem is significant historically in Nietzsche’s view because it represents the “germ” of
the dramatic dithyramb and, hence, of tragedy. Nietzsche describes the entire creation
of the lyric poem as consisting of a two-stage process, exemplifying the involvement of
both art impulses.
I want to consider in full the passage in which Nietzsche describes the
composition of the entire lyric poem. This passage is particularly resonant with our
interest in finding Nietzsche’s early accounts of language, for it sets out important

29

BT, 44. Further, “the perpetually attained goal of the primal unity [is] its redemption through mere
appearance” (45).
30
One is reminded here of the dual nature of those earlier forms mentioned in OMW, the duality of words
(tone-gesture), and the duality of music-lyric in Urlyrik.
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details regarding how the development of music gives way to a development of
language, and how Nietzsche construes their relation, and whether that relation is
metaphysical. Here we cite the passage in full:
In the first place, as a Dionysian artist he has identified himself with the
primal unity, its pain and contradiction. Assuming that music has been
correctly termed a repetition and a recast of the world, we may say that
he produces a copy (Abbild) of this primal unity as music. Now, however,
under the Apollinian dream inspiration, this music reveals itself to him
again as a symbolic (Gleichniss-artigen) dream image. The [image- and
conceptless] reflection (bild- und begrifflose Wiederschein) of the
primordial pain in music, with its redemption in mere appearance, now
produces a second mirroring as a specific symbol (Gleichniss) or example.
The artist has already surrendered his subjectivity in the Dionysian
process. The image that now shows him his identity with the heart of the
world is a dream scene that embodies the primordial contradiction and
primordial pain, together with the primordial pleasure, of mere
appearance. The “I” of the lyrist therefore sounds from the depth of his
being: its ‘subjectivity,’ in the sense of modern aestheticians is a fiction.31
We might begin by considering the second sentence, for it discusses the
constitution of music, and thus can be held against similar claims made in OMW. Here
Nietzsche uses the term Ureine, rather than Urgrund, both connoting a primal oneness,
and claims that music is “a repetition and a recast of the world,” or a “copy (Abbild) of
this primal unity.” Thus Nietzsche here uses Welt and Ureine interchangeably.
In OMW, the “will” was at issue as well, for music, and tone, were the symbolic
expression of “will,” but will itself, that primary manifestation in the form of degrees of
pleasure and displeasure, was said to be expression of “one primeval ground that we
cannot see through,” as the “most general manifestation of something that is otherwise

31

BT, 49. Citations of the German refer to eKGW, Published Works, GT-5:
http://www.nietzschesource.org/#eKGWB/GT-5
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totally indecipherable for us.”32 Thus, we find here again this claim that music is an
expression of this primal oneness, and Nietzsche adds the specification here that it is a
copy, while we might wonder the role that “will” will play in this text, as it is not
mentioned in this passage.
With regard to what Nietzsche means by the “primal oneness,” a question that
we carried away from OMW, the first sentence of this passage gives some insight, for
the language of the Dionysian brings some clarity to that question. Here we are told that
it is the Dionysian impulse that has allowed for an identification with the primal
oneness. What are we to make of the description that the artist, as Dionysian, has
identified [ganzlich . . . eins geworden, completely become one] with the primal unity
[Ur-Einen]? Here, as in OMW, we are forced into the metaphysical question: this entire
aesthetic depiction of existence is haunted by this question, for this language of Ur-Eine
seems to suggest a primordial oneness at the ground of all individuation. Yet this
oneness contains contradiction, rather than a unification. Because it is said to be
through the Dionysian, or as Dionysian, that the artist obtains identification with the
primal unity, we should mine Nietzsche’s discussion of the Dionysian.
Along these lines of following the characterization of the Dionysian to answer
the question of what the primal unity is, Allison contends that we can actually read this
primal oneness against the grain of metaphysics. On the basis of the discussion of the
aesthetic drives, in this becoming one with the Ur-Eine, we should think the loss of
individuation as the basic movement of the Dionysian process. Indeed, just a few lines
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later Nietzsche clarifies that the Dionysian process entails the loss of subjectivity. To say
that the artist is one with the primal unity is to say that he is without, or having lost, the
measure of the principle of individuation, in what Nietzsche will also call a “state of
mystical self-abnegation and oneness.” As Allison puts it:
In the Dionysian state, one is dispossessed of all that renders the
individual a singular and distinctive subject in the first place: the specific
concatenation of character, personality, tastes, fears, expectations,
reflection, and values. The Apollinian begins here, with the ordering,
selection, and elevation of certain dispositions, with the idealization of
particular values and judgments, and casts these forth as unified and
exemplary images for the purpose of defining and preserving the
individual as a discrete individual. . . . The Dionysian state, aptly
described as “intoxication,” would thus correspond to a suspension, a
‘decodification’ of these individually and socially sanctioned codes.33
Why the continual use of “primal” terminology, though, in these descriptions, if they are
not meant as metaphysical claims about ultimate or underlying reality? “Dionysian
priority . . . is an analytic priority: it testifies to the always present instinctual sources of
human behavior which, in the absence of particular, individual, and categorical
determination, can but weakly be termed polymorphous, undirected, and nonspecific.”
In short, “. . . Nietzsche claimed that the Dionysian state is more primal because it
underlies or subtends personal individuation.”34
As far as what is made available within the state rendered by the Dionysian
impulse, “[t]he ‘truth’ of the Dionysian . . . is a world unbounded by moderation,
direction, purpose, or the hope of redemption. It is a truth whose object is existence in
general: namely, the world in its fullest extension . . . in its greatest intensity,” that
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“undiminished state of existence upon which forms are enacted, codes imposed, and
specific goals wrought.”35
Thus, in Allison’s reading, the Dionysian constitutes one of the “instinctual
component[s]” of empirical reality, as it does not emerge from beyond empirical
experience—though, as we will discuss below, it emerges, metaphorically, from
“beyond” the subjectivity of the individual—and what it reveals is a view of empirical
reality, not another reality that grounds or underlies it—though we may metaphorically
say it “underlies” the everyday approach to reality.
It is in this state that music is produced. And this means that this state of
identification with the Ur-Eine—the Dionysian state—also expresses the way in which
music is produced as a coming to the artist from beyond the subjective self and the
control exercised over those capacities maintained in an everyday self-possession; the
music Nietzsche is describing cannot be produced when one is situated within an
awareness of one’s subjectivity, thinking conceptually or remembering his/her own
personal experience. It is described as an expression through the artist.
After the musical composition, the lyrical composition is described as a ‘second
mirroring’ that reveals something to the artist. For the artist, in the production of music,
was in an ecstatic state. Returning to the relevant passage:
Now, however, under the Apollinian dream inspiration, this music reveals
itself to him again as a symbolic (Gleichnis-artigen) dream image. The
[image- and conceptless] reflection (bild- und begrifflose Wiederschein) of
the primordial pain in music, with its redemption in mere appearance,
now produces a second mirroring as a specific symbol (Gleichnis) or
example. The image that now shows him his identity with the heart of the
35
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world is a dream scene that embodies the primordial contradiction and
primordial pain, together with the primordial pleasure, of mere
appearance.36
Now, one of the distinctions implied herein is that between music’s provenance, and,
that which music reveals.37 We have already been told here that music emerges from a
Dionysian experience, that of loss of subjectivity through identification with a oneness
that is beyond the bounds of the individual. Music thus has a Dionysian provenance, and
itself emerges as a repetition and second-casting of the Ur-Eine, a copy of this
oneness—this loss of individuation—that the non-subjective being has identified with,
become. Music is thus the manifestation of that to which one is exposed—the loss to
which one is exposed—in the Dionysian experience. The Ur-Eine comes to mere
appearance in music, an appearance that is an image- and concept-less reflection of this
loss.
But because this occurs in a state of self-dispossession, it is not fully experienced.
The artist is the through which but not the to whom of this experience. It is relevant,
here, that music itself “compels” or generates “image sparks.” It calls for a further
depiction of this experience of loss in the fullness of images, which occurs by the artist’s
Apollinian impulse. Under its inspiration, the reflection of Ur-Eine in music creates a
second-mirroring, one that makes use of images, in the form of a specific symbol. The
specific symbol is a dream-image that sensualizes the Schein, mere appearance, of
music—embodies it. This is expressed in this passage as we are told that, after the
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emergence of music, the Apollinian impulse leads to the revealing to the poet, of that
Dionysian experience, that “identi[fication] with the heart of the world.” While music
was the expression through the artist, its symbolic mirroring is a revelation to the artist,
for it “now shows him his identity with the heart of the world” in a scene that embodies
the movement from primordial contradiction to appearance. (BT, 50, 49)
Recapitulating this process, Nietzsche elsewhere claims that “Dionysian art
therefore is wont to exercise two kinds of influence on the Apollinian art faculty: music
incites to the symbolic intuition of Dionysian universality, and music allows the symbolic
image to emerge in its highest significance.”38 The first part of the sentence suggests
music’s revealing power, that it in fact mediates a Dionysian experience and incites the
intuition of this to proceed to a symbolic level, which is achieved in expressing music in
images through poetic creation. When symbolic intuition of this Dionysian experience is
itself experienced, it has a higher significance than does the mere reception of images,
because the images express beyond their image content—they are symbols, expressing
what does not appear in their appearance.
This raises the question of why the artist is “compelled . . . to figurative speech,”
of why there is an imitation of music in images at all, for music remains for the artist
even without its expression in images: “Our whole discussion insists that lyric poetry is
dependent on the spirit of music just as music itself in its absolute sovereignty does not
need the image and the concept, but merely endures them as accompaniments.”
Nietzsche indicates that it is this second-mirroring, the dream-image, which shows the
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artist his oneness with the heart of the world—or, in Allison’s language, that shows the
artist his loss of the markers of individuation. The emphasis here is on this “showing” to
the artist of that which was the very occurrence of the Dionysian process.39 It is thus a
repetition, to the artist, of the Dionysian experience. (BT, 55)
In the showing to the poet of this Dionysian experience, what exactly is it that is
shown? In some places in this text, Nietzsche will call what is revealed by music “will”:
“If, therefore, we may regard lyric poetry as the imitative fulguration of music in images
and concepts, we should now ask: ‘As what does music appear in the mirror of images
and concepts?’ It appears as will, . . . the opposite of the aesthetic, purely
contemplative, and passive frame of mind [Stimmung].”40
The difference remarked here is that between the origin and subject of music, or
between how it emerges and what it reveals; or, between its essence and appearance:
music appears as will, but is not will.41 Because the Dionysian process trespasses the
bounds of will, music’s emergence into its imageless appearance is “prior to” subjective
will. Music is the imageless coming into appearance of what is beyond appearance. But,
Nietzsche implies, we cannot interpret this for ourselves without the metaphor of
subjective will: he claims that “[the poet’s] own willing, longing, moaning, rejoicing, are
to him symbols by which he interprets music” and again “he interprets music through
the image of will.” Will is the metaphor for the interpretation of music. (BT, 55)
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This should call to mind much the same point in OMW, but in which Nietzsche
had not so explicitly thematized will as interpretation. There Nietzsche had claimed that
“The ‘will’ as the most original manifestation is the subject of music,” but that the origin
of music “cannot by any means be the ‘will’ but must lie in the lap of the power that in
the form of the ‘will’ generates a visionary world: the origin of music lies beyond all
individuation, and after our discussion of the Dionysian this principle is self-evident.”42
Nietzsche has repeated here in BT the provenance of music beyond the individual, in a
Dionysian experience, but in this text, aligns “will” with the interpretation of that very
experience to the poet.
Recall that Nietzsche has said that in the lyric poet we have the birth of a second
kind of language, one that mirrors not phenomena but music. The language of the poet
here gives music an appearance as a phenomenon.43 In the lyric poet’s lyrical
composition, s/he interprets to her/himself music as will. But music is not only a
content—not only a content mirrored in lyric—but an expression—of the heart of
things, Urgrund, or Ur-Eine—or, of the loss of individuation. Thus, if we interpret music
as will, we already experience it as preceding that interpretation, as calling for an
interpretation. Which is to say, in that lyrical creation the poet experiences his/her ‘will’
as the attempt to configure that which—already gave rise to it.
In the final sentence in this passage, Nietzsche claims that in projecting this
Dionysian vision in lyric, the “I” “is not the same as that of the waking, empirically real
man, but the only truly existent and eternal self resting at the basis of things, through
42
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whose images the lyric genius sees this very basis.” The “I” of the poetic lyric becomes
the symbol by which the “world-symphony” is reprojected: “For, as a matter of fact,
Archilocus, the passionately inflamed, loving, and hating man, is but a vision of the
genius, who by this time is no longer merely Archilocus, but a world-genius expressing
his primordial pain symbolically in the symbol of the man Archilocus.”44 In this state, the
artist
has already been released from his individual will, and has become, as it
were, the medium through which the one truly existent subject
celebrates his release in appearance. . . . Only insofar as the genius in the
act of artistic creation coalesces with this primordial artist of the world,
does he know anything of the eternal essence of art; for in this state he
is, in a marvelous manner . . . at once subject and object.45
Against Schopenhauer’s insistence on installing the subject-object opposition in
the description of the lyrists’ creation, Nietzsche contends that the lyrist obtains a
Dionysian release from individual subjectivity, and it is in that state of release that the
song, in both its musical and lyric elements, are composed. Hence the characterization
herein involves a complication of the subject-object distinction. (BT, 50)
Music has been said to be the repetition of the loss of individuation. It is
regathered for the individual in the image of the lyric, but not subjectively. The “I” is the
individualized site of coming into appearance of primal suffering as an embodiment of
suffering and the redemption of coming into appearance. Lyric poetry, then, justifies the
suffering it portrays. Through the images the lyrist sees the basis, the unity that music
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expresses; he sees his subjective being as exceeded by its appearance—he is connected
to this excess through what seems to be a musical mood.
In BT and OMW, music is related to will, and will is distinguished from Urgrund,
or what is called the primary unity or primary ground of the world, and of life. Music, in
both texts, is an expression of Urgrund, or the primal unity. And language is a
symbolization, or a recapitulation in the form of images, of music. At the same time, in
OMW, Nietzsche says that music is that through which and as which we understand
anything at all of “willing and becoming.” Relatedly, he says in BT that willing is the
image by which we interpret music, the symbol by which music appears. And in OMW,
he calls music the Erscheinungsform, the general form of appearance.
Though the primal oneness sometimes has the sense of itself being an
undergirding subject, that does not seem necessary here. Pursued negatively, the
suggestion is simply that the composition of music is a door into being outside the
confines of the subjectivity we take to characterize it. And language, when it is written
out of a vantagepoint that is determined by that musical experience, rather than
grounded in the subject’s conceptual forethought, unworks the unity and solidity of the
subject for the one writing. This language of “redemption” that creeps up in these
moments will be replaced in the later work. And when the draw into appearance, and
into the unified subjectivity of the everyday, is no longer expressed as redemptive, what
new idiom will Nietzsche use to express the force behind that draw? Whatever it may
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be, we at least see here that Nietzsche’s depiction of language is wrapped up in an
unworking of the Subject.46
Metaphor: Interpretation, Work, and Becoming versus Rhetoric
I want to now lead us into the distinction that Nietzsche makes between
metaphor as vicarious image versus metaphor as rhetorical figure. It is the former that
the lyric poet, in the creation of the lyric out of the musical mood, employs and through
which s/he becomes. This treatment of metaphor as vicarious image is one of the
reasons for finding in the discussion of language surrounding the lyric poet important
features of deep connection with, and perhaps early iteration of, elements to be
explored in Nietzsche’s later works: 1) the sense of language as performative; 2) a
critique of the Subject; 3) a troubling, an unworking even, of the seeming priority that
the constative claims of this text grant to music over language.47
To recapitulate: as Nietzsche presents it, in lyric poetry, the musical aspect
emerges from the poet, “as a Dionysian artist,” already “identifying himself with” the
pain and contradiction of the primal unity, thus surrendering his subjectivity. Music
emerges as the “recasting” of this primal unity into mere appearance without images. In
46
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the linguistic aspect of the lyric poem, growing out of music, this recasting itself is
recast: there is a “second mirroring.” It is as if, after the lyric poet is in a Dionysian state,
“Apollo approaches and touches him with the laurel. . . . [and then] the Dionysian
musical enchantment of the sleeper seems to emit image sparks, lyrical poems, which in
their highest development are called tragedies and dramatic dithyrambs.” Music
transmits the Dionysian state that the poet then recasts into specific images, such that
the images are more than surfaces, and more than emergent subjectivity. The lyric
poem can appear to be the spontaneous work of an individual subject, but if it emerges
from the spirit of music, then it is already in the mode of recasting the experience
undergone, but not identified, within that spirit. This specific imagery of the lyrical
recasting finally “shows him [the poet] his identity with the heart of the world.”48 In this
mode, the lyrical “I” and the lyrical projections of the “I” do not regard the individual
subject--Archilocus—but the “I” of the speaker itself becomes the symbol, translating
into images, including the image of the speaking poet himself, the “eternal self resting
at the basis of things,” and the lyric poet sees, or, encounters for the first time for
reflection, this in his images. (BT, 49-50)
Lyric poetry is thus always figurative, but not merely at the level of rhetoric, for
the experience of the poet is itself a figure of music: “his own willing, longing, moaning,
rejoicing, are to him symbols by which he interprets music.”49 The lyrical poetic person,
the “I,” is thus symbol of that which first appeared, without images, in music.
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This means that the criticism that Nietzsche soon levels at the language of the
poet is meant to underscore that the symbolic valence in lyric poetry is not the language
itself—the mere words—but is the coming to language, or the longing for expression,
that happens through the poet out of the wordless, imageless experience of music:
“Language can never adequately render the cosmic symbolism of music, because music
stands in symbolic relation to the primordial contradiction and primordial pain in the
heart of the primal unity, and therefore symbolizes a sphere which is beyond and prior
to all phenomena.” What comes first is the symbol-character of music, and language,
later, translates the symbol-character into phenomenal appearance. Hence, the
language is the phenomenal translation of that which has only a symbol-character—
music. “Hence language, as the organ and symbol of phenomena, can never by any
means disclose the innermost heart of music; language, in its attempt to imitate it, can
only be in superficial contact with music; while all the eloquence of lyric poetry cannot
bring the deepest significance of the latter one step nearer to us.” (BT, 55)
This apparent criticism of language could seem to denigrate lyricism for its
indirection, its character of recasting. But I believe that it also suggests that the
translation provided by the lyric poet is not merely encapsulated in the language or
eloquence of the poem, for it is the language and eloquence that do not get us closer to
the primal unity. But language and eloquence are not all that are at issue in the
poetizing of the lyricist. For Archilocus himself is able to access that unity in becoming
himself, as poet, the symbol of the primal unity; bringing to expression in the affect of
the poet, only touched in his words, that which does not appear. The words do not
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contain the primal unity, for the issue is not containment; yet, in a certain performance
of them, the poet becomes, and reflects to him/herself that becoming. The lyric poet is
one who performs, and becomes in that performing of, words. The meaning of the
words, their signification, is not the issue, as Nietzsche makes clear; it is that which is
delivered to the performer of these words through the performing of them. The words
become thick like images, dense as the image of the one performing them; it is as if the
performer turns on the words and grasps them as their performance, as their
emergence, and sees from whence they seem to emerge—to where their signification
intends? No matter.
As we have seen in the above, much of the discussion of lyric poetry finds
Nietzsche trying to complicate the depiction of lyric poetry as merely subjective,
expressing the passions of a particular subjective experience, or as expressing, as
Schopenhauer sees it, the emergence of poetry out of the conflict between subjective
willing and objective knowing.
As Nietzsche recalls, Schopenhauer suggests that the lyric presents the tension
and alternation between subjectivity and objectivity: between the poet being caught up
in his desires, hence his limited subjectivity, and being pulled out of that by “the sight of
surrounding nature” whereby he experiences himself as “subject of a pure and will-less
knowing.” Nietzsche’s criticism here is that “the whole opposition between the
subjective and objective . . . is irrelevant in aesthetics” because it presents the struggle
as occurring within the self of the poet; on the contrary, Nietzsche sees “the subject, the
willing individual that furthers his own egoistic ends” as the “antagonist” rather than
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origin of art, and that from which the artist becomes “released” so that he becomes
“the medium through which the one truly existent subject celebrates his release in
appearance.” (BT, 51-52)
This suggests that the lyric poet accesses, in the experience of coming
to/bringing to images, the original unity that is carried by the symbolism of music. The
lyric poet sees the primal unity of things “through” the “images” in his poems, when the
poet is taken to be himself “symbol” of a deeper reality, rather than a mere “ego.”50 But
he accesses the primordial unity in a sublimated fashion, for he accesses it through the
valence of his own becoming-symbol, and thus he obliquely glances, as in relief, that
which pre-exists the symbol—it is the becoming symbol, and the hint of that which preexists symbolization, that is his means of access to that which pre-exists all appearances:
Insofar as the subject is artist, however, he has already been released
from his individual will, and has become, as it were, the medium through
which the only truly existent subject celebrates his release in appearance.
. . . On the contrary, we may assume that we are merely images and
artistic projections of the true author, and that we have our highest
dignity in our significance as works of art—for it is only as aesthetic
phenomena that existence and the world are eternally justified. . . .51
Music, as the first, non-imagistic recasting of the primal unity, is the power to
transmit the primal unity through symbols. “[T]he word, the image, the concept here
seeks an expression analogous to music and now feels in itself the power of music.”52
Music is thus an “analogue” for the poet because it is symbol—it is an analogy for the
poet, then, in that it shows that the revealing power of all symbolization is not in the
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phenomenal images produced but in the becoming the site of the “release” into
appearances, in the sense that music was also a site of this kind of release. Archilocus
cannot get directly at music, but mirrors it through the symbols of the subjective affects
presented by himself, as of the poet, in the lyric:
Thus all our knowledge of art is basically quite illusory, because as
knowing beings we are not one and identical with that being which [is]
the sole author and spectator of this comedy of art. . . . Only insofar as
the genius in the act of artistic creation coalesces with this primordial
artist of the world does he know anything of the eternal essence of art;
for in this state he . . . can turn [his] eyes at will and behold [himself]; he
is at once subject and object, at once poet, actor, and spectator.”53
Lyric poetry is one of the germs of the tragic chorus, and it might be called a
germ because what happens for the lyric poet comes to happen on a larger scale for the
audience in tragedy. For Nietzsche reads the tragic chorus, that which is the origin of
tragedy, as having a similar structure to that of the lyric poet in relation to music and
the primordial unity described above.
Given that the process of the lyric poet presents the “germ” of the dramatic
dithyramb and of tragedy, it is possible for us to look ahead to some things Nietzsche
says about tragedy, and apply them to the germ, to illuminate this relation between
music and language. But as we do so, it is important to keep this in mind: when
discussing the lyric poet, the relationship at issue is that between music and language.
When Nietzsche later discusses tragedy, the relationship at issue is that between music
and the tragic myth. Both relationships figure that between music and an expression, or
symbolization, of music in an image-laden form.
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Nietzsche describes the satyr chorus as composing a “fictitious natural state”
comprised of “fictitious natural beings.” These beings are not experienced as purely
imaginative: the onlooker can be taken up into the position of the satyr chorus in that
the satyr’s position is taken as symbolic of a relation between appearance and reality
with which the Greeks were familiar. The satyr occupies a position that is felt as the
natural position of man were he, unnaturally, to be without the trappings of culture:
“the gulfs between man and man give way to an overwhelming feeling of unity leading
back to the very heart of nature.” The chorus is felt to “represent existence more
truthfully.” It is not that the chorus shows reality, but that it, like music for the lyric
poet, symbolizes a relation between reality and appearance: “the symbolism of the satyr
chorus proclaims this primordial relationship between the thing-in-itself and
appearance.” (BT, 58, 59, 61, 62)
Nietzsche agrees with Schiller’s view that the tragic chorus sets up a “living wall”
to “close itself off from reality and to preserve its ideal domain,” and goes on to
describe the way in which this closing off and preservation aids in a translation and
transformation of reality that bears a similar structure to the work achieved through the
lyric poet in relation to music, described above. There is a transformation enabled by
this walling up at the heart of his description. When he claims, in relation to those who
overlook the significance of this feature of the “wall,” that “it is not sufficient that one
merely tolerates as poetic license what is actually the essence of all poetry,” he
emphasizes that the transformation of reality that occurs is not a device and is not
extraneous to the work. (BT, 58)
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It is the visible symbolizing that, reinterpreting Schiller, “is a living wall against
the assaults of reality because it—the satyr chorus—represents existence more
truthfully, really, and completely than the man of culture does who ordinarily considers
himself as the only reality.” The satyr is a projection of what man is behind the
appearances of culture, and as such, this what man is, as unified with all other men,
cannot be grasped except through such a projection out of the site of culture in which
man always already finds himself. Because in the satyr’s appearance this is related to as
the appearance of that which, in all cultured appearances of man, never shows itself,
the symbolic power of the satyr also depicts the relationship between appearances and
the truth of those appearances which itself does not appear in them, or as Nietzsche
calls it here, between the world of appearances and “the eternal core of things, the
thing-in-itself”: “just as tragedy, with its metaphysical comfort, points to the eternal life
of this core of existence which abides through the perpetual destruction of
appearances, the symbolism of the satyr chorus proclaims this primordial relationship
between the thing-in-itself and appearance.” (BT, 61-62)
The satyr chorus is thus a middle ground, an appearing of what does not appear.
This middle-character is essential to its achievement of the Dionysian and Apollinian
together. The chorus is an appearance of the destructiveness of all individual existence
implicit to Dionysian reality, in its embodiment of such literal destruction of individuals.
At the same time, because the destruction takes place as an appearance that is the
setting of the destruction, there is an embodiment of “the eternal life of this core of
existence which abides through the perpetual destruction of appearances.” The
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appearing of the destructiveness in the form of the tragic drama is what gives the
metaphysical comfort, and the saving power, to the contact with this destructiveness. It
is mediated through the redeeming character of appearance. Hence, “we may call the
chorus in its primitive form, in proto-tragedy, the mirror image in which the Dionysian
man contemplates himself.” (BT, 61, 63)
Nietzsche takes up the question of the derivation of tragedy from the chorus,
and it is his artist’s metaphysics, as well as the general structure of the lyric poet’s
process, that aids him in explaining how the chorus can be thought as tragedy in nuce.
Nietzsche proposes that the satyr, “as the Dionysian chorist,” “the fictitious natural
being, bears the same relation to the man of culture that Dionysian music bears to
civilization.” The man of culture is to the satyr as civilization is to Dionysian music. This
latter relation between civilization and Dionysian music is expressed with an image
borrowed from Wagner, that the relation of civilization to music is like lamplight
subjected to the light of day. Lamplight is aufgehoben by the light of day. The lamp’s
light, shining, is taken into the shining of the daylight—it is not destroyed, but rather,
the drawing its contour, its difference from the day’s light, has no means of appearing.
The difference of the lamp’s light from the day’s light is what disappears, for all around
is only one light. “Similarly, I believe, the Greek man of culture felt himself [aufgehoben]
in the presence of the satiric chorus; and this is the most immediate effect of the
Dionysian tragedy, that the state and society and, quite generally, the gulfs between
man and man give way to an overwhelming feeling of unity leading back to the very
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heart of nature.” This is a description of that Dionysian process of the loss of the
measure of separable subjectivity:
The metaphysical comfort—with which, I am suggesting even now, every
true tragedy leaves us—that life is at the bottom of things, despite all the
changes of appearances, indestructibly powerful and pleasurable—this
comfort appears in incarnate clarity in the chorus of satyrs. . . . With this
chorus the profound Hellene, uniquely susceptible to the tenderest and
deepest suffering, comforts himself, having looked boldly right into the
terrible destructiveness of so-called world history as well as the cruelty of
nature, and being in danger of longing for a Buddhistic negation of the
will. Art saves him, and through art—life.54
Thus, the tragic myth, presented in the drama, is said to be the presentation of
Dionysian states, the very presentation of which redeems an existence characterized by
the Dionysian: “. . . the essence of tragedy . . . can be interpreted only as a manifestation
and projection into images of Dionysian states, as the visible symbolizing of music, as
the dream-world of a Dionysian intoxication.” The chorus gives the Dionysian vision and,
as an art product, performs the redeeming of Apollo. (BT, 59, 92)
On one hand, the chorus presents the audience with a Dionysian vision: to the
extent that onlookers “permit themselves to be represented by such satyrs,” they can
“imagine that [they themselves are] chorist[s].”55
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of the dithyramb is the saving deed of Greek art; faced with the intermediary world of these Dionysian
companions, the feelings described here exhausted themselves” (60).
55
The Dionysian element of loss of individuation is not fully detached from an Apollinian element of the
construction of difference through appearance, which is to say, there is an ineradicable sense of figure or
symbolization to the chorus, just as the movement to images in the lyric grew out of the poet’s
experience of music. This is a development of that sense of dream as full immediacy which is yet still
undergirded by that which it does not fully represent—that which is the source of pleasure in the
dream—and this is what Nietzsche seems to call the “saving power of Greek art,” which is linked to the

142

The Entrance of Metaphor as Transformation
It is here that Nietzsche suggests that the satyr chorus is a metaphor: “For a
genuine poet, metaphor is not a rhetorical figure but a vicarious image that he actually
beholds in place of a concept.” He follows this sentence by describing the difference
between two ways of constructing a character, one way being that of “vicarious image”:
“A character is for [a genuine poet] not a whole he has composed out of particular
traits, picked up here and there, but an obtrusively alive person before his very eyes.”
(BT, 63)
The satyr chorus, then, is a vicarious image, not only for the poet, but for the
audience: “The Dionysian excitement is capable of communicating this artistic gift to a
multitude.” The distinction between the composition of the metaphor and the
experience of the metaphor is eradicated because the vicarious image of the satyr
chorus describes not only the way it is composed, but the way in which it functions as an
experience for the audience: the satyr chorus is experienced as a metaphor, a vicarious
image in the place of a concept: “[t]he satyr chorus is, first of all, a vision of the
Dionysian mass of spectators, just as the world of the stage, in turn, is a vision of this
satyr chorus.” (BT, 63)
Nietzsche describes this process of taking on the metaphor as a transformation.
This “magic transformation” is distinct from the painter’s relation to his images, which is
one that retains the subject-object split, in which there is no fusion with the images, but

fact that the chorus is intermediary, emphasizing that the spectator is not completely taken into the
chorus. Rather, “we may call the chorus in its primitive form, in proto-tragedy, the mirror image in which
the Dionysian man contemplates himself” (BT, 63).
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in which the images are held as “objects of contemplation.” In this phenomenon of the
dramatic dithyramb, the image—of the satyr chorus—becomes that as which one sees
oneself. It is vicarious, an image that one lives through. And because of this, another
vision is afforded, the vision of that living as a satyr as itself revelatory of the Dionysian
aspect of existence: “In this magic transformation the Dionysian reveler sees himself as
a satyr, and as a satyr, in turn, he sees the god, which means that in his metamorphosis
he beholds another vision outside himself, as the Apollinian complement of his own
state. With this new vision the drama is complete.” (BT, 64)
What is interesting about this section for my purposes is that Nietzsche uses
Metapher as the term to describe the distinction of this experience from mere
figuration. This extension of metaphor beyond its being a linguistic figure is shared by
both accounts of language. Here, there is a lived transformation that the Dionysian
reveler undergoes, as he comes to see himself as a satyr. This seeing himself as a satyr is
more than figuration because it implies a transformation rather than just a translation.
Because of that transformation, he is able to see differently, to have another vision, that
of seeing the god, which is, seeing the Dionysian truth that is depicted in the satyr’s
experience. Metaphor is thus chosen as the means of naming this experiencing
differently, in the place of a concept, that allows for an additional element of seeing to
emerge. The difference between the rhetoricity of figure and the vicariousness of the
image here is that provision of an additional view. The metaphors of this poet are seen
in and through, they are not the figural translation of something extraneous to this
seeing. This means that they create a vision that mediates that which they are of—for
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they create the vision of the god, the Dionysian vision—they recreate the experience,
through the satyr, of the Dionysian exposure that has been had, but has not been
contemplated or recognized. What happens here is both performance and
interpretation in the mode of the future anterior—this is what, finally, is recognized as
what will have already occurred.
Recapitulation of the Lyric Poet
Nietzsche writes in OMW that the lyric poet is
the artistic human being who must interpret the music for himself by
means of the symbolism of images and emotions but who has nothing to
communicate to the listener. Indeed, in his transport he simply forgets
who is standing close to him, listening greedily. And as the lyric poet sings
his hymn, the people sing their folksong for themselves, prompted by an
inner need, not caring whether the words are understood by those who
do not sing.56
These notes also claim that music is will coming to expression—its subject is will. It is the
unimagistic expression of the most basic form of appearance. If, as we are told here, the
lyric poet interprets music for himself, he interprets the unimagistic coming to appear,
the expression of will—not directly, as does music, but indirectly, by means of the
symbolism of images and emotions. He uses images and emotions to indicate what does
not appear in images as coming into appearance in images. These images and emotions
are reflections of what the music indicates or expresses—what it echoes directly in
sound.
Again, what music expresses directly, lyric poetry expresses through the detour
of an image—a vicarious image, an interpretive schema, that which gives to be
56

OMW, 115, emphasis added. This reminds one of the attempt at a self-criticism.
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interpreted: “The worst music, as opposed to the best poetry, can still signify the basic
Dionysian world ground; and the worst poetry, as opposed to the best music, can still be
a mirror, an image, a reflection of this basic ground.” The words, as experienced in lyric
poetic performance, deliver reflections of music, symbolizing what it expresses. The
images and emotions in which they consist, then, are the means to showing what music
expresses—what it is to have already expressed. Music, because it is a bringing to
expression, cannot be such a means: “Music never can become a means, however one
may push, thumbscrew, or torture it: as sound, as a drum roll, in its crudest and simplest
stages it still overcomes poetry and reduces it to its reflection.” (OMW, 116)
Lyric poetry is singing, an attempting to reach music, a tending toward music, a
being its reflection; it thus uses a power of language that is other than gesturing or
signifying. It sings rather than signifies through the words. It expresses the totality of
words as symbols, not as signs.
To sing is to be the vessel or site of this outpouring. And to move from tone to
tone in singing is a being directed not by conceptuality or images, not
calculating/planning the next step or forming equivalences. The tone of words is the
tone of music, the tone of words is the half of the essence of language that is music, this
outpouring. Singing is a use of words that tries to forget its other half.
Nietzsche’s very use of the term Metapher marks this “transformative power” as
a power of language, of the dramatist’s use of language. This is a power of language
about which I have two claims. First, it seems to be immune to the criticism of language
occurring earlier in the text, the criticism of the images of the lyric poet, which
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attempted to present music but which could only symbolize it, and thus did not “bring
the deepest significance [of music] one step nearer to us.”57 So we are going to have to
ask about the relationship of this metaphorical use of images in the dramatic dithyramb
to the use of language that the lyric poet introduced, and which we discussed in the
previous section. Second, this description of metaphor is unique in Nietzsche’s early
work, because it eschews the linking of metaphor with translation and figure for the
linking of metaphor with transformation of vision. This is a working, performing
language through which being/what is is not delivered, but rather, through which
becoming is enacted. This is especially interesting given that much twentieth century
metaphor theory follows precisely this development, moving away from the relegation
of metaphor to a category of rhetoric and repetition, and toward metaphor as a figure
of disclosure. Metaphor becomes not an isolated rhetorical figure that can be translated
back into literal language after the detour through the figural, but it becomes a
hermeneutical tool, a means of meaning creation.58
Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks
Philosopher and Poet
The process of the lyric poet has a corollary in another text, Philosophy in the
Tragic Age of the Greeks (PTzG), wherein Nietzsche claims that both the poet and the
philosopher undergo a similar process, that of having an “intuition” [Ahnung] which
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BT, 56.
Kant had already presaged something of the sort with his discussion of aesthetic ideas in the absence of
a concept. See Kant, Critique of Judgment, on aesthetic ideas.
58
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they seek to re-express or expose [herausstellen], the poet in verse, the philosopher in
concepts.
The dialectical philosopher is one who “seeks to hear within himself the echoes
of the total sound of the world [Gesammtklang der Welt] and to re-project them in the
form of concepts,” concepts which are for this philosopher what verse is for a poet.59 In
fact, both poet and philosopher desire to express this world-sounding that echoes
within themselves: “What verse is for the poet, dialectical thinking is for the
philosopher. He grasps for it in order to get hold of his own enchantment, in order to
perpetuate it.”60 Words and verse, for the poet, and the expression through dialectic,
for the philosopher, are the means needed to communicate “what he has seen and lived
[lebte und schaute].”61 The sameness in the poet and the dialectical philosopher is that
they have their means—for the poet, verse, for the philosopher, dialectical thinking—by
which they attempt to express and perpetuate their enchantment (spell), or “what they
have seen.”62
What the philosopher’s intuition is of, then, bears a striking resemblance to the
Dionysian element of dissolution, the loss of individuation, what OMW called Urgrund,
and which BT described as that which is brought to Schein by the imagistic lyrical
element of the lyrical poet. It is BT’s discussion of music in this context that will be seen
to give more body to this description. We should recall that Archilocus’ use of language
emerges from a musical “mood” or Stimmung. And that music does not truck in images,
59

PTzG, 44.
Ibid., 44.
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Ibid.
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Ibid.
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but rather expression or “echoing”—hence it was called a direct expression of the
Dionysian state, and not its symbolizing in the form of an image. Language, though,
trucks in images, language is an imaging. What is revealed, in the musical mood, is then
expressed in images, using language. Lyric poetry is the unity of this entire process, the
revelation through the musical mood, and the expression of that in images.
Nietzsche says nearly the same thing in the third section of PTzG. He claims that
Thales has an “intuition,” and that he expresses that image, or rather attempts to petrify
it for himself, in images, through using dialectic philosophy. Recall that the lyric poet is
one who has already experienced the Dionysian ecstasy, composed music in that state,
and who then casts the music in the form of language. What Nietzsche here suggests
about the dialectical philosopher is that there has also been a Dionysian ecstasy, and the
attempt to image this in the form of dialectical concepts, but, the music here is no
longer music as such. Music is rather the world-symphony, and this gives us reason to
recall OMW. In that the subject of music is will, the world-symphony that the
philosopher has heard is not the sound of music as such, but, since music is to will as
intonation is to tone, what the philosopher has experienced is something like—the
coming into appearance of appearances.
It must be kept in mind that philosophy is depicted in this dual fashion, as a
conviction or doctrine that emerges from an intuition for which an expression is
sought.63 This dual nature is the philosopher’s being the site of a sounding and a re-
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In speaking of Thales as exemplary here, Nietzsche claims that his generalization that “all is water” was
not empirical observation, but that “[w]hat drove him to it was a metaphysical conviction that had its
origin in a mystic intuition” (PTzG, 39, emph. added). Nietzsche claims that all philosophy is characterized
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projection, seeking to let echo in himself the full sounds of the world and then to project
that out of himself in a concept. He will claim that poetic and philosophical expression
are the same in their being, for different kinds of men, the means of communicating and
perpetuating a personal transformation that he calls this “seeing” of the unity of all
things.
This duality is important because it means that intuition and expression are
included, together, in what is labeled philosophy or philosophical thinking, just like the
duality of the lyric poem, just like the duality that has been sketched out, throughout
these early works, of music and words.
Sean D. Kirkland’s interpretation of “personal attunement” in PTzG is actually
helpful for interpreting this common description of the philosopher and poet, those
“striv[ing] to let the whole sounding of the world echo in himself and to project it out of
himself in concepts.” 64 Kirkland suggests that we read Stimmung not as “mood,” but, in
the Heideggerian tradition, as attunement:
Heidegger insists here that Stimmung announces itself, contrary to our
term ‘mood,’ as a Gestimmtsein, a ‘being affected by, determined by, or
attuned to.’ That is, it is essentially not a merely subjective or internal
occurrence, which may or may not have a connection to the world, to
‘what is.’ Rather, it originally entails a relation to its intentional object, a
prior, pre-cognitive being determined or affected by one’s world.65

by such intuition—of the unity of all things—wedded to the “ever-renewed attempts at a more suitable
expression” of it (39). So the content of philosophy is the expression of the metaphysical conviction that
arises from the mystic intuition that all things are one. The intuition that all things are one remains
“religious” or “superstitious” unless it is also paired with a certain attempt at expression. Philosophy is not
the mystic intuition that all things are one, but the intuition along with the attempt to express this.
64
Sean D. Kirkland, “Nietzsche and Drawing Near to the Personalities of the Pre-Platonic Greeks,”
Continental Philosophy Review 44, no. 4 (2011): 417-437.
65
Ibid., 426.
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Reading Stimmung in this way, Kirkland calls it “that moment of always prior contact
with the world,” which is the sense of being determined by “the world’s always initial
phenomena, i.e. appearances or modes of self-presentation. . . .’”66 So, in Kirkland’s
reading, personal attunement is the expression of the always having already appeared
of the world, in the form of a being determined by this already sounding, appearing.
Importantly, there is no getting behind the attunement, no sense of speaking of the
human who preexists that appearing/sounding, or of that which appears/sounds to the
human, for what is separated analytically in language here are co-constitutive of a
unitary phenomenon that might be called the “sounding” of the world.
The philosopher’s intuition can only be expressed through dialectic and scientific
reflection, just as the poet’s intuition can only be expressed through verse. But, verse
and dialectical thought are translations, Nietzsche claims here. Both poet’s and
philosopher’s means are like “alien tongues.” They are all that can be grasped for, but
they cannot fulfill the desired directness. They are thus called “sad means,” because the
only means, and means unequal to the hope of the power behind it.
The Sad/Miserable Means
Just as, for the poet, word and verse are stammering the intuition and
enchantment of the poet into an “alien tongue” that is needed to tell what has been
seen and lived, so is every philosophic intuition expressed through dialectic. “Thales had
seen,” or had intuited, “the unity of all that is” but, there is only a sad means, so “when
he went to communicate it, he found himself talking about water!” He did not choose
66

Ibid., 427.
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water as an allegory for the vision—he wanted to communicate the vision itself. Here,
Thales is in the position of both poet and philosopher, having had an intuition,
expressing it, but having only a miserable means in which to do so. And that means of
expression is called miserable because it is “[fundamentally] a metaphoric and entirely
unfaithful translation into a totally different sphere and [language].” (PTzG, 44, 45)
My reading of BT and OMW has held that although language is presented as in a
hierarchy below music, in that music is a direct expression while language is only a copy
of music, it seems, nevertheless, that there is a power that language affords. This is
language in its ability to provoke the interpretation of what it makes visible. Lyrical
language, and the language of myth, seem to have this character of providing an insight,
making it visible, such that an interpretation becomes possible. Although it is clear that
language is derivative of music, this is not the end of the story, for its very derivation as
a form of expression allows for a mediation whereby the content of that expression can
become interpreted. But here there is a clear criticism of language. It is significant that
Nietzsche has used the terms from the genetic account, those of Metapher and
Übertragung.
There is a fallenness of expression from primordial intuition. The suggestion is
that the expression of intuition—by which philosophy is constituted—will always be
fallen, whether it takes place in poetic verse or in dialectical thought. When Nietzsche
invokes “metaphor” at last here, it is in the sense of “mere metaphor,” and reading
metaphor as a kind of analogy. It is the mark of a failure of directness in expression.
There can be no directness; this is the requirement of expression in language.
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Metaphor, as a kind of analogy, is made primordial expression, however, because it is
said to undergird both the coming to expression of poetry and of concepts. But it is still
the site of the loss of the proper, that primordial intuition.
Early in this section, he claims that imagination, and finding resemblance and
similarity, is essential to the uniqueness and the power of philosophical thinking, to its
fruitfulness. And by extension, as Thales was the first to venture toward conceptual
thinking, he suggests that it is imagination that is responsible for that emergence of
abstraction and the transition into a new way of thinking, beyond empiricism on one
hand, and beyond myth and allegory on the other. Yet, when it comes to discussing the
philosopher who uses dialectical thinking, and the poet who uses verse, Nietzsche is
back to the criticism of the “metaphorical” quality of language, in its failure to be a
direct presentation, in its being a translation. And he classifies Thales here as a
dialectical philosopher, or as a poet, for Thales is said to suffer the same limitation of
means that those two do.
When Nietzsche shifts into the language of the “sad” metaphor at the end, then,
he speaks from the viewpoint of dialectical philosophy itself, the viewpoint that prizes
the content rather than the experience of the drive to expression within the
intuition/transformation. Being carried along by the power of the drive to expression,
that of creative imagination, is joyous and light—judging any given expression for its
success in transmission will always find a failure at its feet. Nietzsche slides between
both positions, and ends up in the latter. Metaphor is sad, then, from the vantagepoint
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of dialectical philosophy, whose goal is transmission of the given, the original. If the goal
is to transmit this, poetry and dialectical philosophy can only be a sad means.
And this is what Nietzsche does when he expresses metaphor, in the end, as sad.
Metaphor is a sad means because there is something in dialectical philosophy of the
pathos of truth.
Everything depends upon what we want language to do and whether we
experience illusion as joyful. There can be a joy in language’s failure to achieve direct
expression, if illusion is still that which inspires one with joy. The sense in BT is that the
Schein of myth and lyric poetry is not approached with the question of whether it is a
direct presentation. In PTZG, we have a different motivation behind the use of words,
one which desires to “transmit” and “perpetuate” intuition. This is the perspective of
the scientific man, described in the last few passages of OTL. In short, metaphor is a sad
means if we expect correspondence, and expect that as an absence of illusion.
This could be a reason why there seems to be no trace of lamentation in OTL’s
mapping of metaphor across the layers of experience. This text presents the
metaphorical aspect of language within the terms a scientific culture would recognize,
and within the perspective of language in its capacity to treat phenomena.67
Conclusion
In this chapter we have explored texts and unpublished notes from the early
1870s composed just prior to, and sometimes overlapping with, the texts grouped in
67

Having already treated the “man of intuition” in BT, and the use of language as expression, OTL could in
fact could represent a modern “man of intuition.” For Nietzsche’s description of the “man of intuition” in
OTL, see OTL, 88-91.
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Chapter 1. This grouping followed the sense that these texts that seem to present an
expressive view of language, one that depicts language in relation to music, depicts
music as itself emergent from and expressive of an origin, and seems to depict language
as the “recasting” of the origin-expression which music itself is said to be. On the
surface, then, these texts are distinguished from the genetic accounts because they
depict language not as a creative, aesthetic leap into a new sphere, but as the copy or
recasting of music, which is itself the provision into appearance of an originary insight
into being, that of either the Dionysian origin of all experience, or an insight into the
primal ground of all experience. Thus it seems on the surface that language in these
texts is depicted as derivative, as the copy of the copy which music is.
What I tried to show in explicating these sections, however, is the troubling of
this notion of language as copy of the copy—as copy of music’s copy of the origin of
phenomenality—by concentrating on two key elements: the “duality of language” and
the figure of the lyric poet. Neither of these elements are tangential to the discussion of
language; both are central. The first, the duality of language, described in the notes
translated as “On Music and Words” (OMW), unworks the surface appearance of
priority given to music in such texts, for music is herein said to itself develop out of the
dual essence of language as tone and gesture—music is a further development of the
tonal aspect of language. The result of this stated derivation is to unwork the very
priority of music over language. While language, as poetic text, may emerge from the
spirit of music, music itself is said to be the extension of one part of the essence of
language, its tonal half. Once again, as in the above genetic accounts, we are presented
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with the ambiguity of origin, for the result of this description is both to cast music as
language, the further development of part of language’s essence, and to cast
language—poetic, dramatic, or even operatic language—as the recasting of music. This
ambiguity is not merely implied; it is directly stated.
The second key element of these accounts is the figure of the lyric poet. The
figure of the lyric poet seems placed between more constatively dominant textual
elements—the artistic metaphysics of the first few sections, the discussion of tragedy—
but this figure is significant for a number of reasons. It interrupts what appears to be an
overtly claimed linear progression from origin to music to lyrical language—the overt
casting of language as the copy of music’s copy of the origin—because the lyric poet
does more than simply copy what is already there in music. The lyric poet provides the
delivery of the encounter with the Dionysian/the originary exposure, which music
expresses, to the one who has been thus exposed for the first time, and in such a way
that this exposure can be interpreted. Though it is accessed in the production of music,
the Dionysian exposure is yet not recognized or interpreted until this exposure is
rendered in the form of language, specifically, of lyrical language. This means that even
though lyrical language is presented as derivative of musical experience, it yet subverts
the priority of music, because lyrical language marks the delivery of that experience. It is
difficult not to read here the structure of future anteriority, for we are given a duality of
the experience of Dionysian exposure: its experience as music, of which we are the
vessel through which this exposure moves into expression; its experience as language,
through which we see ourselves as the vessel that was, before we could recognize it.
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An interesting addendum is presented in PTzG, in which two significant
extensions of BT occur. First, the claim that not only is it the work of the lyric poet to
deliver this Dionysian experience to interpretive possibilities, but that this is equally the
work of the philosopher—the philosopher and the poet do the same work. Second, in
this text, in distinction to BT, that very delivery of the prior exposure to the “sounding of
the whole world,” which lyric poetry and philosophy are said to be, is given a cast of,
what I call, lamentation—both are called “sad,” marked as failures, for they fail to
achieve the direct presentation of the exposure that propels them. It seems to be the
element of language that prevents their success—language imposes a spacing, it cannot
disappear into the view that it presents, it introduces an irreducible spacing and
density.68 It is significant, to my reading, with a significance far more important than
that to which my attention has done justice, that the figure of the lyric poet in BT, itself
the germ of the dramatist and tragedian, obtains nothing of this cast of lamentation.
Here, the “vicarious metaphor” seems to militate against this sense of loss. The
language of the lyric poet, and of the dramatist, is said to be the living mirror, the
vicarious, lived through, similitude, which achieves the delivery to the poet of the prior
exposure. The copying, metaphorical nature of this presentation seems, thus, rather
than the mark of a falling away, the mark of a sine qua non of direct experience at all. So
we see here, in this apparently unified treatment of language as “expressive,” two very
different vantagepoints on its content. Thus my claim is that the difference regards the
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We are reminded here of the relation between logos and noesis in Plato: that which is, and is to be
sighted by the soul, cannot be transferred through logos, though logos may lead us up to the requisite
precipice of this sighting. We are, thus, also reminded of Derrida’s notion of différance.
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vantagepoint being figured within the given text: within PTzG, the vantagepoint of the
philosopher prevails, finding language a failure at recapturing what is valued in
philosophy, the origin; within BT, language is no failure, because it gives the prospect of
a becoming enabled through the language. Thus, is it the case that what we find in these
texts is language splitting into various functions, language as re-presentation of what is,
and language as valence of work, performance, and becoming?
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Part II

Introduction to Part II
In the later work, writing becomes a site of provocation, the site in which the
relation between the narrative voice of the text and the self depicted within that text
becomes one of the more interesting questions. Notice that this is divorced from a
primarily autobiographical interest, for the narrative voice of a text is not necessarily the
direct voice of the author, of Nietzsche the person. My view here is that writing
becomes a privileged site or stage for the later work, and that one of the issues being
staged here is that of the relation of the self to the self. This interrelation of writing and
the self is most striking in those places in the later work in which it seems as if there is a
certain work on the self being carried out in the narrative project of the writing,
especially, in the Prefaces of 1886 (to BT, GM, BGE, HTH, Dawn) and in Ecce Homo
(though this latter work is also foregrounded in the third Untimely Meditation,
Schopenhauer as Educator).
The initial question that such passages and such suggested interrelations
provoke might be posed in this way: what is performed in this work of self-narrativizing?
This is an especially important question to answer because this view that writing
is depicted as the site of a work on/of the self seems on the face of it to be in tension
with other central interests of the later work, namely, the critique of the Subject. To
privilege a question regarding the self, to see this as central to the later work, thus
raises the question, how does this valence of the texts relate to the critique of the
Subject, the apparent denial of the Subject, that we find also in the later works and
notes? Doesn’t the critique of the Subject undercut the attempt to privilege the self?

We can see this tension if we focus on the notion of unification. The critique of
the Subject emphasizes dispersal, or the impossibility of unification of the Subject. The
force of the critique of the Subject seems oriented toward unworking the illusion of
unification implied by our view of the Subject. Yet, it seems as if part of what is at issue
in amor fati and in the retrospective retrievals figured in narrative in all those textual
sites mentioned above (Ecce Homo, Schopenhauer as Educator, the Prefaces) is precisely
a work that appears to be of the order of unification, in the sense of creating and uniting
a previously dispersed self and its history into an at least narrativized whole.
So, reading these two valences of the works together, wondering how the selfnarratives and the critique of the Subject are to be reconciled, we might press certain
questions against that apparent unification in these passages of self-narrative: is there
actually a unification of the self figured here, or is part of the work of this writing to
unwork the apparent unity? And, is the apparent unification to be read as merely the
illusory hope of a particular narrative voice, one who, in this hope, reveals his own
implication in cultural tendencies toward unification that Nietzsche is critiquing? In
other words, are these unifications being critiqued and unworked, as part of Nietzsche’s
critique of modernity? Is this a unification that might be squared with the critique of the
Subject, one which acknowledges an impossibility of full assimilation?1
Running throughout the reading of these two issues, and the attempt to read
them together, is that constellation of language, and it might even seem that the
constellation of language in the later work is oriented around these nodes of the self,

1

This would seem to put it closer to a hermeneutic view of interpretation.
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narrative, and writing. My approach is to believe that if we focus on narrativizing the self
as it takes place in Nietzsche’s later work, we find something like the center of the later
constellation of language, and, a sense of how that constellation is involved in, and is
central to unpacking, his mature philosophical project.
In my view, the surface tension between these two strands, the Subject and the
self, and the question of how to reconcile them, is a promising surface conundrum in
Nietzsche’s work. And this view obviously takes something for granted at the outset:
that there is an important relationship between what are vaguely here termed the
Subject and the self, and thus that these two strands need to be thought together. This
is obviously a prejudice informing my work, and I am allowing it to do so in the hope
that letting vagueness pave the way might actually lead to some clarification about what
Nietzsche means both by the Subject and by the self, if only obliquely. Regardless of the
labels that might be given to these two strands, and the uses to which they might be
put, I believe we might start with the question: can they be reconciled, and what
happens in the attempt? Thus we begin with the Subject.
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Chapter 3
Who is Speaking—Language and the Subject

Introduction
The Critique of the Subject
If we consider the critique of the Subject in all its myriad forms, it is very hard
not to meet up with the following questions, somewhere along the way: What is to
become of the notion of the Subject? Is it to be replaced by a mitigated version, a
differently construed subject or subjectivity? Or, is it to be eschewed completely? Does
the critique of the subject lead us to reject this category altogether, and, if so, what
exactly does this involve? Or does the critique of the Subject lead us to revise the
constitution of Subject and subjectivity, and what exactly would comprise this revision,
and could it escape the vicious circle of a constant, retrospectively realized failure?
These questions ask, in essence, whether the Subject and subjectivity is to be rejected
or reconceived. 1

1

There are a number of ways that the emergence of this questioning within philosophy might be
genealogized, and while this is not my interest or intention here, mentioning a few historical references
might help to at least draw its outlines: Freud’s positing of the unconscious; Althusser’s “Ideology and
Ideological State Apparatuses,” which describes a Subject which in no sense is pre-existing to but is rather
created through the interpellation of various state institutional forms; Foucault’s highly influential
analyses, such as that in Discipline and Punish, which depict the Subject as, again, not pre-existing to but
the effect of power as it works through the networks of socially-arranged discourses and knowledges;
feminist work on the non-essentiality of “woman,” building off of Simone de Beauvoir’s claim, in The
Second Sex, that “one is not born but rather becomes a woman.” Critiques such as these and others have
given rise to work which has become attentive to the ways that the Subject, or subjectivity, is formed
through processes that are importantly historical, political, and social—a vantagepoint on what Foucault
calls “subjectivation”—rather than as a pre-given essential ground through which we orient ourselves
within these valences. Some of the widely regarded key insights that have emerged from work that
responds to or is influenced in some way by these discourses includes the insight that the very vision of

It is often claimed that Nietzsche’s view of the Subject amounts to a denial of the
Subject—after all, the text says as much in some places: some of the more often cited
claims regarding the Subject, such as, that there is “no doer behind the deed,” or that
the Subject is a fiction, may yield the impression that Nietzsche’s view is only of the
order of denial.2 It seems in the end more apt to say that what we are dealing with is a
denial of certain features often associated with the Subject. It is a certain way of
conceiving the Subject, and uses to which the concept of the Subject is often put, that
are the focus of this critique.3

what universal subjectivity comprises has always been a work of power whereby some positions or roles
(regarding class, gender, or sexuality) reflect themselves into the presumed vision of universality, and are
thereby valued, normalized, and hence further empowered, while other positions not thus described are
either ignored or disempowered. In other words, the power to claim to objectively describe the universal
subject has largely fallen to those in positions of power through advent of gender, sexuality, or class,
which power simply reinscribes itself in such a seemingly objective description. Hence, the view of
universal subjectivity poses an epistemological and political problem, neither of which is fully extricable
from the other: as subjectivity is formed through political relations available at a given historical vantage,
it is never able to extricate itself from the contingency of that situatedness to speak to anything that is
supposedly “outside” of such a situatedness. Thus a universal subjectivity could never be thematized.
2
What I am calling Nietzsche’s critique of the Subject is found spread throughout a variety of passages
from mid-to-late works containing such statements about the status of the Subject, treated below.
3
Ricoeur’s analysis of the Subject as treated by both Descartes and Nietzsche in the Introduction to
Oneself as Another seems on point in many ways. Ricoeur claims that Nietzsche’s attack on the Subject of
the cogito is primarily a linguistic and deconstructive claim: that in demonstrating the tropological nature
of the language at work in “I think,” which is taken as Nietzsche’s primary method here, one that builds on
his earlier claim in the Rhetoric course that all language is tropological, he shows that doubt is possible
even at this stage of the derivation of the cogito, a doubt made possible by the ‘lying,’ illusory character of
all language, and that Nietzsche’s intent should be considered as that of showing that he can doubt better
than Descartes, precisely by noting this character of language. Ricoeur thus takes Nietzsche’s response to
Descartes as deconstructive only. I think Ricoeur is admirably clear, and correct, in his emphasis on the
tropology at work in the cogito. Where I hesitate is in the claim that Nietzsche’s work here is only
deconstructive, only to doubt further. Ricoeur claims that even Nietzsche’s claim as to his “hypothesis:
the subject as multiplicity” should be taken with the recognition that all language suffers from tropology,
and hence, that Nietzsche cannot be taken to be “reconstructing” a Subject, as that reconstruction would
suffer from the same tropological deconstruction, a point which Nietzsche must surely have recognized.
Ricoeur is right about the carefulness Nietzsche had with regard to any such reconstruction, as I think we
see in his claim that reading interpretation as interpretation is itself an interpretation, and “so much the
better!” and in his claim about the multiple Subject as a “hypothesis.” However, it seems that Ricoeur,
following a strong tradition, assumes that Nietzsche’s critique of truth, achieved through the tropological
finding about language, relegates all of Nietzsche’s claims to the mode of deconstruction (of which irony
would be a part, in my view). But, if interpretation itself has a power that is not of the valence of truth
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Because Nietzsche’s claims regarding the Subject often respond explicitly to
Descartes’ claims, and hence can be thought as a response to the Cartesian Subject, I
will begin with a brief overview of this Subject.
The Subject of Descartes’ Cogito4
According to Heidegger, but echoed elsewhere, since Descartes, modern
philosophy has had an orientation toward the Subject, which determines the
philosophical tradition.5 This orientation is based on the opinion that the ego is the first
certainty given to the knower, that “the subject is accessible immediately and with
absolute certainty,” whereas other objects require mediation to be known. 6
This orientation toward the Subject is comprised of certain beliefs about the
Subject, and about objects, as this concern with the Subject brings the distinction
between subject and object, or res cogitans and res extensa, to the center of view. This

versus appearance as “falsity”—the power to make a possibility visible or inhabitable (and this is precisely
one of the claims of Ricoeur’s hermeneutics)—then does this not mean that there can be a reconstruction
of the Subject, only one which maintains itself within this view of interpretation, rather than only within
the view of truth versus falsity? In other words, could there not be a reconstruction of the Subject that
aims not at asserting the being of this Subject, but at making another self-relation possible? It does seem
to be through implying a differently constituted Subject that Nietzsche is able to critique Descartes’
view—but does the fact that this is only an interpretation mean we are left only with a deconstruction?
Secondly, I also hesitate at Ricoeur’s suggestion that it is the tropological nature of language that carries
Nietzsche’s critique of the Cartesian Subject. This, in my view, fails to account for the claims that
Nietzsche makes about sensation, affect, and the body, generally speaking, in related passages. Both of
my above hesitations will become apparent in the following. (See Paul Ricoeur, Oneself as Another
[Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992], 1-26.)
4
Although the term ‘cogito’ derives from Descartes’ statement in the Principles “cogito, ergo sum,” itself a
translation of the claim in Discourse on Method that“je pense, donc je suis,” it is used here, following
standard practice, to refer to the basic finding expressed in the phrase, a finding that is also demonstrated
in Meditation 2 of Meditations on First Philosophy—all of these phrases indicate the finding that the
thinking and the being of “I” are co-implicative.
5
This section consists in an overview of the historical reading provided by Martin Heidegger in his The
Basic Problems of Phenomenology, translated by Albert Hofstadter (Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 1975), 122-137. This source is hereafter referred to as BPP.
6
BPP, 123.
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is because, in his articulation of the Subject, Descartes posited two kinds of substance,
res extensa (extended substance) and res cogitans (thinking substance). Thinking
substance pertains to the I or ego, and is thus the essence of the Subject. This splitting
of substance into two kinds, thinking and extended, that pertaining to subjects and
objects, becomes determinative. Heidegger claims that we see this basic structure taken
up by Kant, for whom “. . . the I, the ego, is . . . as it was for Descartes, res cogitans, res,
something, that thinks, namely, something that represents, perceives, judges, agrees,
disagrees, but also loves, hates, strives, and the like.” Further, from this structure, Kant
articulates the ego as transcendental, holding that thoughts are what the ego has,
predicates to a subject, and that they are had as a knowing of them. This distinctive
having of all its thoughts and comportments brings the Subject’s knowing of the Subject
along with any act of knowing. The ego is the ground, or the unifying, of all its
determinations, all its predicates, such that it apperceives itself in any of its activities,
which Kant articulated as the ‘original synthetic unity of apperception.’ (BPP, 125-127)
What Heidegger articulates here seems to be a kind of centrifuge around the
ego. We see this if we consider that Aristotle’s term hypokeimenon is translated into the
Latin as subjectum, and was understood as that which underlies all actual beings, as that
which has predicates but is not itself a predicate, and was roughly the meaning of
substance. Hypokeimenon was thus not something pertaining only to human beings but
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to each existing or actual being. But, because in modern philosophy the ego is the
subjectum—that which has predicates—true substance becomes the ego as subjectum.7
Continuing in Heidegger’s reading, one of the questions that arises for Descartes,
deriving from the separation of two distinct kinds of substance and the privileging of
one as the ground of the Subject, is how thinking substance can interface with extended
substance. Faced with the two kinds of substance, thinking and extended, Descartes,
thinking, begins from within thinking substance, and must proceed from some feature
of this kind of substance, and these are the mathematical ideas. The Subject can engage
extended substance in terms of its ability to appear in a form that is taken to give
expression to mathematical ideas—measurable extension. What is true of extended
substance is then only that in it which is mathematically renderable.
Kant follows this basic structure, and, in the building up of the transcendental
ego, what happens to all other actuality, what are from here understood as objects (res
extensa), is that in fact, their being is determined by the conditions of their appearing to
the ego (for Kant retains the belief that being=appearing). The ego in its grounding
character, as not another perceived object but that which is apperceived in all
perception, the ground of all perception, thus grounds the perception through which all
appearances become manifest. Thus the constraints of perception, or the categories
defining how the ego can combine into perceived unities, because they set the context
of all appearing to the ego, determine the being of all other beings insofar as

7

Ibid., 127. Heidegger claims that Hegel is the first to state this explicitly, though it builds on Kant,
Descartes, and Leibniz.
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appearing=being. The ego is transcendental insofar as it thus determines the conditions
for any appearing. (BPP, 128)
Hegel continues with this structure laid out by the separation of subject and
object, first, in the agreement that experience of objects presupposes forms of
subjective understanding, in other words, that the Subject sets the conditions for
appearance. However, history comes to play a role here, as history is the unfolding of
consciousness coming to discovery of its own implicit conditions of knowing. The
Kantian attempt to lay out the conditions of knowing, based on the constraints of the
knowing subject, becomes a historical process for Hegel. But there is still this same form
of grounding subjectivity, this same case that with each increase of nuance in the
knowing of objects there is an increase in apperception, or, in a Hegelian register, a
becoming explicit of implicit conditions of the Subject.
Yet another element that we see throughout this history is the limning in of
being in accord with knowing, figured by the correspondence between being and
knowing, which is another way to express the grounding character of the knowing
subject. Descartes’ cogito presents an exemplary instance of the correspondence
between knowledge and being, as it is a moment in which an object of thinking, the
thought ‘I exist,’ is shown to be a necessary object of knowledge, as the thought
immediately proves an existence that must be as long as there is thinking. The thought ‘I
exist’ is the fundamental knowledge statement, for its necessary correspondence with
being ensures that it must be true. Likewise, the unity of apperception that grounds the
Subject for Kant is a moment of the perfect confluence of knowing and being. For Hegel,
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with materiality and history being the development of Spirit, absolute knowing
represents the confluence of knowing and being.
We also see here in Descartes’ cogito the attempt to unify the Subject through
illuminating it. Descartes begins in thinking, and his project in The Meditations, while
beginning with the question of what can be known with certainty, ends in the
clarification of what the Subject is and how, through knowing what the Subject is,
anything else can be known, and of that, only that which accords with the Subject’s
mental perception of ‘clarity and distinctness’ can be. Likewise, Kant’s critical project is
in many ways the attempt to articulate the extension and limits of the Subject, also thus
deriving the point that only what the Subject can know can be said to be true. For Hegel,
materiality itself, and history, is the immanence of consciousness, and all knowing is
thus spirit becoming explicit to itself.
Nietzsche’s Critique
We will find in Nietzsche’s critique of this Subject a rejection of some of the
features mentioned in the previous section, namely, the presumed correspondence
between knowledge and being, specifically in the case of the who that presumes to
know and the being of that who; the presumption that the ‘I’ of narration could know,
as an object of immediate perception, what ‘I’ is. This rejection is achieved through the
depiction of “thinking” as the extension of physiological processes, unworking the
distinction between thinking and the body, indicating the inability of thinking to reach
into its own origins, and hence, showing the Subject to be dispersed beyond its ability to
articulate its own limits and thus unify itself.
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Yet another word should be said, regarding the historical aspect of this critique
of the Subject. We know that Nietzsche is attentive to historical context, and that his
critiques always mark themselves with this attention in some way. I will try to indicate in
the passages we consider how we can think this historical context, but a few things can
be said at the outset. First, in passages in which Nietzsche speaks of the Subject and
explicitly mentions elements, even terms, associated with Descartes’ cogito, we have
grounds for assuming that the Subject under discussion therein is the modern Subject,
that characterized in accord with the preceding section. But what about passages,
namely, those in GM surrounding the slave revolt in morality, in which Nietzsche makes
claims about a belief in the Subject that is, historically speaking, operative in the days
contemporaneous with the life and death of Jesus Christ? We would seem to have two
interpretive options here. Either we have in this instance a case of a modern mind, one
already shaped by belief in the Subject, reading that belief anachronistically back into
the history that is being constructed, the genealogy, thus calling attention to the
projection, or infection, of the narrator of and by this belief; or, we read this not as a
projection but rather the suggestion that there is a belief in the Subject bearing
similarities to the modern Subject prior to modernity, hence calling into question that
the sources of the belief are specifically modern. This will be a question that, once noted
here, I will try to attend to at each stage of the following reading.
Finally, in the course of the ensuing retrieval of Nietzsche’s claims about the
Subject, language will be a ubiquitous theme, and will often take over in emphasis. It is
impossible to separate Nietzsche’s claims about the Subject from related claims about
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language, because of the role of language in shoring up and reinstating the problematic
aspects of the Subject that he wishes to call into question. This means that what we deal
with here is equally a critique of language as it is a critique of the Subject. In fact, the
aspects of the Subject that Nietzsche is interested in revising are those aspects that are
able to be installed as schemas of certain uses of language—words and grammar—
which installation leads to nefarious effects.
It may be easiest to lay out Nietzsche’s critique of the Subject by beginning with
those passages that seem most to indicate a denial of the Subject, and to ask what it is
that is being specifically denied. This will provide a means of setting up the terms of the
critique.
The Subject, Words, and Grammar
BGE §16 and §17
In BGE §16 and §17, Nietzsche points out the multiplicity obviated by the claim “I
think.” The belief that ‘I think’ contains an immediate certainty—either that that ‘I’ must
be, or even that there is “an I” [ein ‘Ich’]—is linked to the “seduction of words,” which
obfuscates the myriad “truly searching questions” that remain to be asked about ‘I’ and
about ‘thinking.’ (BGE, 23-24)
Behind “I think,” which poses as immediate in its expression of what is the
case—it is a statement taken to be a naked presentation of its object, hence something
that can be immediately recognized as true—are a series of questions that remain
covered by taking this statement as an immediate certainty. Exposing this series of

171

questions means exposing what are in fact a number of complex processes undergirding
our very use of the words ‘I’ and “think” in an attempt to name those processes, let
alone the complexity of their interrelation as immediate. In place of these complexities,
covered by words, we find no definitive answers, a situation marked by Nietzsche’s
listing of questions. What we find, here and elsewhere, is the prior reduction of
complexity to unity under the schema of Subjects as agents; this reduction is being
unworked. (BGE, 23-24)
The seduction is to take ‘I’ and ‘thinking’ as indicating realities that are as unitary
and immediate as is our recognition of them as linguistic entities, as words. It is
important that this ‘I think’ is put in quotation marks. What we assume of ‘I think’ is that
it is what we call an ‘immediate certainty,’ a statement of a thought that “g[ets] hold of
its object purely and nakedly . . . without any falsification on the part of the Subject or
object.” In fact, the seduction of words here—both the words “immediate certainty” as
well as the words ‘I think’—is just this: it is the seduction to believe that there is a
whatness or reality shown by words which is fully captured by them, which is as
immediate as the presence of the words seems to be. But the problem here is with the
immediacy, and the completeness and unity connoted by certainty: the belief that there
is no mediation involved between the statement ‘I think’ and the state of affairs to
which it is applied, and the belief that this statement is a complete expression of the
state of affairs. (BGE, 23)
In Nietzsche’s view, the statement ‘I think’ cannot be an immediate certainty
because almost every function served by the statement is either a mediation, or,
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contains a question or feature that is not completely known. We find a number of
assumptions contained within the statement, and these assumptions are precisely those
that have to do with the features of the Subject under contention here. We have the
assumption that thinking must be undertaken by an acting subject as its cause, that ‘I’
names this subject, that there is an entity matching the name ‘I,’ that what occurs now
is properly named ‘thinking’ rather than ‘willing’ or “feeling,” and that it is known what
constitutes these states. The statement “I think,” considered as a name of a
corresponding reality, covers over these questions. These views of immediacy and
completeness are precisely what are owed to “the seduction of words.” This means that
words give the impression of a reality that they themselves constitute.8
Further, this seduction involves an interpretation projected onto experience, one
based on “infer[ence] according to the grammatical habit” of attaching agents to
actions, or doers to deeds; specifically, of thinking that every activity belongs to “a one
[Einer]” that is acting. In BGE §17 Nietzsche indicates the specific grammatical habit of
attaching an agent to every activity, a subject for every verb. This is called a ‘schema’
that is the basis of the interpretation that there is an entity engaged in thinking in the
case of ‘I think.’ This is, in fact, not an immediate certainty, but an interpretation
mediated by this schema of the grammatical subject-verb habit. And Nietzsche calls this
projected belonging a “schema” that also informs the scientific positing of atoms.
Descartes fell under its spell, as do atomists. (BGE, 23-24)

8

This point has clear resonances with the genetic schema in OTL in which words are figured as aesthetic
leaps.
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In these passages from BGE, we are given reason to notice how words as singular
units lead to the seduction to think that there are corresponding entities or realities that
mirror that unity in both the sense of oneness and of immediate presence. We also see
how the duality of words in subject-verb pairings leads to the seduction of thinking,
along the same lines, that there are subject entities related to verb effects as their
causes. Notice the suggestion that a seduction of words is to hypostatize from them
entities or realities that mirror their unity and immediacy. All of this can be summarized
by noting that what Nietzsche calls into question here is the immediacy of the cogito, or
the immediacy of a relation between its two parts, the ‘I think’ and the ‘I am.’
This adds a further element to be considered. If the provision of the ‘I’ in ‘I think’
or ‘I doubt’ or ‘I exist’ comes from a grammatical habit, as both passages suggest, then
what we find here is nothing about the found ‘I,’ but something about the seeking ‘I’:
that it is subject to precisely this kind of habit. And this means that what Descartes does
in the Meditations is not to discover the Subject, but actually to reveal the preexistence
of the habit already at work in his thinking.9
Now, what are we to make of the historical question? It seems in many ways
that this is pushed off onto the question of language, of those habits that Descartes
exemplifies. Clearly, it took modernity for these seductions to become philosophically
determinative. Is Nietzsche implying that a particular seduction toward the implications
9

We might say that Descartes skips the question of the ‘who,’ and of the possible equation of two ‘whos’,
and moves from the cogito immediately to the question of ‘what’ the found ‘I’ is. However, what we say
about this found ‘I’ cannot be the case of this meditating, narrating ‘I,’ but only of the latter’s projections
and forms of meditation. The found ‘I’ has to be considered from the fact of its emergence from an
engagement of looking for—it—an engagement that can turn on its own contents, and that can thus deny
itself under the banner of seeking itself. In doing so, it denies the possibility of finding the ‘I’ that set this
seeking in motion, which it covers over by asserting that it is the same as what is found.
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of words, which themselves pre-exist modernity by far, becomes more trenchant or
tempting in modernity? It does not seem so, for the same “seductions” of grammar are
indicated as tempting also for the pre-moderns in the passage we consider next.
Because this next passage mentions not only the temptations but the needs to which
they spoke, Nietzsche allows us to consider the way that needs give rise to beliefs that
can, in another historical context, become philosophically determinative. Just as we
moderns are the heirs to the conscience vivisection of millennia, which can combine
with contemporary exigencies to produce new forms of vivisection, we modern Subjects
are heirs to the same needs that gave rise to beliefs that predate their modern form.
GM I §13
In this passage, the narrator returns to the slave revolt in morality, and he claims
to present his solution to the “other origin of the ‘good’ . . . as conceived by the man of
ressentiment.” While not all of the details in the genealogy of ‘good’ in the perspective
of ressentiment are relevant to our discussion, some elements are useful in
contextualizing the emergence of the Subject and the meaning of its denial, in this
passage.
At this point in GM I, we recall that the oppressed and exhausted Israelite slaves
find themselves in emergency conditions, and they are prompted by “an instinct for selfpreservation” to the exploitation of a certain belief, the belief in the available
conception of the Subject, for “their own ends.” Inasmuch as the slave revolt in morality
consists in a reversal of the usage and meaning of particular words, namely the words
‘good,’ ‘bad,’ and the creation of ‘evil,’ what we find in this passage is the indication that
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this transformation required a particular pre-existing conception of the Subject. By
taking advantage of this pre-existing conception, the slave revolt is able to transform the
meaning of those other words in a language. The transformation in the meaning of
those words then goes on to reinscribe this moral vision into the original conception of
the Subject, adding yet another layer to it. In this way, the Subject first enables a
transformation in meaning that then renders the Subject into a moral subject, the
Subject of ressentiment morality. This is, in broad outlines, the process Nietzsche
describes in this portion of the essay. 10 (GM, 44-46)
Here we find a claim that might be taken to indicate that we owe the Subject to
a misreading of action provided by language and its ‘seduction’:
A quantum of force is equivalent to a quantum of drive, will, effect—
more, it is nothing other than precisely this very driving, willing, effecting,
and only owing to the seduction of language (and of the fundamental
errors of reason that are petrified in it) which conceives and misconceives
all effects as conditioned by something that causes effects, by a ‘subject,’
can it appear otherwise.11
However, this tendency is also said to be part of the ‘popular mind’ and how it ‘sees’
events:
there is no “being” behind doing, effecting, becoming; ‘the doer’ is
merely a fiction added to the deed—the deed is everything. The popular
mind in fact doubles the deed: when it sees the lightning flash, it is the

10

As this is one of those passages in the Genealogy in which the narrator describes a non-teleological view
of development, in which pre-existing forms are taken over, reinterpreted and redirected to new ends, it
bears out the claim that “the cause of the origin of a thing and its eventual utility, its actual employment
and place in a system of purposes, lie worlds apart; whatever exists, having somehow come into being, is
again and again reinterpreted to new ends, taken over, transformed, and redirected by some power
superior to it; all events in the organic world are a subduing, a becoming master, and all subduing and
becoming master involves a fresh interpretation, an adaptation through which any previous ‘meaning’ and
‘purpose’ are necessarily obscured or even obliterated” (GM 2 §12, emphasis added).
11
GM, 45, emphasis added.
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deed of a deed: it posits the same event first as cause and then a second
time as its effect.12
What there is is an event or a happening that is doubled into the perception of a
doer and a deed. But it can seem that this tendency is also being said to have its source
in language, as “scientists do no better when they say ‘force moves,’ ‘force causes,’ and
the like . . . our entire science still lies under the misleading influence of language and
has not disposed of that little changeling, the ‘subject’ (the atom, for example, is such a
changeling, as is the Kantian ‘thing in itself’). . . .”13
What we owe to the slave revolt in morality is not the Subject, but rather, a
moral valence applied to the Subject. The Subject is for the slave revolt in morality a
pre-existing form that the transformation of the slave revolt took over and
reinterpreted in moral terms: “just as the popular mind separates the lightning from its
flash and takes the latter for action, for the operation of a subject called lightning, so
popular morality also separates strength from expressions of strength, as if there were a
neutral substratum behind the strong man, which was free to express strength or not to
do so.”14 We are told that the weak ‘needed’ this belief in “a neutral, independent
‘subject’” to prop up their “interpret[ation of] weakness as freedom, and their being
thus-and-thus as a merit.”15 Thus, the oppressed took advantage of this pre-existing
conception of the Subject in order to achieve the further transformation whereby their
physiological characteristics of weakness and inaction might be reinterpreted as
voluntary and virtuous characteristics:
12

Ibid.
Ibid.
14
Ibid., emphasis added.
15
Ibid.
13
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This type of man needs to believe in a neutral, independent ‘subject’ . . .
[t]he subject (or, to use a more popular expression, the soul) has perhaps
been believed in hitherto more firmly than anything else on earth
because it makes possible to the majority of mortals, the weak and
oppressed of every kind, the sublime self-deception that interprets
weakness as freedom, and their being thus-and-thus as a merit.16
In the context of this genealogy, it is the new end to which the Subject is put that
is the real culprit of the analysis. This new end is the moral transformation, within which
the Subject, once it is believed in, provides a ground in which to locate the causation of
characteristics, imposing the interpretation that characteristics such as weakness and
inaction are actually choices to be meek and humble, are voluntary traits of character
that manifest themselves in chosen actions, on the basis of which one can be judged as
‘good’ or ‘evil.’
Hence the Subject is called the ‘little changeling,’ for it can be dressed up in new
garb and made to support a variety of other beliefs: in this case, the belief in the moral
constitution of the Subject, but also, as we will see, it is the basis for the belief in
causality and mechanical theory, hence it is the basis of both the belief in freedom of
will and, on the other hand, the determinism of nature; and, it is the basis of the belief
in god. At the heart of the conceptual transformation wielded by ressentiment is the
opportunity provided by this “little changeling, ‘the subject.’” It was already there—
where did it come from? (GM, 45)
The question that is not the locus of analysis in this passage, but which I am
asking here, is whether the Subject is being said to have its origin in language, or if

16

Ibid., emphasis added.
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language reinforces a belief that has other sources.17 Some of the above quotations in
this passage indicate the former view. Nietzsche claims that it is owed to the errors of
reason that are left petrified in language, and which are then extended through
grammatical habits. But all that language provides in this case is a schema for this
doubling, for reading events as effects of causes, and for reading causes as the subjects
of our grammar. But what if we ask the further question, how is language’s ability to
provide the schema of doer-deed able to gain traction in the first place? In other words,
why is such language able to be seductive in this way? What makes us able to be thusly
seduced? Just as the moral interpretation of the Subject emerged from a need of a
certain kind of life, might the prior subject, which it utilized, already emerge from a
need of a certain kind of life? This directly relates to the historical question, for even
though we began considering a particularly modern form of the Subject, the question of
its sources pulls us beyond this period.
We should take stock of what has been denied in this passage, given that it was
approached as a denial of the Subject. Nietzsche has said that the deed is everything,
and that there is no doer behind it. Popular morality creates the appearance of a
distinction between a person and their actions, based on the distinction already
contained in the conception of a subject as a cause of actions that are taken to be its
effects.
The Subject as that which pre-exists and causes actions is in fact retrospectively
imposed onto the experience of events. This sense of a pre-existence to actions as the
17

I do not mean to deny that the subject might not ultimately be overdetermined, or that the various
means of its constitution are not themselves only termina of processes that we couldn’t fully penetrate.
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substrate that causes them, an entity whose characteristics pre-exist the happening of
events—this is what Nietzsche denies here. As we will see in ensuing passages, the
attribution of “cause” is always a retrospective projection. In this sense, what we have
are effects, or better put, events. To retrospectively project a cause as if it were prior to
the event is the problem here, and it is language’s provision. But it remains possible
that, if the Subject is not a cause, there is some way that the Subject is more on the
model of effect, of the same order as the events that we call deeds. If the deed is
everything, behind which there is no doer, then the deed may also be the doer, or be
the Subject, meaning, there is an interpellation implied here, not an erasure. If the deed
is everything, and there is no doer behind it, this does not amount to the claim that
there is nothing, or no future entity, involved in the happening of events. Rather, the
correction regards the temporality of the involvement, and the relation of the
constitution of the entity to that involvement.18
I intend by this only some guiding suggestions rather than any conclusions yet.
Treating this passage only as a guiding line, it serves to introduce a number of related
strands which will be taken up in the following, summarized below.
First is the demonstration of the connection between Nietzsche’s critique of the
Subject and a certain critique of language. Even as Essay 1 of the Genealogy is involved
in a critique of a transformation in linguistic use around the words ‘good,’ ‘bad,’ and
‘evil,’ the passage we have considered shows us that the possibility of this linguistic
transformation is undergirded by another valence of language which is already involved
18
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in the concept of the Subject, namely in grammatical schemas that reinforce the
subject/cause/doer-effect/deed means of perception. We have further asked whether
language creates this belief in the Subject as cause, or whether it emerges elsewhere
and is reinforced through language. This pushes the analysis of language beyond the
consideration of words and their meanings, to a consideration of language as providing
primary interpretive schemes, or schemas, out of which the meaning of terms of reason
and morality might grow, the kind of conceptions that could undergird further
transformations of language. Language contains these interpretive schemes that are
also objects of belief. This valence of language is, as we already see here, connected to
grammar, to habituation, and to a certain seduction or temptation, appealing to our
needs, all of which we might want to try to get a further grip on.
Second is the highlighting of a particular feature of the Subject that Nietzsche
denies: the Subject as causal substrate of action. This passage invokes this element of
the concept of the Subject, though it does not aim to explain its provenance.
The Subject Beyond Words and Grammar
In WP §485, Nietzsche claims that the term ‘the Subject’ names “our belief in a
unity underlying all the different impulses of the highest feeling of reality” and that it is
“the fiction that many similar states in us are the effect of one substratum.”19 The
Subject relates to a variety of feelings and states: it is that which we believe both to
underlie and to cause them. We see here an emphasis on the supposed unity and causal
nature of the Subject that we have already found presaged in the passages above.
19
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But is this belief in the Subject the result of language, of yielding to language’s
seductions, as certain passages seem to indicate? The “metaphysics of language . . . sees
doers and deeds all over: it believes that will has causal efficacy: it believes in the ‘I’, in
the I as being, in the I as substance, and it projects this belief in the I-substance onto all
things—this is how it creates the concept of ‘thing’ in the first place. . . .”20 This passage
seems to repeat the above claims, that there is a belief in a Subject as a unified being,
and, that this Subject has a causally effective will. But what it claims is that this belief is
first regarding the ‘I,’ and then projected into all things, and hence, doers and deeds are
found all over, as a result of the projection of the ‘I.’ ‘Projection’ is a term Nietzsche uses
to describe the act of interpretation. So the belief in the Subject as willing and causally
effective is an interpretation that is applied through language to all other things beyond
‘I.’ The suggestion is that there is a more primary belief, the belief in the ‘I’.
Where does this belief come from? It is in fact not to these seductions of
language that we owe belief in the ‘I’; rather, to those seductions we owe the
intensification of, and reapplication of, the belief. The Subject, ‘I,’ is itself a certain
temptation to which we are subject on the basis of our human perspective, through the
constitution of our sensory and psychological capacities; but temptations and habits of
language, and from them philosophical ideas and claims such as Descartes’, serve to
shore up this basic temptation, and allow it to masquerade as what is simply the case,
and to be applied to more extensive uses.21
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Interlude: The Schemas of Grammar and Words
Something I have been suggesting thus far is that, though Nietzsche seems to
suggest in places that the belief in the Subject originates in language, this is not entirely
accurate. Part of what Nietzsche implies is a distinction between two senses of
language. On one hand, there is language as a momentarily static, though historically
altering, set of functions enabling discourse: words and their meanings, rules of
grammar for creating units of meaning. There is another sense of language that we will
start to see when we turn to considerations of biology, and this is language as a function
of life: interpretation. Though language in the second sense is more extensive and
pertains even to non-speaking and non-writing life, its function of assimilation can take
over and make use of language in the first sense. We see this when we note that
language in the first sense is a provision of schemas for interpretation that are
comprised by the structure of grammar and words.
My claim is that the belief in the Subject is reinforced by language in the first
sense, extended beyond ‘I’ through the aid of language as grammar and words, but the
belief in the Subject is first a belief in “ourselves” as Subjects, and this actually comes
from certain tendencies of sensation, from feelings, from a psychological prejudice,

the word ‘I,’ he did not derive the very belief in the ‘I’ from the language of ‘I.’ This goes back to my claims
in the opening section: Descartes slides easily from the ‘I’ that engages in the meditation, to the ‘I’ that is
found. But this ‘I’ meditating was there from the beginning, and remains, and seems to be slid into the ‘I’
that is found. This suggests that what is built up regarding the found ‘I’ is able to define the subject only
by masquerading as the same subject of the meditations. This would be an example of language taking
over a pre-existing belief and utilizing it in new directions, much as the second section discussed. All this
means, for the time being, is that the seductive power of language seems to be presaged by a desire for
such seduction that is not tied only to language, considered as words and grammar, but rather, which
uses language in this sense. Is there a deeper sense of language, then?
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from a subjective conviction which will be discussed in the ensuing pages, and this
regards language in the second sense, language as interpretation.
I want to take a moment to lay out those schemas of language in the first sense,
schemas that Nietzsche links to grammar and words, to what he calls their seduction
and metaphysics.
Doer-Deed and ‘I’
Nietzsche often mentions our “grammatical custom that adds a doer to every
deed.”22 He claims that this grammatical custom in Indo-European language ensures
that every deed, indicated by an active verb, is attached to a subject, either by the
verb’s being related to a nominal subject, or, its containing a differential ending
attached to the root verb. For example, in the single words chante versus chantent, the
difference in the endings attached to the root verb create a dual indication within the
single word of both the action, ‘deed,’ and the Subject, ‘doer.’ This might otherwise be
indicated by the attachment of a separate word to indicate subject, as in ‘nous
chantons’ or ‘I sing.’ Whether expressed in one word or two, all spoken or written
indications in these languages of a given action within a grammatical structure must
consider the number, and often the gender, of the Subject who is believed to be
performing that action. This grammatical custom is thus the very attachment of a doer,
or causal agent, to every deed, or action. What I want to emphasize is that this requires
a pre-existing belief that Subjects are the kinds of beings who can be causes of actions
through their will.
22
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The ‘I’ might be said to derive from the grammatical custom of attaching doers
to deeds, as a specification of the most general doer, ‘it.’ This is suggested in BGE §17,
where Nietzsche considers Descartes’ phrase ‘I think.’ While he will make many points
regarding this “I think,” the point here is that, were we to replace ‘I’ with the more
general ‘it,’ eradicating the leap to the specificity that it is ‘I’ thinking, we are still left
with an inference based on the basic “ . . . grammatical habit: ‘Thinking is an activity;
every activity requires an agent; consequently—”.23 This passage suggests that phrases
with ‘I’ in the Subject position are in one sense just more specific examples of the basic
grammatical custom of attaching a subject to an active verb, the doer-deed schema, as
mentioned above.
But notice that, as claimed above, the doer-deed schema rests on a pre-existing
notion of what a doer is: the kind of being who is causally related to actions in the first
place. There must already be a belief, on the order of cause and effect—there must
already even be the belief in cause and effect—for the doer-deed schema to be
applicable and salient.
There is thus something special about the role of the ‘I’ that is not merely
reducible to the doer-deed schema. In fact, the ‘I’ grounds it. Consider a passage already
cited: “The metaphysics of language . . . believes in the ‘I’, in the I as being, in the I as
substance, and it projects this belief in the I-substance onto all things—this is how it
creates the concept of ‘thing’ in the first place. . . . [T]he concept of ‘being’ is only
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derived from the concept of ‘I’.”24 Here, I would emphasize that Nietzsche suggests that
the concept of ‘I’ is the source of the concepts of substance and being. This is echoed in
his claim that reason depends upon “. . . our belief in the ‘ego’ as a substance, as the
sole reality from which we ascribe reality to things in general.”25
It might seem curious that, in WP §484, Nietzsche suggests that substance is
derived from the grammatical subject-verb relation, not the specific subject ‘I’:
There is thinking: therefore there is something that thinks’; this is the
upshot of all Descartes’ argumentation. But that means positing as ‘true a
priori’ our belief in the concept of substance—that when there is thought
there has to be something ‘that thinks’ is simply a formulation of our
grammatical custom that adds a doer to every deed.26
Here, the concept of substance is said to be derived from the doer-deed schema,
not from the specific subject ‘I.’
So, does this mean that ‘I’ is only a special case of the doer-deed schema? And if
so, why would Nietzsche have suggested, in the former of the above cited passages, that
it is from ‘I’ that being and substance are derived?
A possible answer here seems to be supplied by the fact that ‘I’ has a
provenance outside of grammar. While ‘I’ is in some senses the specific nomination of a
doer—it names a particular doer, and hence it appears to utilize the doer-deed schema,
projecting ‘I’ as a particular doer—it is yet a doer whose deeds have a relation to the
one who says or thinks it unlike all others. This is because the doer-deed schema is in
fact based on a pre-existing experience that ‘I’ is taken to name. The doer-deed schema
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is actually a projection of the ‘I,’ which occurs when we think of all doers on the model
of ‘I.’ With ‘I,’ then, we have a repetition of that same model provided in GM I §13,
discussed above: that of a form that is ripe for the taking and the application toward
different ends. The basic schemas of grammar actually involve the exploitation of one
schema in particular, that of the ‘I,’ and its investment in the other, that of ‘doer and
deed.’ And this should leave us asking, as we would of any investment, as we learned to
ask from GM I §13, what is the return—and what is the kind of being who would be
motivated by such a return, by a return, at all?
Before we move on to asking those questions about the return on this
investment, we should look at how Nietzsche indicates that the belief in the ‘I’ is not
simply derived from grammar and words, but is rather a prior experience to which ‘I’ is
applied as a name, on the basis of which this name becomes ripe as a schema for
application to other experiences.
BGE §19
We see this special relationship between ‘I’ and the deeds purported to it in
passages in which Nietzsche seems to suggest that ‘I’-claims have something working in
their favor that other claims about doers would not: the “appeal to intuitive
perception,” the belief in ‘immediate certainty’ of such claims.27 This should call to mind
the ‘I think’ claim of which Nietzsche has made much in what we have discussed above,
and indeed, in WP §483, Nietzsche suggests that there is a kind of priority to the ‘I
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think’: he suggests that in ‘I think’ there is a belief that “this ‘I’ was the given cause of
thought from which by analogy we understood all other causal relationships.”28
This special relationship between ‘I’ and its purported deeds is said to be the
source of the idea of causation, and this notion of causation—that deeds are the effects
of the doer as cause—is an important constituent of what we mean by being and
substance. In fact, the very grammatical custom of ‘I’ as subject in such formations is
projected into all other ‘doer-deed’ schemas.29
The key here is that ‘I think’ is not only, from the one vantagepoint already
discussed, a more specific case of ‘it thinks,’ a substitution of a general term of
nomination for a more specific term; from another vantagepoint, ‘I think’ is a more
specific case of ‘I will.’ It is actually from the experience of will, or from our
misunderstanding of the experience of will, that the content of ‘I’ is constituted, and
then further projected into the ‘doer-deed’ schema as its basis. Thus there is something
about our experience of what we call willing that fleshes out what we hold the ‘I’ to
be.30
This is clarified by considering some statements Nietzsche makes in notes from
as early as the 1870s. In §139 of The Philosopher, we find these claims: “The only causal
relation of which we are conscious is the one between willing and acting. We transfer
[Übertragen] this onto all things and explain to ourselves the relationship between two
28
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Clearly, Nietzsche is here discussing a phenomenon that cannot hold for the Ancients, for whom the
notion of substance was not derived from the subject.
30
This is also indicated in passages we will consider later, WP §550-552, in which the claim is that all
causal explanations are based on the conception of the intention and willing of ‘I’ and the apparent
relationship of this to actions. The experience of willing as “effective” becomes part of the constitution of
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alterations that are always found together. The intention or willing yields the nomina;
the acting, the verba.”31
When we consider what willing is believed to be, or the experience of it that we
affirm through our belief, we see that what we face here is not so much, or merely, the
‘I’ as specific doer, but this ‘I’ as a relation of unification to deeds. The relation of ‘I’ to
its deeds forms the analogy for causation, which is thereafter free for attachment to all
other apparent entities on the basis of the doer-deed schema. But this apparent
relationship between the ‘I’ and its deeds is mired in obfuscation and misunderstanding.
Section 19 of BGE demonstrates this misunderstanding of willing at the heart of
the belief in the ‘I’ as cause. Nietzsche begins this section by claiming that ‘the will’ is
spoken of by philosophers “as if it were the best-known thing in the world.” But he goes
on to analyze ‘willing’ against the grain of this presupposition, foregrounding the
analysis with the claim that “[w]illing seems to me to be above all something
complicated, something that is a unit only as a word—and it is precisely in this one word
that the popular prejudice lurks. . . .”32 In analyzing the experience named ‘willing,’ he
finds, rather than a unit, a multiplicity of many ‘ingredients’ that are usually obscured:
sensations, thoughts, and affects. The temptation that the word provides is that toward
a hypostatization that would obscure this multiplicity and present it as a unity. It is the
temptation to view the experience that we name by the one word ‘willing’ as the same
kind of immediacy and presence that the word seems to be. This seems to be the
popular prejudice, toward the unity that words are able to present. But the very reason
31
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that this obfuscation by the word can occur is because it is undergirded by a prior
obfuscation that occurs due to the limitation of the capacities and perspective from
which we interpret those very events of which we are a part, and, the desire for this
obfuscation. In other words, the word reflects the prejudice that is already an inclination
of our constitution and its concomitant needs. (BGE, 25)
These myriad sensations that are obscured not only by the word ‘willing’ but also
by our perspective on the experience include the state of being away from something or
toward something, the sensations of “this ‘from’ and ‘towards’ themselves,” and various
muscular sensations. For example, if we spot a rattler crossing our path on the sidewalk
and then run in the opposite direction for shelter, a standard description would have it
that we saw the snake and then ran. If pressed to include willing in this description,
standard thinking, holding that “willing suffices for action,” might expand thus: we saw
the snake, willed to run, and then ran. But Nietzsche asks, what is this “willing to,” in
this case, run? Phenomenologically, in the example I’ve proposed, it includes our
sensation of positionality in relation to what we identify as a snake, to the street on
which we walk, and a sensation of being in the mode of away from the snake, away
from this spot of pavement, and toward the horizon that we see, or the front door at
the end of the street, as well as the sensations of awayness and towardness themselves.
And of course there are the muscular occurrences, from the tightening of the diaphragm
as we gasp one last deep breath, to the tensing of the muscles of our falling leg and the
flaccidity of the one rising, which now moves backward to form a pivot-point for the
change in direction. There is also thinking, “a ruling thought” in this experience, the
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thought that we need to run back toward home to escape the dangerous snake. And
there is affect, “specifically the affect of the command.” This affect of command is that
of superiority in relation to that which must obey, a consciousness that is “inherent in
every will” that “’this and nothing else is necessary now,’” and “obedience will be
rendered.” In other words, we feel a commandingness over the action in the situation.
The thought and the affect tend to bury the complexities of the body, or rather, to
synthesize them with the thought and the affect. (BGE, 25)
We see this tyranny of thought and the conscious affect of command over the
body if we consider that what is “strangest” about the will is precisely the relation of
command and obedience in the one who wills: “[a] man who wills commands something
within himself that renders obedience, or that he believes renders obedience”
(emphasis added); “we are at the same time the commanding and the obeying
parties. . . .”33
However, we tend to cover over the sensations accruing to the obedient
element—sensations of passivity, restraint, pressure, impulsion—“by means of the
synthetic concept ‘I’ . . . .” Following from this, we draw “erroneous conclusions” of the
will, such that “he who wills believes sincerely that willing suffices for action,” that “will
and action are somehow one.”34
It is important here that Nietzsche has called out the “synthetic” nature of the
concept ‘I,’ claimed that it obscures the passivity in action, and has attributed to it the
view that willing alone is sufficient for action. Synthesis indicates a uniting, and
33
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specifically a uniting of that which is not analytically but experientially united. The
synthesis of the ‘I’ is apparent in that both action, including all the “muscular
sensations” accompanying the above ingredients of willing, and willing, as the intention
to act and the thought of the act, are united as one, and they are united as one insofar
as they are the will and act of the ‘I.’ In other words, we believe that the running five
seconds later is the effect caused by our willing to do it, and that our willing to do it is
one with the action in the sense that the action is merely the temporal outgrowth or
expression of that willing, and that ‘I’ am one who caused the will and the act. We
associate willing with the commanding element alone, while the obeying element is
displaced as the resultant “action,” relegating the passive elements to the “action” that
we can be said to have commanded. Willing is then depicted as a commanding, active
experience only, and the “action” that occurs is attributed to the willing of it, as its
“necessary effect.” In a sense, what happens is that the passive elements are retained
only in such a way that they can be explained as effects of the active will, and in this
way, the ‘I’ remains in command of itself.
This belief is only conceivable due to the obfuscations of the process of action
leading to this terminus. This privileging of the commanding elements of the experience
of willing is accompanied by a privileging of the thought elements of the experience.
And here it becomes important that in discussing the “ruling thought” of willing,
Nietzsche adds almost tangentially “let us not imagine it possible to sever this thought
from the ‘willing,’ as if any will would then remain over!”35
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A key to the error of this interpretation and the provenance of the error from
beyond words is found in the following passage:
Since in the great majority of cases there has been exercise of will only
when the effect of the command—that is, obedience; that is, the action—
was to be expected, the appearance has translated itself into the feeling,
as if there were a necessity of effect. In short, he who wills believes with a
fair amount of certainty that will and action are somehow one; he
ascribes the success, the carrying out of the willing, to the will itself, and
thereby enjoys an increase of the sensation of power which accompanies
all success.36
In other words, what we call willing is actually composed of a passive reception of
expectation that is not accounted for by this whole conceived relation between the ‘I’,
its will and the effects of its will, for willing masquerades as cause of what was expected.
Will is our interposition into this process in which the action was already underway.
When the expectation is borne out, we thus are able to attach it as consequence to us,
to our will; the action is hereafter read as necessary, not merely expected. This
interposition, at the very least, renders one more than an automaton.
Through use of the concept ‘I,’ we “deceive ourselves” about the presence of the
passive elements. The ‘I’ that is a duality of activity and passivity, expels its command
aspects into the faculty of ‘willing,’ and its passive aspects into the ‘action.’ ‘I’ becomes
the projected substratum from which willing and acting proceed, when in fact that
which is here said to be the effect—the action—was actually under way prior to its
conscious recognition as the expected. It is on the projected unity of ‘I’ that the
prejudice contained in the unity of the word ‘willing’ actually rides. Will is thus a fetish;
invested with the commanding elements and perceived power over the obedient
36
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elements that are all really contained in the duality of the ‘I.’ But then, the ‘I’ is a fetish
as well, invested with the multifarious commanding and obeying deeds as their unified
source.
Thus, we experience as if it is our intention that is the origin of action. Nietzsche
will elsewhere call this a “subjective conviction,” which yields a psychological
vantagepoint on the origin of ‘cause.’ The conviction is that all motion and change come
about from an intention that works through this motion or change. Hence belief in the
Subject, the attributive subject of will, is “belief in the living and thinking as the only
effective force—in will, in intention—it is belief that every event is a deed, that every
deed presupposes a doer. . . .”37
Thus we can see why Nietzsche calls the “oldest habit” of ours that of
understanding events as the result of intentions, for it follows the model of our
experience of ourselves as the attributive source of actions. This is an “interpretatio[n]
based on [our]selves,” and it is in fact on this habit and projected self-interpretation
that science as we know it depends.
This is what Nietzsche will call a “subjective conviction.”38 It is indicated in WP
§488 as well: “The concept ‘reality,’ ‘being,’ is taken from our feeling of the subject.’
‘The subject’” interpreted from within ourselves, so that the ego counts as a substance,
as the cause of all deeds, as a doer.” This feeling of the Subject, when it is believed to be
the cause of deeds, obtains the feeling of power, and this power indicates, in a sense,
the impetus for the continuation of the grammatical custom, its ability to take on a life
37
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beyond mere grammar. It increases our feeling of power if there is a center that can be
viewed in this way. But the root here is not an entity or a being but rather a feeling.
First, throughout these sections there is, I take it, the implicit avowal that what is
being described herein is an historically conditioned phenomenon. We must already feel
and believe ourselves to be an ego if this feeling is then able to be the basis of an
ensuing understanding of reality. Thinking of oneself as an ego, thinking of oneself as
over and against objects/reality, and the conception of will as unifiable as a faculty of an
ego, are not conceptions the Ancients would have shared, though they used the
language of “I.”
Second, this gets us to the point that investments have their returns, and
Nietzsche indicates this return in the final phrase of the above passage from BGE §19, as
“an increase in the sensation of power which accompanies all success.” In fetishizing the
multiplicity of activity and passivity into a unified ‘I’ that “wills” and ensuingly “acts,” we
have multiplied the effects of the occurrence of this entire multiplicity—well, we have
turned it toward a profit at all. And part of the reason we are able to obtain this feeling
of power is through the force of ‘I’ as centralizing. ‘I’ directs the feeling of power that we
gain precisely by engaging in these interpretation of ‘I’ as substrate of various actions as
their ground; hence Nietzsche indicates that what has happened is something like the
thought “L ’effet c’est moi.” Here is the equation that Descartes could not account for:
that the being implied by thinking is the being of a one, an “I.” Consciousness is able to
take for itself the credit for the entire, multiple process, to read only itself as cause
there.
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In BGE §19, then, we see both the obfuscation provided by words, as well as the
misunderstanding we engage that does not rely on words and grammar but is extended
through them. ‘Willing’ exists as a word, and only as a word is it in fact a unity. However,
the process that occurs in cases that we take to be named by this one word, ‘willing,’
demonstrates a multiplicity to whose origin it seems we will never be able to penetrate.
It is not the word ‘willing’ that first leads to this obfuscation, but our own
misunderstanding of the process of actions, our own misunderstanding of the event in
which we are involved, the sources and contents; our own misunderstanding of the
nature of willing and intent. That ‘willing’ is one word, however, becomes important
only in the case that we already misunderstand ourselves in the above ways such that
the application of the unified word goes unnoticed as the imposition that it is; it also, in
going unnoticed, in being this imposition, serves an implicit need we have in the midst
of, as, that multiplicity.
Here, we are better able to understand how the grammatical custom of the
attachment of a subject to an action is able to gain such traction, because of the results
that accrue to the feeling of power when this subject is, in particular, ‘I.’ Recall that, in
WP §484, we are reminded of how Descartes proceeds from ‘thinking’ to the ‘I,’
supposedly through the light of nature which reveals that, given thinking, an I must exist
to be engaging in the deed. But Nietzsche’s critique here is that this procession does not
derive, but presupposes, the Subject. And this custom gains such traction because it aids
our feeling of power.
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Our use of ‘I’ thus claims unity (there is one substrate) and claims causality
(actions emanate from this substrate) and claims reducibility (that thinking, willing,
feeling, anything conceivable as an action, are the same inasmuch as they are the
emanations of this one cause). This ‘I’ as substrate to which many processes are
attached as their ground: this word, this ‘I,’ is actually the experience of ourselves as
ground and cause of action. We can say this is a word, but it is more to Nietzsche’s point
to say that it implies an interpretation of experience toward the greatest experience of
power that is then invested in a word.
So it appears that ‘I’ is actually the result of an experience from within our
current perspective that yields the provision of an opportunity: it provides a kind of
economically beneficial analogical structure whereby we can translate externalities to
ourselves. We have taken advantage of this grammatical custom, but here Nietzsche
adds depth beyond a merely Humean claim of habit: precisely by engaging this habit, we
enable our ability to assimilate our experiences toward the greatest feeling of power,
which is achieved by assimilating them to a center, and, we enable our ability to obtain
fresh feelings of power, precisely in such assimilation.
Thus, Nietzsche has not simply found a grammatical form which is repeated in
our thinking and feeling, the work of locating similitude, but he has attempted an
explanation as to why the very repetition of this form, this form of ‘I’ as cause of deeds
which include such actions as thinking, feeling, willing, is such a draw, and this
explanation is ultimately economical and biological: because it enables us to assimilate,
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because it allows us to attribute the strength of assimilation to the one being in
particular that we feel ourselves to be, which is a joy, a feeling of power.
Part of Nietzsche’s critique of the Subject thus focuses on the enabling power
that language yields to a Cartesian view. As has been suggested by our stage-setting
passages, above, this enabling power is found in the way that words, and grammatical
functions, utilize schemas that amount to interpretations that are projected onto
experience. Nietzsche will often refer to these schemas when he mentions the
“seductions” of language, as ‘faith’ or ‘belief’ in grammar or words, as ‘habits’ of
grammar, as ‘deceptions’ of grammar, and as ‘metaphysics’ of language. He suggests
that the yield of these habits, seductions, deceptions, are certain familiar schemas with
the aid of which we interpret our experience, and that, in general, these schemas are
nothing other than the basic categories of reason, many of which are also the basic
characteristics of our thinking of the Subject. Language yields reason in this sense,
because it is the source of the schemas whereby reason is constituted, and thus, as the
light of nature is for Descartes that power, often called reason, whereby what is true or
false becomes immediately clear, Nietzsche shows that this power is actually mediated
by certain words and grammatical structures.
But part of Nietzsche’s point is that these uses of language, this mediation, even
further obscures the physiological processes that themselves actually mediate
experience, covering them over such that we remain oblivious to there being a cover at
all. Language serves to deny the myriad mediations pre-existing its emergence on the
scene. It mediates an experience—of things, subjects, causation—that it projects as
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immediate. Reason, as an outgrowth of this habit of language, is thus an operation of
consciousness in the oblivion to its actual constitution.
My next step will seem to be a step back, then. I want to consider the biological
perspective within which Nietzsche places this process of misunderstanding and our
projection out of it into the context of another process, assimilation. After this, it will be
possible to come back to the schemas of language laid out above to suggest that ‘I’ is a
form of assimilation, and, as a word, the provision of an interpretation that allows the
‘doer-deed’ schema to also function as an assimilation, extending the range of this
power.
The Biological Roots of the Subject: Assimilation
BGE §19 has put us in mind of features which run counter to those of the Subject
as a conscious unity that subtends its actions as a causal ground, in indicating not only
the multiplicity of ingredients to the experience we name ‘willing,’ but also the passive
reception of an expectation that operates behind the back of consciousness.
Part of the view of the conscious and willing subject is that its primary,
determinative engagements with the world of which it is a part are conscious, or
possibly conscious, mental engagements that are a combination of thinking and exercise
of the will. In Descartes’ view, sensory perceptions are to be subjected to conscious,
rational analysis if we are to find truth regarding them. Nietzsche, however, suggests
that all conscious activities are outgrowths of more preliminary biological engagements,
just as in the above passage he suggested that willed action is the outgrowth of
muscular sensations that were likely already underway. The terms he uses for these
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primary biological processes are assimilation [Anähnlichung and Einverleibung] and
equalization [Gleichsetzung].
Assimilation describes the process of growth through incorporation, whereby
organic life is comprised of the results of a rendering of the new and foreign into a
repetition of form that creates a being that is an inseparable combination of old and
new. This turning of the new into the old is a tropic work, a kind of turning that subtends
all speaking and writing.
My guiding interest here will be to suggest that this kind of biological tropic
engagement which preexists consciousness is repeated in consciousness, first in the
form of our belief in the Subject, then in the process of language as provision of
interpretive schemes based on that belief in the Subject, whereby incorporation of the
new occurs through its translation into the form of the old; and that the activity to
which we give the name interpretation—the projection of pre-existing schemas—is thus
a form of assimilation.
The historical question emerges at this point again, however: is it the case that in
Nietzsche’s comments that give us reason to read the Subject as a means of assimilation
through interpretation, an assimilation that also characterizes language, there is a
transhistorical claim about the nature of human being? First, we might note that
Nietzsche’s claims about assimilation make use of analogy with a certain form,
idioplasm, which was part of the contemporary scientific attempt to explain the
heredity of characteristics as a development from internal causes. This particular view
seems to already reflect the dominance of thinking of beings on the model of
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inside/internality-outside/externality, and hence to reflect that partitioning of subject
and object. The effect of Nietzsche’s use of the idioplasm as an analogy is, on one hand,
a criticism of the reign of the Subject in subverting the priority of thinking substance
over extended substance, i.e. that of the human over other beings, for assimilation at
least describes a process shared across organic life, placing the human as one among
these organic beings. However, the analogy is clearly taken from the scientific thought
of Nietzsche’s day. It would seem that rather than attempting to give a transhistorical
explanation of assimilation, Nietzsche is rather only interrupting the priority given to the
thinking Subject here.
For such a reading as an interruption, we might note BGE §22, in which Nietzsche
describes the will to power, and a clear version of eternal recurrence, as possibly being
an interpretation put forward “so vividly that almost every word, even the word
‘tyranny’ itself, would eventually seem unsuitable, or a weakening and attenuating
metaphor—being too human. . . . Supposing that this also is only interpretation . . . well,
so much the better.”
In other words, we might imagine this whole series of claims to be an
interpretation, supposing that what is happening in the use of the Subject is the same
work that we believe to be happening in our current understanding of organic beings.
This might be an interpretation that is only available for one already shaped by modern
Subjectivity, but its point is not to present a corrective on the order of truth, but to
provide an interruption to some elements of this Subjectivity from out of its own
resources. In other words, thinking of ourselves, in our uses of language, and in our
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belief in ourselves as Cartesian Subjects, as thereby employing activities that are also
employed by non-conscious beings allows us to see or imagine a continuity between res
extensa/objects and res cogitans/the Subject that, because it is figured as more primary,
subverts the vision in which everything about the Subject is grounded in thinking.
So, in what I cite below, I believe that what we see at work in Nietzsche’s claims
about the seductions and habits of grammar and language are nothing other than
depicting these habits as refracted continuations of this basic process of incorporation
through assimilation, rendering the old in the form of the new so that it can be made
use of. In fact, the tropological nature of language is based on the tropological nature of
this biological process, a claim that goes back to early in Nietzsche’s career.39 This
biological perspective in the critique of the Subject is also a critique of language, an
indication that language itself is more than a static conglomeration of words and
grammatical structures existing at a given time, but is a kind of function or praxis that is
also the way of being of the kind of Subjects we are discussing. In other words, the
Subjects that we believe ourselves to be can be thought of as propped up by a function
that precedes them and which is continued in language. Language, in its more narrow
sense as a techne used by us, is in a broader sense the process whereby conscious
beings come to be. What may have appeared to be merely grammatical or linguistic
habits or seductions are given a continuity with the processes that constitute kinds of
entities. And as there is a kind of falsification involved in this process, language’s
purported falsity is of a piece with the falsity that is a condition of our kind of existence.
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This will allow us to read the “seductions of language” and “habits of grammar” in
relation to the suggestion in BGE §19, that what is at issue is the incorporation of new
experience in such a way that it might increase the power of the organism at issue.
Because the schemas of language also involve a hiding of this very nature, what this
biological vantagepoint exposes is the obfuscation of the multiplicity characterizing our
experience by the application of the above-mentioned “schemas” provided by language.
This obfuscation covers over the continuum nature of the Subject, the way that the
appearance of the Subject rides on so many layers of assimilation. But this is precisely
what the conception of the Subject is supposed to do, because this is what assimilation,
in this biological sense, always does—and, perhaps, what this very reading of
assimilation continues to do.40
Equalization and Assimilation
In certain passages in WP, we find the notion of subject as a substantial unity
undergirding sensing and thinking processes subverted by the notion of subject as a
misnomer for what is actually a continuum of biological processes. The terms
equalization and assimilation help to make this clear, as Nietzsche renders processes
that we think of as thinking, sensing, speaking, etc., in terms of these biological
processes, which, when thought in relation to the claims regarding language, look to
bear a striking resemblance to a preliminary process of interpretation; or, rather, make
interpretation resemble a continuation of the process of assimilation.

40

Hence language “loves error, because being alive, it loves life” (BGE §24).
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A glimpse into the continuum nature of the Subject, as opposed to its unity, can
be found if we consider the idioplasm41, protoplasm, amoeba, and crystal. All are forms
of composition that allow us to consider “assimilation” in nuce, an overpowering of the
new and rendering it into a repetition of prior forms. Nietzsche mentions these in a
number of passages in § 4 and 5 of Book 3 of The Will to Power.
The “primitive conditions (pre-organic)” of thinking “is the crystallization of
forms, as in the case of crystal. – In our thought, the essential feature is fitting new
material into old schemas . . . making equal what is new.”42 The crystal is not an analogy
for thinking; it engages a process that is repeated in what we call thinking; it is a form
which composes itself in a process of incorporating new material and rendering it into
repetitions of the present form of the crystal, as each new branch of the crystal comes
about through this repetition of its basic structure in reworked, new material.
Sense perception is said to work in the same way as the idioplasm: “The same
equalizing and ordering force that rules in the idioplasma, rules also in the incorporation
of the outer world: our sense perceptions are already the result of this assimilation and
equalization in regard to all the past in us; they do not follow directly upon the
‘impression’—.“43
The amoeba also engages this process: “All thought, judgment, perception,
considered as comparison, has as its precondition a ‘positing of equality,’ and earlier still
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Refers to Naegeli’s theory of the idioplasm as a theory of heredity of characteristics; the idioplasm, like
the germ-plasm, is the locus of continuous development in a definite direction from internal causes. From
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a ‘making equal.’ This process of making equal is the same as the process of
incorporation of appropriated material in the amoeba.”44
All of the above inorganic and organic forms engage a process of assimilation, an
“equalizing and ordering force” by which what is new is made equal to the form of the
entity to enable incorporation.45 The crystal at each stage of growth repeats the prior
forms; the organic forms constitute the same incorporation, as each cell of a
multicellular organism grows by the ingestion of material that is rendered into the form
of new cells that repeat the protoplasm already within them.
The same process of ingestion through equalization can be observed in our
sense, thinking, and linguistic processes—indeed, the distinction is misleading, as the
picture we get is one of a continuum of this process of incorporation through
assimilation and equalization. This is a kind of biological language or, as we see below,
interpretation.
Assimilation and Interpretation
We might turn here to a passage on language as translation into familiar terms,
to notice the shared traits between this process of assimilation and the process of
language as translation and the related notion of interpretation: “Inner experience
enters our consciousness only after it has found a language the individual understands—
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i.e. a translation of a condition into conditions familiar to him—; ‘to understand’ means
merely: to be able to express something new in the language of something old and
familiar.”46
Nietzsche calls this rendering of inner experience into a language that we
understand interpretation. This interpretation is said to be “interposed” between the
“text” and our experience of it. It is a “lack of philology,” for the suggestion is that there
is a “text” that might somehow be read “as a text” but for our projection of an
interpretation on the text.47 The suggestion is that the projective nature of
interpretation sets the terms that allow for assimilation.
Our depiction not only of outer but also of inner experience rides on the back of
these interpretations:
I maintain the phenomenality of the inner world, too: everything of
which we become conscious is arranged, simplified, schematized,
interpreted through and through—the actual process of inner
‘perception,’ the causal connection between thoughts, feelings, desires,
between subject and object, are absolutely hidden from us—and are
perhaps purely imaginary. The ‘apparent inner world’ is governed by just
the same forms and procedures as the ‘outer world’.48
Thus incorporation through equalization is used to describe the experiences of
sensation, of inner experience, of knowledge, of linguistic use, of memory, and even
that whereby the Subject becomes aware of itself.
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Ibid., §479.
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Consciousness and Assimilation
This basic drive to make equal, to assimilate and hence incorporate, is also
employed by sense processes and consciousness, but it seems accurate to say that
sense processes and consciousness are something like extensions or repetitions of this
basic process of equalizing in order to incorporate.
Consciousness is first a “becoming-conscious” of perceptions “which [were]
useful and essential to us and to the entire organic process. . . . Consciousness is present
only to the extent that consciousness is useful.” Consciousness’ particular form of
making equal often goes by the name of ‘knowledge,’ but this is just an expression for
the means whereby consciousness services a need of the growing organism, the “need
for security, for quick understanding on the basis of signs and sounds, for means of
abbreviation. . . .” (WP §504, 513)
The logical construction of the world is based on a “compulsion to construct
concepts, species, forms, purposes, laws” which Nietzsche calls constructing “’a world of
identical cases’.” These identical cases allow it to appear that “‘the same form is
attained,’” but “what appears is always something new, and it is only we, who are
always comparing, who include the new, to the extent that it is similar to the old, in the
unity of the ‘form.’” This inclusion creates a world that is thus “calculable, simplified,
comprehensible, etc., for us.” (WP §521)
This compulsion to construct a world of identical cases, thus rendering it
calculable, is found also in our sense processes: “[t]his same compulsion exists in the
sense activities that support reason—by simplification, coarsening, emphasizing, and
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elaborating, upon which all ‘recognition,’ all ability to make oneself intelligible rests. Our
needs have made our senses so precise that the ‘same apparent world’ always
reappears and has thus acquired the semblance of reality.”49 Sensory capacities are
depicted not as mere receptivities, but as sources of projection as well as reception.
Within this discussion of sensory processes, we find another claim about the
origin of the Subject. Nietzsche suggests that the Subject comes from two kinds of
prejudice: that of the sensory capacities and their kind of ‘language’, and that of the
psyche.
Regarding the senses, the suggestion is that our sensory capacities are
themselves the source of the doer-deed schema: “Psychological history of the concept
“subject.” The body, the thing, the ‘whole’ construed by the eye, awaken the distinction
between a deed and a doer; the doer, the cause of the deed, conceived ever more
subtly, finally left behind the ‘subject’.”50
In another passage, he suggests that ‘subject’, ‘object’, ‘doer’, ‘deed’, are
a result of translation into man’s ‘sense language’:
[motion] always carries the idea that something is moved—this always
supposes, whether as the fiction of a little clump of atom or even as the
abstraction of this, the dynamic atom, a thing that produces effects. . . .
Subject, object, a doer added to the doing, the doing separated from that
which it does: let us not forget that this is mere semiotics and nothing
real. Mechanistic theory as a theory of motion is already a translation into
the sense language of man.51
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Yet it seems that this sense prejudice also relies on a psychological prejudice:
“We have borrowed the concept of unity from our ‘ego’ concept—our oldest article of
faith. If we did not hold ourselves to be unities, we would never have formed the
concept ‘thing’.” This is called a part of ‘our psychical ‘experience,’ a ‘psychological
prejudice’ which joins with sense prejudice in creating the mechanistic theory of the
world, which “employ[s] two fictions: the concept of motion (taken from our sense
language) and the concept of the atom (=unity, deriving from our psychical ‘experience’)
. . . [thus presupposing] a sense prejudice and a psychological prejudice.” Using these
prejudices, “[m]echanistic theory formulates consecutive appearances, and it does so
semeotically, in terms of the senses and of psychology (that all effect is motion; that
where there is motion something is moved); it does not touch upon the causal force.”
(WP §635, emphasis added)
Thus, we have a number of interrelated experiences. The first is ignorance. We
cannot see into every event, we are superficial, and everything is new. However, we
crave the familiar, and at those places beyond which we cannot see or sense, we install
the familiar. The creation of identicalities in sense rides on this desire to render the new
as the old. Thus, out of this desire, we not only err, but we repeat the same error, over
and over again. From our ignorance comes a rendering of the cases of our ignorance
into identicalities, on the basis of which we can apply familiar schemas. What is
important is that we be able to schematize.
It just so happens that our experience is the basis of these familiarities. Feelings,
sensations, subjective experiences. The ability to use feelings, sensations, and subjective
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experiences as the basis for re-rendering observations comes from our desire for the
familiar. And this is there, at the root of language. For we must have the ability to see as
the same in order to apply words, for words are first names of images. But language
serves a double function, for it not only re-renders, repeating the drive for familiarity
that sensation already accomplished, but it renders, it creates. At a certain point of
development, the availability of a language is a shortcut to identicality. Language takes
over that more preliminary desire and capacity, the desire to make familiar as the old,
the same; the capability to make the old, the same. This is what Nietzsche will call the
equalization required for assimilation, and we see that it has its roots in a process that
exists for organic as well as inorganic entities.
Thus, this biological process of assimilation appears to be repeated in the means
of increasing power that we observe in the schemas provided by particular words and
linguistic structures:
The meaning of ‘knowledge’: here . . . the concept is to be regarded in a
strict and narrow anthropocentric and biological sense. In order for a
particular species to maintain itself and increase its power, its conception
of reality must comprehend enough of the calculable and constant for it
to base a scheme of behavior on it. . . . In other words: the measure of
the desire for knowledge depends upon the measure to which the will to
power grows in a species: a species grasps a certain amount of reality in
order to become master of it, in order to press it into service.52
Indeed, the biological process looks to be no different from the process of
interpretation:
Not ‘to know’ but to schematize—to impose upon chaos as much
regularity and form as our practical needs require. In the formation of
reason, logic, the categories, it was need that was authoritative: the
52
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need, not to ‘know,’ but to subsume, to schematize, for the purpose of
intelligibility and calculation—(The development of reason is adjustment,
invention, with the aim of making similar, equal—the same process that
every sense impression goes through!)53
The Subject, an Interpretation
It is thus significant that the Subject is called an interpretation, in WP §481.
Based on the description of WP §479, considered in the above interlude, we understand
this to indicate its projective nature. ‘The subject’ is an element of language not only as
a word, but as this kind of translating and projecting capacity. For, as a word, it is like
the others, inasmuch as “[w]e set up a word at the point at which our ignorance begins,
at which we can see no further, e.g., the word ‘I,’ the word ‘do,’ the word ‘suffer,’”—
these are perhaps the horizon of our knowledge, but not ‘truths’.” As regards its
translating capacity, that which makes it interpretation: “The ‘subject’ is not something
given, it is something added and invented and projected behind what there is.” (WP
§482, 481)
What Nietzsche is critiquing here, by ‘the subject’ is both, on one hand, a word
or a set of interchangeable words, such as ‘I’ or ‘ego’; but it is also the work that such
words achieve for beings like us, which is the provision of a means of interpretation.
This is always an interposition, a projection, such that the new can be rendered into the
familiar.
If we return to his earlier claim that “‘to understand’ means merely: to be able to
express something new in the language of something old and familiar,” Nietzsche adds
in WP §481 that though this renders knowability, “the world is . . . interpretable
53
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otherwise.” This is because “it is our needs that interpret the world; our drives and their
For and Against. Every drive is a kind of lust to rule; each one has its perspective that it
would like to compel all the other drives to accept as the norm.” Interpretations are
thus perspectives from the vantagepoint that is advantageous to a given drive that
desires to rule the others. ‘The subject’ thus can refer to a set of means of
interpretation whereby a drive rules the others through projection of its vantagepoint.
We will consider this notion of a multiplicity of drives, within which one can gain
the power to rule or to appear to rule, as we get further. For now, I want to focus on
language in its interpretive capacity.
The above claim about language as translation into the familiar is significant for
two reasons. First, it indicates that language, considered in its mimetic potential as a
means of representing the new in already familiar terms, is itself a part of the
constitution of the becoming conscious of anything, thus adding an element that
Descartes did not explicitly thematize. Consciousness seems to be characterized less by
immediacy, and rather at least by the temporality required for re-expressing, translating
into familiar conditions. Imposing this language into the previous section’s findings, we
might be tempted to say: the found ‘I’ represents an interpretation. Second, the claim
implies that, since the Subject in Descartes’ terms has as its content that of itself of
which it has become conscious, the very language used to render this consciousness is
itself part of the constitution of consciousness. We thus have reason to consider the
language of consciousness in both senses this phrase implies: in the sense of the
particular elements of language that are used or implicated in a Cartesian view of
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consciousness; and in the sense in which consciousness itself functions as a kind of
language, or as a kind of language-ing, a kind of projecting and interpreting. This latter
sense is part of Nietzsche’s innovation here, part of the view of the Subject that he is
actually building up in contrast to Descartes’. In Nietzsche’s comments on the Subject,
language is both that which supports and continually reinscribes the Cartesian view of
the Subject, but it is also that of which a consideration enables a deconstruction and
reconstituted view of the Subject. What forms the link here, enabling language to
perform both functions? It seems to have to do with thinking about language in two
senses: as a means, as a structure composed of kinds of entities (words, sentences, etc.)
and as a function that those means bring to bear (interpretation). In the latter sense,
language is a means of provision of perspective by which one drive is able to rule or
appear to rule the others. Language is like a capacity that can be used, or put to use, in
this sense. When we look at particular linguistic elements, in the next section, we
consider not only those elements in particular, but the way in which they are put to use,
and the drive by which they are put to use, toward an interpretation.
What Nietzsche has done in these passages is to make consciousness an
extension of a process that preexists the Subject of consciousness. If consciousness is an
extension of the basic activity of assimilation through equalization, then the ‘I’ posited
by consciousness is such an instance of assimilation through equalization. What is at the
root of this supposed immediacy is a mediation. Further, because it is an extension of
the mediation that gives rise to consciousness itself, there can be no immediacy here:
we cannot get before or behind the mediation, for we, as beings of consciousness, are
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of it. The consciousness that gives rise to self-consciousness is already a process of
assimilation. ‘Who’ assimilated that which pre-exists the assimilated subject?
There is another issue to be pursued more fully here: how this biological process
is one among many, i.e., is part of a multiplicity of such processes of assimilation. The
section below considers how this biological turn interrupts the unity of the Subject.
Subject as Assimilating Multiplicity
The above consideration of consciousness and sensation allows us to approach
the Subject in its capacity as an interpretation that serves the aim of assimilation of a
multiplicity. Specifically, Nietzsche’s claim that what goes for ‘outer’ experience goes
also for ‘inner’ experience is important here. For we have noted that consciousness is a
becoming-conscious of certain perceptions useful for preservation of a kind of life,
which is at the same time a not becoming conscious of others. Consciousness is partial, a
fact which the term ‘self-consciousness’ might serve to obfuscate. When we note this
fact that consciousness is partial, “that a higher court rules over these things
[unconscious bodily processes] cannot be doubted—a kind of directing committee on
which the various chief desires make their votes and power felt.”54
In WP §490, Nietzsche claims “My hypotheses: the subject as multiplicity.” While
Nietzsche does not claim here that the Subject is certainly a multiplicity, only
hypothesizes it, this notion of the Subject as multiplicity makes sense as an hypothesis if
we consider the work of consciousness as on a continuum with the body and biological
processes of assimilation. In fact, this is what BGE §19 goes on to indicate when it turns
54
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to the language of “commonwealth.” Nietzsche uses this language of the
commonwealth to describe the way that various centers of power operate within an
entire organism. One center usurps the power of the others.
Here, consciousness is expressed not as the outgrowth of the unity underlying
actions effected through the body—which is the understanding of subject as substrate,
substance—but as one class comprising the many classes within this bodily
commonwealth. Consciousness is not the director of the commonwealth, as ‘I’ purports,
but the class that likes to take credit for, and hence to erase and claim for itself, the
actions of all the subservient classes. Consciousness is no less subservient, except that it
has the ability to hypostatize itself, to puff itself up, to create an image of itself—as the
center and director of all, which it achieves through the ‘I,’ in its saying “L’effet c’est
moi.” It is in this way not unlike the CEO with no connection to the actual conditions or
activities on the company factory floors, who does not know how many employees are
employed by the corporation, or all that they achieve on a daily basis, but who claims, at
the end of the quarter, that due to his/her directives, “I made that.”
In WP §492, we get a perhaps even stronger demonstration of how physiological
experience obviates the pretensions of ‘I’ as causal substrate, and, one which shows us
that the problem in this case is not with the notion of a Subject as such but with the
notions of unity and causation as substrate of all actions that are attached to our
thinking of the ‘I.’ Here Nietzsche begins with the statement
the body and physiology the starting point—why?—We gain the correct
idea of the nature of our subject-unity, namely as regents at the head of
a communality (not as ‘souls’ or life forces) , also of the dependence of
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these regents upon the ruled and of an order of rank and division of labor
as the conditions that make possible the whole and its parts.
This repeats the sense in BGE §19 of the myriad sensations, thoughts, and affects
comprising, as “ingredients,” the apparent ‘willing’ of an ‘action.’ The subject-unity is
not a conscious commander of isolated actions, but a regent kept in “relative ignorance
. . . concerning individual activities and even disturbances within the communality [that
is] among the conditions under which rule can be exercised.”
Consciousness is not the regent, for “[i]t is not the directing agent, but an organ
of the directing agent.”55 But it gives the semblance of rule, or perhaps usurps the ruling
position, in the sense that it directs toward a certain perspective interpretation,
precisely the perspective interpretation that it rules. This follows the sense in which
Nietzsche claims, in these sections, that “a belief can be a condition of life and
nonetheless be false,” or, “that a belief, however necessary it may be for the
preservation of a species, has nothing to do with truth,” and that “it could be useful and
important for one’s activity to interpret oneself falsely.”56 For “our belief in the ego as
substance,” is a condition of life, for if we “let it go means: being no longer able to
think.”57
We have found that the schemas that come along with the belief in the Subject
of consciousness provide for certain needs of this kind of life. As WP §488-489 indicate,
these include stability through change, and an ability to organize relations with other
organisms (as things that we can act on). Consciousness is, as we have found above, a
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development out of the need to assimilate. Hence, “[n]ot ‘to know’ but to schematize—
to impose upon chaos as much regularity and form as our practical needs require. In the
formation of reason, logic, the categories, it was need that was authoritative: the need,
not ‘to know,’ but to subsume, to schematize, for the purpose of intelligibility and
calculation.”58
So the conscious subject, who feels itself to be the commander of this entity we
are through its being the substrate of causation through willing, does not rule, but
provides a familiar interpretation, the interpretation through which we assimilate and
obtain fresh feelings of power, and make more likely our success at certain assimilations
in the future. However, what we take as the highest power within us has itself
developed as a means, and as a means, it cannot be self-justifying, but justified only by
the role it plays and need that it fills. This need that it fills is that of “the interests of
social intercourse,” and in fact it is developed out of that very intercourse itself (WP
§524).59
Language and Assimilation as ‘Making Similar’: Composing Subjects
Language is not only the name for the process of interpretation that is a
repetition of assimilation that seems to occur at the level of individual organisms.
Consciousness in its service of the need for social intercourse here opens onto language
as convention, as the shared familiar. For language is also said to develop out of the
need to service a kind of shared life. Because it develops out of the need to make a
58
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certain kind of life possible and continuable—the need for quick assessment, for a
process of abbreviation that can be convention, habit, familiar—language is the sine qua
non for the usurpation of the position of rule by consciousness for not only one life, but
a kind of life which is shared. In this sense, it has a second life beyond the assimilation
we have already considered: it not only assimilates (makes equal, incorporable)
phenomena, it assimilates (makes equal, similar) the kind of life characterized by
consciousness. This assimilation relates to the way that a spoken and written language is
shared.
Sharing a Language: Language and the Origin of Ideas
We have already seen Nietzsche implicate philosophy in a seduction by
grammar, a reliance on the schemas it provides for thinking of subjects as causal
substrates. This is why language has been said to hold prejudices of reason. This view
seems to be deepened in a few passages in BGE in which Nietzsche suggests that the
structure of language is determinative of the conceptual structure of peoples who share
a language.
Here he claims “that individual philosophical concepts are not anything
capricious or autonomously evolving, but grow up in connection and relationship with
each other . . . [and] belong just as much to a system as all the members of the fauna of
a continent . . . is betrayed in the end also by the fact that the most diverse philosophers
keep filling in a definite fundamental scheme of possible philosophies.”60 They operate
“under an invisible spell,” for, however different their projects, “something within leads
60

BGE §20, emphasis added.
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them, something impels them in a definite order . . . to wit, the innate systematic
structure and relationship of their concepts.” In this way “their thinking is, in fact, far
less a discovery than a recognition, a remembering, a return and a homecoming to a
remote, primordial, and inclusive household of the soul, out of which those concepts
grew originally,” such that “philosophizing is . . . a kind of atavism of the highest order.”
(BGE §20, emphasis added)
What can be the source here, which is sought over and over?
The strange family resemblance of all Indian, Greek, and German
philosophizing is explained easily enough. Where there is affinity of
languages, it cannot fail, owing to the common philosophy of grammar—I
mean, owing to the unconscious domination and guidance by similar
grammatical functions—that everything is prepared at the outset for a
similar development and sequence of philosophical systems; just as the
way seems barred against certain other possibilities of worldinterpretation.61
And it seems probable that philosophers at home in languages in which “the
concept of the Subject is least developed . . . look otherwise ‘into the world,’ and will be
found on paths of thought different from those of the Indo-Germanic peoples and the
Muslims. . . .”62
Sharing a Language: Language and Inner States
WP §503 claims that knowledge “is an apparatus for abstraction and
simplification—directed not at knowledge but at taking possession of things.” What
constitutes this abstraction and simplification directed to ‘things’?

61
62

Ibid.
Ibid.
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In earlier texts we have considered in part I, the main point regarding language
was a negative one, the point being that, whatever those ‘things’ are, our words, and
even moreso our concepts, could not be said to grasp or represent them faithfully. But
in a number of the later texts there is a valence of language, specifically in consideration
of words and concepts, that amounts to the sense in which language is not just a sign
language that purports ‘things,’ however unfaithfully, but that signifies affect, or what
are often called “inner states.” Language does more than simply signify these inner
states, however; it plays a role in the creation and recreation of similar inner states
within a people who share a language.
We might begin by considering the suggestion that perceptions contain value
judgments:
. . . the sum of all those perceptions the becoming-conscious of which
was useful and essential to us and to the entire organic process—
therefore not all perceptions in general. . . . [W]e have senses for only a
selection of perceptions—those with which we have to concern ourselves
in order to preserve ourselves. Consciousness is present only to the extent
that consciousness is useful. It cannot be doubted that all sense
perceptions are permeated with value judgments (useful and harmful,
consequently, pleasant or unpleasant).”63
This seems to suggest that consciousness of perceptions increases as the value
judgment that those perceptions are useful grows. Becoming conscious of perceptions
or a type of perception involves, then, a kind of affirmation of that type of perception.
WP §506 suggests that the weak inner sensations, or emotions, called up by
words are actually the basis of concepts: “First images—to explain how images arise in
63

Ibid., 503. This seems to bear a relation to the claim in OMW that there are two types of
representation, sensory, mental, linguistic, on one hand, and those that accompany all of these, in the
form of pleasure and pain. This tone underground seems now to be expressed as the force of
value/valuation inherent in perception.
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the spirit. Then words, applied to images. Finally, concepts, possible only when there are
words—the collecting together of many images in something nonvisible but audible
(word).” This much might put us in mind of his earlier schema involving sensations,
words, and concepts in OTL. Yet, he goes on: “The tiny amount of emotion to which the
‘word’ gives rise, as we contemplate similar images for which one word exists—this
weak emotion is the common element, the basis of the concept. That weak sensations
are regarded as alike, sensed as being the same, is the fundamental fact.” While in OTL,
the concept was said to have its basis in a metaphor or aesthetic leap from words into
an entirely new sphere, Nietzsche here supplies a point of continuity between the word
and the concept, as the concept is, in at least one sense, born from the collection of the
‘emotion’ compounded by all the similar ‘images’ to which a word is attached. It is as if
we envision the images that come to mind when we hear a word, and what forms the
basis of the concept is not what looks or appears similar in those images, as if they were
purely visual, but that what is similar is the emotion in us that we sense when imagining
what the word represents.
This means, first, that words are harbingers of emotion. That they imply an
emotive response in us means that they are the sorts of things to which values are
attached. And if our emotive response to words is the basis of the concepts that they
form, then the concept contains a valence of evaluation. This analysis also suggests that,
since words and concepts are conventional, the evaluative valence must also be shared
by those who use a language in common.
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These suggestions are echoed more clearly in BGE §268, where words are said to
correspond to inner states. “Words are acoustical signs for concepts; concepts,
however, are more or less definite image signs for often recurring and associated
sensations, for groups of sensations.” The passage goes on to indicate that words are
associated with certain inner experiences or sensations, such that to understand
someone’s words is to have the same inner experiences associated with the same
words: “To understand one another, it is not enough that one use the same words; one
also has to use the same words for the same species of inner experiences; in the end
one has to have one’s experience in common.” The inner states associated with words
might be “feelings, intentions, nuances, desires, and fears. . . .”
Within what we might call “a people,” those who “have long lived together
under similar conditions (of climate, soil, danger, needs and work),” the same words
become associated with the same inner states: “in all souls an equal number of often
recurring experiences has come to be predominant over experiences that come more
rarely: on the basis of the former one understands the other, quickly and ever more
quickly.” (BGE §268)
Hence, “the history of language is the history of a process of abbreviation,”
whereby people are able to understand one another more and more quickly, because
the same words serve as abbreviations of the same inner states, sensations, and needs.
And this history traces a “progressus in simile,” as man continually develops “toward the
similar, ordinary, average.” (BGE §268)
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We might consider these points, first, in distinction to the earlier treatment of
words and concepts in OTL. In the schema depicted therein, we moved from sensation,
to mental image, to words applied to those mental images. Words were there
considered in their naming function, as names for the mental images. Words became
concepts as they transcended their function of naming mental images, and instead were
considered to name different sorts of entities, the concept. The concept was a
collapsing, an attempt to make each use of the word, as a name, equivalent. Since the
word named mental images, it was a collapsing of each mental image thus named into
only what was the same, and exclusion of whatever was particular to one or another.
The concept was then an artificial conglomeration of everything that each instance of
application of the name to a mental image shared, and nothing they did not.
There are similarities between the above passages on words and concepts and
this earlier depiction. This earlier schema in OTL can also be said to involve a kind of
inner state, inasmuch as the mental images might be called inner states. And certainly,
in both, words and concepts perform a kind of narrowing function, whereby the
understanding that is built up through our use of language and concepts tends to
obscure the inner states at their basis.
But what seems to be unique to these later passages is that the inner states are
not that which are named by words, but that which are “associated with” or “given rise
to” by words. There seems to be something non-mimetic here.64 If we look at WP §506,
that passage that seemed at first to recapitulate the earlier schema, we see that words
64

This mimetic framework was marked by Nietzsche’s appending the “mysterious X” to this schema, in
relation to which the initial sensation, itself translated into a mental image, was unequal.
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name images. But the emotion that Nietzsche refers to here as the basis of the concept
is not the image that is named by the word, but rather “[t]he tiny amount of emotion to
which the ‘word’ gives rise, as we contemplate similar images for which one word exists
. . . ” (emphasis added). The contemplation of what the words are said to name is what
gives rise to the emotion: in this sense, the emotion at issue is said to be “associated”
with the word, but not “named” by the word. This is a valence of words that was not
included in the earlier depiction. It is our inability to make distinctions among these
associated emotions that allows the concept: “That weak sensations are regarded as
alike, sensed as being the same, is the fundamental fact.” WP §511 links this “regarding
as alike” to conditions of life: what we are dealing with here is the equalization of what
is not equal, in order to assimilate it.
We have just seen that language is the process of abbreviation of inner states,
sensations, and needs, and that the development of language describes the
development of communities toward a similar structure of soul. Nietzsche elaborates
elsewhere that
Which group of sensations is aroused, expresses itself, and issues
commands in a soul most quickly, is decisive for the whole order of rank
of its values and ultimately determines its table of goods. The values of a
human being betray something of the structure of his soul and where it
finds its conditions of life, its true need.”65
If we consider both kinds of passages, Nietzsche seems to suggest that not only do
values betray the structure of soul, but language seems to be a means whereby that
structure is composed and reiterated. This suggests that language not only provides
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BGE §268, emphasis added.
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schemas and habits for interpretation, but that it plays a role in composing the soul that
goes on to engage that kind of interpretation.
Consciousness represents the first ‘usurpation’ of rule. Its tool is language. The
tool has a ramifying power: it shapes ‘the soul,’ the system of valuation. We can only get
out of this from within this: changing language, but we cannot throw it off:
Now we read disharmonies and problems into things because we think
only in the form of language—and thus believe in the ‘eternal truth’ of
‘reason’. . . . We cease to think when we refuse to do so under the
constraint of language; we barely reach the doubt that sees this
limitation as a limitation. Rational thought is interpretation according to a
scheme that we cannot throw off.”66
Conclusions
The Subject, as all unities, is an interpretation. Interpretation is a function of a
kind of life. So, there is a kind of life that lives by interpretation. Who we are is, at least
in one way, to appear to ourselves as the Subjects of our interpretations—the
retrospectively created subjects of the interpretations that consciousness cannot
live/grow/amass power/assimilate without, as interpretation is a form of assimilation,
enacted in our case not only through language proper—‘grammar and words’—but the
languages with which the body is inflected. When engaged by a being characterized also
by consciousness, these assimilations create the illusion of a pre-existing center, the
Subject as the illusory unitary center of force. But, then, beings that we are live by this
illusion, and its constitution is testament to how we are, for we are through it, which is
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WP §522.
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why this critique of the Subject is not simply a denial of the Subject, as through the
critique we gain a perspective on how we are as what we are not.67
It seems in many ways that the category of interpretation is the larger context
within which language is placed in these texts and notes. Interpretation is neither a
merely linguistic nor conscious nor rational phenomenon; in fact, the process that might
be named ‘interpretation’ gives rise to our very ability to posit categories or name
‘interpretation’ at all. Interpretation on one hand is that process of assimilation that
describes the means whereby all forms of life, from inorganic to organic, incorporate
others as they become. As it is at its basis a projecting of a schema whereby that which
is external to the organism becomes internal to the organism by becoming ‘rendered’
into familiar terms (the function of ‘identical’ cases), all beings in any process of
development interpret. Nietzsche remarks that even this positing of the process is itself
interpretation, for he is not at liberty to throw off the schema whereby his kind of life
lives. The difference between the crystal and the human, from the perspective of the
human, is that the crystal does not posit its own activity in another form, as a word or a
concept, as we do. Likewise, when we observe the body, we find many instances of
interpretation, but were it not for the perspective of consciousness, all these processes
might still go on as they do now, save for the process of naming the others as
‘interpretation.’ But this is just where the special power of interpretation, in the form of
language, comes in, for as language, interpretation can alter itself of its own designs.
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Which Nietzsche will claim is itself an interpretation, as which, “so much the better!”
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Language becomes a kind of prison, or a kind of imprisonment, for particular
forms of consciousness become embedded (‘petrified’) in language, and language in one
sense is this embeddedness, such that when we think only in the form of language,
language becomes a means whereby a certain interpretation becomes solidified and
unsurpassable, and is the form beyond which an alternative is usually not imagined.
Language is such a means that allows the interpretations of consciousness to become
solidified, to gain an impressing power that continually reasserts itself.
Yet, this power can turn on itself. It can turn on itself because, analytically
considered, interpretation is not equivalent to any of its schemas: because
interpretation is not equivalent to a given linguistic expression. It is the power of
schematizing, not reducible to any one schema. Because there is a force of life that runs
through interpretation, the particularities of any given interpretation can be seen as the
evaluations necessitated by that form of life. Which raises the spectre of others.
It seems as if the problem identified with language, throughout, is not one with
language as such. Language is not lamentable because of that power which it could
never have, the power to represent the in-itself faithfully. Language is lamentable only
as a particular formation of language, when a particular schema, expressed in language,
takes on the appearance of reality, masquerading as what it is not. In fact, it seems as if
there is a saving power here, and that the saving power is also this character of
language, new uses of language. Language is not the source of any given interpretation,
but is rather both the means whereby any one is enabled, as well as the means whereby
any one is solidified.
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This raises the question: How can one schema of interpretation be displaced by
another?
I noted in an early footnote that Ricoeur views Nietzsche’s Nachlass passages as
offering only a deconstruction of Descartes’ view of the Subject. But this doesn’t seem
right, because of the prospect that Nietzsche holds out: when the affective power, given
expression through schematizing in general, turns away from one form of
schematization. We might think here of Kant speaking of the hidden art in the soul, and
naming it schematism. Nietzsche links this with ‘inner states,’ which we might want to
call affect.
There is a schematization that has been enabled by language that we have
considered here, the use of language to shore up a particular view of the Subject.
However, this view of the Subject is also broken by an alternative use of language. This
is the prospect Nietzsche holds out to us, in indicating that language is connected to
inner states, and that these inner states might gain the power to subvert those very
uses of language. Language is the reserve of a power, not an entity. The prospect of selfovercoming is presaged in the power of language.
The Subject does not come from language, but rather from a variety of
inclinations, those tended to by sensory processes, by prejudices. It is reinstalled in
language, which can tend toward petrification. But the suggestion is that language also
allows an ability for us to take on a different relation to those sensory and psychological
tendencies. In fact, Nietzsche’s reading is what allows us to take on this different
relation to our sensory and psychological tendencies. The standard view of the Subject is
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undercut by this view, that the Subject is the assimilative work of a being that
supersedes this assimilation only because—it is the result, rather than the cause, of the
assimilation.
The Subject is a fiction, but this does not mean it is not; just as words are
fictions. The Subject is a trope, just as words are tropes. The tropes: metaphor,
metonymy, synecdoche. The Subject is all of these: a translation into alternative terms;
a substitution of effect for cause; a substitution of part for the whole.68 What Nietzsche
points out about the Subject is not its not being, for it is for us and for our thinking, but
rather its tropic status, which means its not being what we believe it to be, a preexistent ground.
The Subject is a creation of language, but this is not the same as the claim that
the Subject is created by grammar and words. The Subject pertains to the work that
language is and that it does.
I said above that language can be a prison. Particular uses of language are
prisons, and here they are just like beliefs, and Nietzsche’s critique shows the way that
habits of language shore up beliefs. Beliefs can be prisons, in the view of The Antichrist,
when we cease to be suspicious of them, when they have become too familiar. The
Subject, as a creation of language in the sense above, and as a belief, is also such a
prison, and this is the source of the question: Can we escape this prison that we have
made? If we are suspicious of it? By using words differently? Nietzsche suggests this
68

As synecdoche, the Subject is in part what we are, only not the whole, though it masquerades as such.
As synecdoche, the Subject pertains to the conscious part of ourselves that inserts itself as the whole, as
the commander of the commonwealth. As metonymy, the Subject is the cause that we feel ourselves to
be over our actions, even though this is a retrospective projection into what is only a series of effects. As
metaphor, the Subject is that into which we translate our experiences.
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when he tells us that language shapes the soul of those who use it in common, but that
uncommon uses of language indicate differently disposed souls. Does this not indicate
one method of changing those who have come to think of themselves as certain kinds of
Subjects? By being suspicious of this term, by using it differently. If the word is put to a
different use, and shores up a different interpretation through this use, do we not make
possible an alternate becoming?
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Chapter 4
Who is Reading, Who is Writing—The Writing of the Self

Introduction
This chapter deals with writing, performativity, and the self. It focuses on Ecce
Homo. It is, however, nothing like an exhaustive reading of this text, but one that
remains focused on elements of its surface. The source of this focus is this view: that
what Nietzsche’s narrative voice in Ecce Homo claims to be doing—saying who the self is
through the present work of writing, itself composed of re-reading prior writings signed
by this self and re-depicting the self who wrote them—in a very important way, does
not, strictly speaking, occur.1 Rather, what occurs in this text is the unworking of the
presumed unity of that self, even as the narrator claims to be retrieving and re-depicting
it. Thus, we have this difference between what the narrator claims to do and what the
text in fact does. In other words, the constatively claimed work carried out in the text is
unworked by the performative valence of the text. What is thus demonstrated in the
text is the impossibility of the unity, oneness, and immediacy of the self, along with the
desperate insistence on the part of the narrator that this not be impossible.2

1

I try to refer throughout to the speaker’s voice in Ecce Homo as the narrator or narrative voice, in order
mark the difference between the signature, Friedrich Nietzsche, and the perspective from which Ecce
Homo proceeds. My sense is that if we conflate the historical person Nietzsche with the narrative voice,
we could foreclose the elements of staging involved in the text, and that the perspective expressed
through the narrative voice is one of the features of the text that is being performed, and in need of
interrogation. It is my view that many of the later Prefaces operate as such stagings, to indicate that the
narrative voice of each text comes from a particular perspective that is not necessarily, or not only, to be
conflated with Nietzsche’s, and which is meant to be interrogated.
2
I use “constative” and “performative” rather broadly, but drawing from the general sense given to the
terms by speech act theory, as it develops from J.L. Austin’s initial claims in How to Do Things With Words.

The Text, the Texts
There are a number of later works of Nietzsche’s in which the constative issue of
the text is the self (the writer himself, Nietzsche himself), but within which the nonconstative issue at play, that which is demonstrated or performed rather than claimed
within the text, is the disruption of the constatively purported self. Here, the texts
present the unworking of the self, and this is curious because this unworking is enacted
in texts that take their very issue to be none other than the identification and
presentation of a self. Which are these texts in which we find this performance? Though
I cannot do justice to them fully here, they are the Prefaces of 1886, and, the entirety of
Ecce Homo.3 What is shared in these texts? The staged act of reading one’s own texts,
and the enactment of a written commentary on those texts that offers a re-presentation
of the real self who, in fact, wrote those texts. The narrative voice of these texts seems
to say: Here’s what I really meant; here’s what I was really doing; here’s what I didn’t see
or say then, when I wrote that, but which I see now, as I’m writing this.4 This general
kind of act could be read as an obsession over authorship, the determination to

Constative utterances are those involving description or reportage of a state of affairs, and which can be
true or false. Performative utterances are those in which the saying of the statement constitutes the
doing of an action. I use these terms to refer to different valences of the written text: by “constative” I
simply mean the written text considered at the level of the discursive claims within it—what is overtly
claimed. With “performative,” in contrast, I mean the meanings that are suggested not by direct
discursive claims but by what is done but not directly stated in the text. The performative valence of the
text is thus that wherein structural or rhetorical techniques constitute meaning. See J.L. Austin, How to do
Things with Words, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962).
3
In 1886 Prefaces are created, for old writings, for writings coming out: EH, GM, HTH, GS. In these last
three, what is provided is a narrative of the development of the narrative voice. For GM, this narrative
stretches back to the narrator’s childhood; for HTH and GS, the narrative begins in medias res, in the
middle of life of illness and recovery. But in all it is clear, it is a particular voice that is being foregrounded
here. Yet there are echoes of this performance in other texts of the late period. Essay 3 of GM is a case in
point, and, I might argue elsewhere, Antichrist.
4
And, perhaps—Trust me?
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continue having the last (and last, and last) word, holding so tightly to the self at the
time that one never lets go saying “that isn’t what I meant/that isn’t what I meant at
all.”
But my view is that to read this act as correction, as improved retrieval and
representation, is taking the narrator at his word, and not taking the text at its deed;
this textual deed is to highlight, and call into question, the very desire to thus name and
represent the one, the one who I “am,” who is purportedly the same one who meant
something by those words that were from this same one. The one who continues to
desire the alignment of the writing self and the written—which one is this?
The Self and Language
The larger issue of my project is language, so how is this chapter related to
language? We have seen language, in the previous chapter, as grammar and words,
form part of the critique of the Subject. My claim is that we find language performing
some of this same work—this work of being the reserve of habits toward unification
that we saw in the critique of the Subject. But there is another valence of language,
found in these staged, non-constative, or performative elements of the written work.
Language is freed from its constative and mimetic overtones, and it is shown to be
performative in these later texts, in two senses. That it is performative is staged by the
narrative voice, who attempts a work regarding the self: to tell himself to himself,
through the writing. But, that very work of telling, and all its work with reading,
memory, and narrativizing, is itself a performance within this text, something that the
text also stages for us to read. It becomes that which says something through what it
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tries to do, and our observation of that attempt. This double performativity is significant
in my reading, which we might focus generally on the issues of: future anteriority,
ambiguity, and catachresis. Ecce Homo is a performative text, which consists in the
resultant view that the self is performative. Ecce Homo is a text of the future anterior; of
irreducible ambiguity; and of catachresis, suggesting that “self” operates in all of these
ways, covering over a lack, an absence which is not simply linguistic.5
There is something that all of these notions are getting at—performativity,
future anteriority, catachresis. Catachresis is the use of a term from another ‘domain’ to
fill a lexical gap—when a ‘literal’ term is not available. Which is to say, there is a space
here, and the term allows us to begin filling it in. What if this is a space where there is
nothing, where we have nothing pre-existing, and the introduction of the term “self”
allows it to become thinkable that there is a something, and projects it as already having
been? This is what gender, ego, and sovereignty do, in Butler and Derrida’s analyses—
they fill in for more than a lexical gap, they fill in for a gap in conceivability. These terms
bring something to appear. Future anteriority then speaks to our need to have this gap
filled.
In Ecce Homo, Nietzsche is treating the self in the same way, though he doesn’t
announce it—he performs it, through the text, through what it enacts, not through its
constative language. The account here is undercutting the covering of the space of
nothing provided by the “self.” What is interesting is that “Nietzsche” directly contests
5

We have that question, of why the telling of his life to himself in Ecce Homo occurs by way of writing in a
double sense: of writing in the sense that the retelling is written, the words we are reading; of writing in
the sense that the retelling is, for the most part, a retelling on the basis of returning to previous writings.
What has been written, what is being written—these issues of writing are intricately bound up in the
questions that Ecce Homo presents us with regarding who the self is.
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this covering of nothing in the critiques of the Subject. But here, in his “text” on the self,
there is no direct critique. It is in fact a performative critique, in which not only is the
whatness of the self revealed to be a nothing but another version of the self is
suggested in its place, one that would look an awful lot like this: performativity without
the future anteriority, without the disavowal of the nothing ‘from which’ it emerges.
A Scruple
A readerly scruple lurking in the background, whose outlines you will have
already traced: it is particularly fruitful to resist reducing “Nietzsche” not only to
Nietzsche the historical person but to Nietzsche as a group of texts. We can never fully
resist the violation of this scruple; we can sometimes hold off for a bit of time. But
resistance is fruitful because (yielding to the very reduction I am trying to resist, yet
cannot) Nietzsche’s texts so often involve a staging of the constative elements—what is
said is staged, and that staging is part of what is said, non-constatively. This staging is
often in part achieved through the implied distance between the narrative voice and the
author of the narrative voice, the one who is writing. In simplest terms, these texts I
have named above, and Ecce Homo in particular, resist our habitual attempt to reduce
the narrative voice that speaks constatively in the text, and the apparent perspective of
that voice, to the voice and perspective of—who else is there?—the one writing that
voice. Doesn’t this resistance only help reveal that the who of that voice is not one?6

6

How is this distance between the narrative voice and the author signaled, performed, if it is not directly
stated? In the way in which the narrative voices of Nietzsche’s texts might undercut their constative
claims; the narrative voice reveals some tendency or characteristic that is meant for us to raise questions
in regard to.
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Clarification of “Performativity”
Not all possible structural or rhetorical techniques are being considered here; I
focus on those that have to do with the performance of the self. What I mean by this is
that I focus on the fact that, in these texts, what is staged is the narrator’s reading of
For example, GM presents a history that is generated through the deployment of reinterpretation of
a standard, current history of morality. The story of descent that is told in this genealogy is a particular
reinterpretation of that standard history of morality. Yet, part of the character of this genealogy is its
inseparability from the Preface, and from the idiosyncrasies recounted there of the particular perspective
from which that genealogy originates: it is the genealogy of—presented and traced by—a particular
individual that the Preface describes. By calling attention to the narrative voice of the genealogy--by
individualizing that voice in the Preface, and giving it a history and needs and desires—the text at the
same time as it presents a counter-history enacts, rather than states, the embeddedness of this counterhistory within the context of a singular life. Thus the text, widened out to include the Preface, becomes
not only the new story told by the “content” of the genealogy—the “counter-history” if you will—but a
story of that story told. In fact, what it marks is that even the counter-history of genealogy has such a
story, which is to say, that it is through and through perspectival. The Preface’s attention to the narrative
particularity of the genealogy makes of the presented genealogy a demonstration of the emergence of
reinterpretation out of the very needs and desires of a life.
On one hand is the general structural point—that the genealogy here is not a simple reversal of a
history, not a substitution of one objective history for another, but that genealogy operates in the
acknowledgment of its emergence out of particularity. On the other hand would be the specific point—
that the content of the particularity of this narrative voice, whether in terms of its self-understanding or
of what is shown of it beyond its purported self-understanding, has a role to play in marking this
genealogy as merely perspectival. In this sense, the fact of the Preface, which is just to say the fact that
the narrative voice is an individual who is not necessarily Nietzsche, enacts a point about the very nature
of this genealogy and all of its points of content that represent a counter-history, and something that
cannot or at least is not made in the language of that counter-history—that the story of descent has its
own descent.
Something of this same interpretive structure can be imposed on Ecce Homo. The idiosyncrasy of the
genealogist is parallel to the idiosyncrasy of the narrator, in that calling attention to both allows to be
demonstrated what cannot be said at the same level as the literal text without risk of its falling prey to the
suspicion that is informing the reinterpretation contained within the literal text in the first place—the
suspicion against dogmatism, the judgment that science, history of morality, and Christian morality all
claim a position that should be adopted by all. The dogmatism of interpretations is prevented by refusing
the self-delusion of faith in the possibility of a transcendent perspective that could be recommended for
one and all. By calling attention to the idiosyncrasy of the narrative voice, Nietzsche enacts rather than
directly states an obfuscation for any attempt to read the ensuing content as claims that purport to be
better statements of the truth of the things they describe.
But, how do we assess that this resistance is a valuable hermeneutic principle? Isn’t it only thanks to
this reduction that we can’t help but yield to, by the experience with many of the texts that share the one
signature of Nietzsche? In other words, isn’t it that habit, of reducing the narrator’s voice to that of the
author, that is called finally into relief only because we try to do it, meet resistance, the tension between
the one and the many, and thus notice ourselves doing it? That, for instance, the ressentiment-filled voice
in The Antichrist can’t be the same one who recounts his genealogy, and his inborn scruples, in the
Preface to On the Genealogy of Morality? There is too much difference to be the kind of unity we expect
in one. We only find the difference because the attempt to unify is unworked by other texts; we only see
the difference because we try to unify the voices.

236

himself. The narrator claims to read previously written works in order to, in the present
act of writing, re-present the self that is contained therein; but what is actually
performed by the work of these writings—their being acts of renewed reading and
writing—is the creation of a self that is projected in the mode of the future anterior. In
these works, the narrator claims to tell us what already was the case about himself, but
the narrator performs, despite himself, the infinitely renewable projection of what will
have been the case, in an act of reading and writing, acts which can be infinitely
renewed, because they can be taken up/read/written about again. This projection
masquerading as retrieval rides on the ambiguity of writing—writing as the written
(inscribed, monument of a past), and writing as the infinitely renewable object of
reading and re-writing. What is performed is the projection of a self, which is read as
being the same across these multiple acts of reading and writing. This means that “self”
functions catachrestically—we interpret “self” as the unity between the temporal
dimensions represented by the first writing, the rereading, and the second writing,
despite the openness of the writing as such—the fact that it can be infinitely read and
written about.
This performative de-constitution of a self, one which seems to be constatively
represented in the direct claims about the narrator’s self, is particularly illuminating
inasmuch as it consists in an auto-criticality. What I mean by this is that in order to
perform this de-constitution, the writer (“Nietzsche,” loosely) demonstrates his
essential ambivalence, in the most literal sense: ambivalence connotes a being in two
directions at the same time. The writer announces his attachment to the constative
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level of claims—attachment to being the kind of self constatively claimed in the
preexisting writing (this is who I am, because it is what I already was, and what I read
now, again, for you)—and, his attachment to the performed level of claims—
attachment to eradicating that very notion of preexisting self in the fact that it has to be
constituted as a temporally distant act of reading and new writing about what is read.
This is the ambivalence of “Nietzsche” regarding which his later writing practice never
leaves us without testimony: for everything that this signatory, Nietzsche, critiques,
there is an attachment to that which is being critiqued, and a critique of that
attachment.
Butler on Performativity, the Subject, and Future Anteriority
Still other aspects of the sense of performativity that I have in mind are
articulated by Judith Butler in her view that gender is performative. While Butler
articulates performativity in a number of texts, most notably 1990’s Gender Trouble, I
will refer to the brief articulation found in the 1988 essay “Performative Acts and
Gender Constitution: An Essay in Phenomenology and Feminist Theory.”7
The claim that gender is performative is not quite the same as the claim that
gender is performed. The notion of performativity draws, first, from the distinctions
made within speech act theory, as noted above.8 Performative speech acts, in fact, are
themselves kinds of constitutive acts, those the very doing of which consists in a making,
or a constituting, of something in addition to the mere performance of the act. A speech
7

Judith Butler, “Performative Acts and Gender Constitution: An Essay in Phenomenology and Feminist
Theory,” Theatre Journal 40, no. 4 (1988): 519-531.
8
Butler refers specifically to John Searle, rather than Austin, in this essay.
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act is both an act of speaking and also the act of making, or constituting, something
through that speaking which is not reducible to the mere spoken words. The exemplary
instance here, within Searle’s articulation, is the marriage vow. In the speaking of “I do
(promise to . . . ),” not only does the speaker articulate these words, but the very
speaking of these words also constitutes the promise at issue. In other words, one does
something besides “simply” speak in a speech act.9 Speech acts are thus, in the use to
which Butler turns them here, themselves exemplary of the feature of constitutive acts:
a doing can also be a making.10
Butler’s claim that gender is performative is illuminated by this first point: in the
acts that we read as “acting out” or “displaying” one’s gender, one is actually making or
constituting one’s gender.
Butler’s notion of performativity draws, secondly, from the dislocation of “being”
from the temporality of presence, which we might hastily denominate “existentialist.”
Such a dislocation we might find, exemplarily, in Sartre’s notion that existence precedes
essence, which is to say that what constitutes my being is never “all at once,” and hence
also never “beforehand” in relation to any of my actions, but is always temporally
extended into the open horizon of what I have yet to do. This existentialist framework
would seem to read every action as constitutive, not just some—constitutive of my

9

What Butler here calls a “speech” act can be understood as “performative utterance” as described
above based on Austin. See note 2 above.
10
What Butler draws from speech act theory is this view on constitutive acts: some human actions “do” in
an irreducibly dual sense, they do and they make in that doing. The possibility of “doing” speaking bleeds
into the realm of the possibility of “doing” promising, and it bleeds because the act whereby speaking can
be enacted is also, sometimes, an act whereby promising can be enacted. With some acts of speaking
words we are also, in that act, making something besides the words (here, a promise). This is the notion
of constitutedness or constitution in acts, the dual character of the act itself.
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being, for which reason, my being must be stretched across all possible actions for me,
which means, stretching into the performance of those actions that have yet to be.
Notice that this view rides on the same notion of the constitutiveness of action, but put
in terms of an impossibly whole temporal vantagepoint: because in whatever I do, I also
constitute, or make, myself, this necessitates that what I am is never fully available at
any one time, as long as I continue to exist and hence am held in the reserve of the
future, inasmuch as what I will do is held in reserve from what I have done and what I
am doing. This suggests I am not a what at all. Butler’s claim that gender is performative
is illuminated by this point: my gender is constituted not merely by the sum of acts in
which I have engaged thus far, but is ongoing and repeatedly renewed in the acts I now
undertake and have yet to undertake.
Thus we can see that Butler’s notion of performativity draws from the
significance of the future anterior to constitutive acts in the sense of the effects of those
acts. Butler articulates a projective quality of the effects of an action which is not limited
to the “not yet” of the future, but, importantly, is directed to our sense of “already was”
of the past. The constitutive act that gender acts are not only make our gender, and not
only make our gender as that which is continually renewed as ongoing and never all at
once, but make our gender as that which we interpret in the mode of “already was,”
that which we interpret as arising from or effected by a pre-existing state of our being.
This is to say, one of the possibilities opened up by performative acts (and maybe this is
all that matters in the end) is our interpretation of what that act means, shows, or
entails. That performative acts result in the interpretation of them, that they are not
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creations, but that they are rather expressions of what preexists them, says something
only about our very ineptitude with the first two valences enumerated above: that we
do not actually know how to interpret a gender act as making, rather than expressing;
that we have not as yet tended to interpret a gender act as incomplete within itself, or
being as continually renewed.
Gender is something that we have gotten into the—habit?—of interpreting as
always already true about ourselves. Butler’s notion of gender as performative
interrupts this thinking, exploding the possibility of finding “gender” in anything
preexistently the case about oneself, by the three features articulated above: gender is
constituted by action; it is constituted never once and for all, but in an ongoing fashion
by actions that are continually to be taken up and thus remain yet to be done; yet, its
constitution is interpreted in the mode of “already was.”
Within Butler’s notion of gender as performative, then, we find both an analysis
and a critique. Butler claims that gender performance comprises all of the above three
aspects, but notice something special about the third—it depends on a notion of what
the human being is that the first two features actually call into question. This third
aspect—that of how gender is interpreted, as preexistent and true about its
performers—would be subverted if the first two features gained traction, if the habit of
the third did not cover them over. In fact, the third feature is really only a statement of
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how gender performance is interpreted by the performers of gender in a society in
which those first two features are not recognized.11
Regathering the Threads
Let me return to my opening claim, given body by these intervening sections.
There are certain texts later in Nietzsche’s oeuvre in which we find, counter to the
constative claims, a performative valence that unworks a version of the self to which the
narrative voice constantly signals his own desperate attachment and service for the sake
of. Both aspects of this duality need to be held together. If we emphasize only the
constative element of these texts, as tempting as that may be, we emphasize only the
Nietzsche showing us how to create a certain kind of self, a preferable kind of self, of a
kind that we, too, might try to create, as an act of retrieval. But we should take care not
to think that the unworking of these claims renders only the denial of a self at all. If we
hold both the constative and performative elements together we find a position of a
self, that is filled with nothing save this tiny sliver, very little, almost nothing—a drive to
create, which works and unworks in the same act of re-reading/writing, a drive limned
in by the need that there be a self, but whose action unworks the object of this need.
And what then is that self? To state it baldly: the self is that which is only as created in a
renewed act of writing upon the occasion of reading the previous writing, but whose
materials of creation, because they project the possibility of ever-renewed re-reading
and re-writing, contain its unworking. Those materials are the words as what is written,
11

Interestingly, performativity and interactive metaphor have in common an irreducibility to a preexisting
essence or ground (what it is is not simply that which is there and which needs to be recuperated—as is
the case with substitution views of metaphor).
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but the who of what is written is not contained in them, and is only in that temporality
of the future anterior as which the act of reading and renewed writing completes that
which was formerly written—but, on the surface, claims only to be representing what
was already there. The unworking is in the ambiguity of the words and in the implied
need for the words to be read in order to fulfill their presentation. The self is not in the
words, though the constative claims of the renewed reading-writing suggest as much. In
each renewed reading-writing act, that which is attempted to be read out of the words,
as if preexisting, in this infinitely renewable act of reading and writing anew what seems
to be read—the words become what they were not, but only now are, but which we
cannot hold fast, because they become letters postmarked to a future reader. Just as,
throughout the Nietzschean corpus, the human is ever mistaking itself and attributing
the force of its powers to an other, the characteristic mistake that Nietzsche has his
narrative voices perform in these texts is that of treating the self as that which is
retrieved, read out, found in a prior presentation, when it is the case that the self exists
nowhere but in the projection of the renewed effort of reading-writing which mistakes
itself for a retrieval. This non-containment, and hence lack of unification, is carried out
in the performative element, which consists in the continued renewal of the project of
saying who one is by reading who one is and projecting it into writing, but calling it a representation or retrieval. This self thus is never once and for all, because it continually
returns in the form of the need to be read, and written, again—this is what is performed
in the writing that contains an ever-renewed reading of the self. It is a continual
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enactment of the fact that who cannot be, despite our act of writing as a protestation to
the contrary, a what.12
As I now turn to the text, concentrating on its surfaces, I will attend to the ways
that ambiguity, future anteriority, catachresis, and performativity, generally, disrupt the
unity of the narrator’s self.
Titular Elements and their Ambiguities
The title page announces the title and the subtitle:
Ecce Homo
How One Becomes, What One Is
There is an explosion of ‘who’s, the question of ‘who’, within these elements. A
battery follows:
On the title page of Ecce Homo. Who is the “man” referred to with the words
‘Ecce Homo’? Is it the same one who writes these words? Is it the one presented in
these words? Who is the other who is to behold him?
Moving down to the subtitle: who is the one, das Man, who becomes what he is?
Is it the one who writes, the one who is recounted? And is there another one for whom
the “how” announces a demonstration, through what has been done by another?
Moving on to the first sentence: who is the “I” in whose voice, or hand, the first
sentence is said, or written?
Who is the “I” of the final sentence of the Preface, who tells his life to himself?
12

Thus, the narrative voice’s claims that he is not read could be interpreted as desire creating a
temptation toward reading, the self ironically depending on this error of readers, of all readers; it lives on
this error.
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Are they all (or some, or none) who we find having signed the Preface “Friedrich
Nietzsche”?
There are more questions here than just the question of the signature, it seems;
the sheer number of possible who’s hide themselves behind so many turns of phrase
and page before the text proper has even begun. There is no way around them into the
text.
From the battery above, there is from the outset what strikes one as so counter
to the reading of philosophy, and even of that exemplary philosophical text of selfdiscovery, that narrative, Descartes’ Meditations on First Philosophy. Philosophers tend
to be univocal, or to be read as such; the exception, the polyglot Plato, who spoke only
in the voice of others, who always, save once, gave their names; and even then, gave a
stand-in—the “stranger.”
The Meditations might be an appropriate foil here, if we recall that the narrative
“I,” in its initially, only apparently, selfless search for certainty, takes no pause before
the assumption that the “I” first found in the thinking attributed to himself—is himself.
Narrating “I” slides easily into thought “I” who slides easily into the “I” that is performed
there. There is no hesitation, no checkpoint; I know who I am, I am that “I am.” Thus our
author, Descartes, who is also supposed to be the narrator, who is also supposed to
stand for me and you and every one we know who might undertake this meditation,
proceeds. The unity of “I” as a word makes short shrift of all these potential
differences.13

13

We learned this from the critique of the Subject.
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The seduction of words cuts both ways, though. We are seduced if we think
every “I” is the same; but we are seduced if we forget how every “I” is the same; the
first seduction elides the difference between words and experiences; the second
obscures the similarity of perception required by and reinscribed by the communicative
function of language.
And all of this raises a question here: is Ecce Homo a book for all, few, or one? 14
Is it an idiosyncratic record of one hermetically enclosed exercise, or a manual, or a
performance, even for a few?15
The Title, Ecce Homo
When Pilate beheld Jesus, he found no fault with him, contrary to the hostile
crowd. He yet had his soldiers scourge him and crown him with thorns. Wanting the
crowd to see how badly Jesus had been treated, yet also to know that he found no fault
in him, he both presented Jesus to be beheld in this condition and clarified that he
found no fault. As he presented Jesus to the crowd, he said “Idou ho anthropos,” or the
Vulgate’s “Ecce Homo,” or “behold the man!”
In its signification, the title announces the provision of a view, and one of a man;
in its Latinate, rather than German, form, it might be a reference to the Vulgate
translation of Pilate’s words when presenting Jesus to the crowd. In this sense, it carries
the ambiguity of beholding, the incalculability of perspective; for Pilate, “behold the
man” carried the sense that Jesus had been treated far worse than Pilate felt he
14

Echoing the question raised by Zarathustra’s subtitle, “A Book for All and None.”
Recall that idios is the root found both in the Greek expression from which “Ecce Homo” derives—idou
ho anthropos—the “homo” renders an “idios”—and in “idiot,” the term Nietzsche uses for Jesus the
evangel, the Anti-Paul, in The Antichrist.
15
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deserved; for the crowd, “behold the man” presented the opportunity to mark only how
much further they would like to go—he deserved far worse in their view. So there is this
residue of the question of appropriate recognition, of the contention surrounding who a
certain one is in the eyes of others. It is further informed by the danger of a mistake: if
we mistake Jesus, and he is who he says he is, his lack of death would prove our foible,
for which we would be guilty of not knowing ourselves, our place, in putting him to
death, and, for this, subject to powers mightier than ourselves; if we mistake Jesus, and
he is not who he says he is, we would suffer otherwise . . .
But what if we emphasize, not the historical connotations based on a
remembered narrative, but the imperativity of the phrase? Behold. Look and see. Who
or what are we to look at? As a title, in its function of naming the text that follows, we
are thus told to look at the text, with the suggestion that there we will find this man.16
Consider the figure of catachresis. It involves a repetition, in fact it is a
capitalizing on repetition. “Ecce Homo,” as a title, is a repetition, repeating a phrase
whose linguistic content is inseparable from the scene to which it has grown attached in
the West’s memory, at least the memory of John 8:5. Already, even there, Pontius
Pilate’s speaking of this phrase is overdetermined. He was not completely serious.
With this title, there is an enactment of a comparison between this scene and
that, the one of John 8:5. Already, we have the comparison between Jesus—a scourged
Jesus about to die, in all seriousness, for man’s sins—and, whoever this one is. We are

16

Nietzsche says at “Why I am a Destiny” 1, “I am not a human being, I am dynamite.”

247

on the lookout, comparing Jesus and this one. Maybe this one is like Jesus, maybe not.17
It all depends on who this one is—and we don’t yet know.
It is this silent, or subtle, question—does Nietzsche know how to read himself?—
at any instance of reading himself, and presenting that reading to his readers in his
writing—for this is what he does continually, in his new Prefaces of 1886, and finally in
1888 in Ecce Homo (and never again), that is part of what is being staged. The renewed
effort to read oneself, that in each renewed reading both unworks the previous
whatness that one appeared to be resolved into within the text, and yet installs a new
whatness that is not a whatness simply because of the continual renewal of writing
what one reads oneself to be. It is the ongoingness, or the inexhaustibility, of readings
of oneself, the continual revision of one’s prior reading of oneself, that is the space of
becoming here—which is separated from the whatness that one takes oneself to be
within any particular reading—only the renewed attempt to read announces that the
self is not a what, because it wasn’t captured in the previous reading. Each attempt
unworks the last, and lays the ground for its own unworking because it takes place as
that which is to be read, taken up again. In this sense, all writing sows the seeds of the
unworking of all of its claims, because it is to be read—writing lays fragments of a
future, dispersing rather than containing, because it calls for a future act of reading.

17

If the latter, then the one who chose that title is either an idiot (having his own hermetically enclosed
meaning), or a buffoon. On the connection of buffoonery to Ecce Homo, see Christine Battersby, “Behold
the Buffoon’: Dada, Nietzsche’s Ecce Homo and the Sublime” in Nigel Llewellyn and Christine Riding (eds.),
The Art of the Sublime, January 2013, http://www.tate.org.uk/art/research-publications/thesublime/christine-battersby-behold-the-buffoon-dada-nietzsches-ecce-homo-and-the-sublime-r1136833,
accessed 03 April 2014.
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Finally, we might also recall that other use of “ecce homo!” from Nietzsche’s
texts, that in TI in which the claim is made that the heart of moralism is the use of
oneself as a model on the basis of which to judge, universally, others; it is as if moralists
scrawl an image of themselves on a wall and proclaim “ecce homo,” this homo being an
aspirational model for all people as such.18 This practice is denigrated by Nietzsche
there, because what each ought to be can neither be dictated by others, nor be based
on a universal image, nor—known ahead of time.19 In relation to this criticized use of
“ecce homo,” it would seem that, if what follows in this text is as a scrawling of an
image on a wall, we might hesitate before the presumption that this is meant to be
normative, or at least, take great care in drawing conclusions about for whom it is
meant to be so. Back to that question: for whom is this an image, a provided view to
behold? What if there is no one?
So we have these two senses from the title: that the text in one sense is a
presentation of a man, in the situation of a contention as regards who he is; and that in
another sense, it is a counter to that universalizing tendency of morality, that uses one
man only as a model for all.
The Subtitle: How One Becomes, What One Is
Everything hinges on the comma. Not merely because the comma is the mark of
a hinging (a mark by which two phrases are jointed such that the extension of meaning

18

TI, 175.
Perhaps this final sense is, in Ecce Homo, most salient, and we will return to it when we consider fate
and necessity in relation to the self, below.
19
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of the latter is tied to the former), and one whose shape mimics a hinge, but because
the comma literally, graphically, inserts an ambiguity.
Now, the ambiguity of and from the comma is a result of language’s silent
grammatical signage—what appears and does not speak—what seems to be external to
language proper, and yet which language employs—here, in the German, to be precise.
In the German, it is unclear whether this hinge is something or is nothing in terms of
meaning. Depending on how we decide to treat the comma, the subtitle could mean
equally “how one becomes what one is” or “how one becomes, what one is,” the force
of the comma’s presence in the latter being something like the insertion of an “and,”
the making of a distinction, suggesting an irreducible duality in the phrase. Are we
dealing with a unity, with an uninterrupted phrase “How One Becomes What One Is”?
Or are we dealing with a duality, with two irreducible phrases, neither determining the
other “How One Becomes, What One Is”? What the comma performs is the posing of
this very question: Is this phrase a unity? Is this phrase a multiplicity? And what the
phrase performs, in the way of an answer, is that this is ambiguous, from the start.
What hinges on the decision we might make here? First, a decision about what
the text is and who it is that is writing it. This is because the comma suggests both, or,
either/or: 1) (without the comma) that the text is explanatory, showing how one
becomes what one is (which raises the further question of who this one is, and whether
it is only one, or all, or a few); 2) (with the comma) a distinction between two issues,
those being “how one becomes” and “what one is,” hence disjoining becoming from
being.
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Everything hinges on this ambiguity; I mean, everything hinges on this moment
of indecision that precedes the choice of one or the other because this very ambiguity
performed by the comma—the ambiguity between an explanation that consists in the
creation of a unity, and the continual disruption of the difference between who and
what—is a staging of what will be performed in the text.
All of this is figured in the graphical representation of the subtitle.
The subtitle is literally under the title—the title under the title. We might be
tempted to think that the “sub” here implies such an order of priority. This might be a
habit, to read the subtitle as the title insufficient unto itself, the title that couldn’t stand
on its own, that depends upon the real title, the essential one, from which it seems to
draw its strength. But “sub-” is also ambiguously connotative, as it also, like the Greek
“hypo-,” that which underwrites, is the basis for, the title we initially read—that being
“under,” hypo-, is not in the sense of being less important, but in the sense of being a
ground. Hypo- is not lesser in importance, but is under in that it underwrites—writing
the figure here of justification, of grounding—the “under” is the space in which we
expect to find a ground. In this sense the subtitle is such because it is supposed, not to
draw its strength from the title, but to provide the title’s justification, its reason.
Well, if this is the case, the ambiguity here regards the question of ground: which
is the ground of which? The question that the graphical placement of the conventionally
named “subtitle,” with its own internally ambiguous, ungrounding hinge, forces us to
ask is: what happens when the space that we have come to think of as occupied by a
ground is—ambiguous? Undecidable? Ungrounding of itself? It announces that the
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ground is not already there, not already provided, not preexisting our decision, but that
only an interpretation of this ambiguity can supply the presumption of a ground—
before this, there is only a vicious circularity between the two choices. And if an
interpretation that chooses one hierarchical relation between the two “titles” disavows
this ambiguity, then—but wait. Can an interpretation ever not disavow this fundamental
ambiguity?20
I have belabored the point of this comma/hinge to call this into relief: what we
find staged here in the subtitle is a fundamental ambiguity regarding the sense of being
in this subtitle. We have, on the one hand, becoming resolved into being: one becomes
what one is—one has been becoming, in all that is now past, what one now, in the
present, is; and on the other hand, becoming and being are irreducible—becoming is
one thing, a thing about which there can be a “how,” and on the other hand is the
whatness of being, but with no clear indication as to how these are related.
From this ambiguous beginning, what the text goes on to stage is this ambiguity.
Either choice, either one, is possible. Is the ensuing text showing us “how one becomes”
a whatness, the whatness of essence, the whatness of what one is, which is to say, what
one always was becoming but couldn’t see until this miraculous now?21 Or is the text

20

How tempting it is to think along the lines of Ricoeur’s reference to the Majorca storytellers, that the
ambiguous split reference, the claim “is and is not” at the same time, is the specific work of fiction, the
domain of this ontological ambiguity. But what we have here is an ambiguity that arises even before the
determination of genre can be made. And what if we decide that this text is not fiction? No one, to my
reading, has risked precisely this reading—Ecce Homo is autobiography, or some strange amalgamation of
genres under the master heading of philosophy. This ambiguity, the is and is not, remains, even if we
resist the classification of fiction. This text already tells us that it engages this ontological ambiguity
regarding is and is not, as recounted above. (See Paul Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor [Toronto; University
of Toronto, 1975] 224.)
21
This is a reading offered by Richard Rorty—a tempting, affirming, and romantic one—in Contingency,
Irony, and Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
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showing us the distinction between becoming and whatness, between being in the
mode of becoming and being in the mode of the whatness of essence? If this latter is
what is shown in this text, then there must be an undercutting of whatness—there must
be a critique of the former reading built into this latter reading. In other words, the text
must be staging the reading of “becoming what one is” only in order to provide clues for
its subversion, for its critique. In this way, both sides of the ambiguity are in play. There
is no choice of one.
To try to unify the above: the comma has been belabored. Why? The constative
content of the subtitle is interrupted, you might say, by the way that the comma seems
to perform the entrance of a possible question. And it is this that I am interested in—
what is performed in the texts, the performance that the texts enact, beyond the
constative content? What is said in the texts is more than what is said as constative,
what is said is also performed. The comma is a kind of mark of performance—it is silent,
but leaves its mark, and the decision it forces us to regarding what is said.
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Becoming What One Is22
Echoes of the subtitle, as represented by the words of the above heading,
appear in GS §335. In this section, there are two main things claimed in relation to this
phrase “becom[ing] those we are.” We might foreground this recollection with the
statement that comes at the end of the section: to “become those we are—human
beings who are new, unique, incomparable, who give themselves laws, who create

22

As Hugh Lloyd-Jones clarifies, Nietzsche’s phrase “become what you are/becoming what one is” is
sometimes regarded as deriving from the controversial final section (68ff) of Pindar’s Second Pythian Ode,
specifically, from lines 72-73, which themselves are controversial (Hugh Lloyd-Jones, “Modern
Interpretation of Pindar: The Second Pythian and Seventh Nemean Odes,” Journal of Hellenic Studies 93,
[1973]; 109-137). Some treatment of the Ode might give a possible perspective on this phrase; for this
treatment, below, I refer to Lloyd-Jones’ reading.
In the Ode, as a lyric, Pindar speaks in the first person, and addresses Heiron, in celebration of
the latter’s victory in a chariot race; though the precise victory is not indicated in the poem, Heiron is
known to have won two chariot race victories (118). In the poem Pindar not only praises Heiron, but urges
him against both envy and believing slander against him: “[e]nvy is the force against which the poet who
would praise his patron has to struggle, and in order to assure his patron’s fame, the poet must do battle
against his detractors” (126).
Of the entire final section (68 ff), Lloyd-Jones claims “the whole concluding passage of this
poem, it seems to me, is fully understandable if we suppose that Pindar is dilating on a common theme of
encomiastic poetry, that of the duty of men, and particularly poets, to give great men proper credit for
their benefits to others and to abstain from envy” (125).
Lines 72-73 begin as Pindar has bid farewell to Heiron, bringing the poem to a close, and then
asks Heiron to “give a gracious reception to [my] poem or poems,” indicating that this poem, as he writes
it, will be sent to Heiron. Then comes the line, “’Be such as you are according to my words.’” The
controversy surrounding these lines regards whether the implication is that Pindar’s words in the poem
allow Heiron to know himself, such that, upon receiving the text, now he can be such as he is, particularly
in contrast to the slanders about him; or whether Heiron can be assumed to already know his character,
with Pindar’s words being only a description that Heiron might follow with action, but not implying that
they are necessary for his self-knowledge (124).
This much at least can be noted: Pindar suggests three valences of the Heiron at issue. There is
what Heiron is, the “such as you are.” There is the question of being or not being in accord with this—
Heiron might or might not “be” such as he is, otherwise, the remonstrance would not occur. Third, there
are the words about what he is in the poem itself, and the question of whether it is the words that enable
Heiron to know who he is, the “such as you are,” so that he can thus “be.” Is the poem merely a
description, a reflection? Or does everything, Heiron’s self-knowledge and ability to be himself, turn on
the encounter with the written words?
Adding yet more context, Lloyd-Jones suggests that the religion of Pindar and his audience would
have it that “Mortal men, even those favoured by the gods, are granted only certain moments of true
happiness; these quickly pass, and will be followed by misfortune, and in the end death. . . . That makes it
highly desirable for the favoured mortal to ensure that his brief hours of happiness and glory attain a kind
of immortality; this can only be achieved through the action of a poet, who through the gifts of Zeus’ son
Apollo and his daughters the Muses can preserve human achievements from oblivion” (126).
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themselves,” we have to first “become the best learners and discoverers of everything
that is lawful and necessary in the world; we must become physicists in order to be able
to be creators in this sense.”
So in GS §335 there is some content given to the who of who we are, and, some
indication as to how we thus become so. Who we are is a certain kind of human being,
who is “new, unique, incomparable,” autonomous and self-creating. In order to become
so, to become these self-creators, we must become physicists. What is meant by
“physicists” here are those who “become the best learners and discoverers of
everything that is lawful and necessary in the world.” Of course this is a physicist of an
atypical sort.
All previous “valuations and ideals have been based on ignorance of physics or
were constructed so as to contradict it.” This “physics” at issue in GS §335 is contrasted
with the reference to physicists in BGE §14, wherein physicists are called out for their
lack of intellectual conscience in the sense that they believe in their interpretations as
truth. When Nietzsche claims in GS §319 that “founders of religions and their kind” have
failed to make their experiences “a matter of conscience for knowledge,” we get a sense
that what is at issue here is intellectual conscience, as they were without intellectual
conscience, without an ability to question their valuations. Those others, “we,” who
“thirst after reason, are determined to scrutinize our experiences as severely as a
scientific experiment . . . to be our experiments and guinea pigs.” To be a physicist in
this sense is to employ a conscience against our previous articles of faith—to employ an
intellectual conscience, which questions our previously unquestioned faiths, “limit[ing]
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ourselves to the purification of our opinions and valuations.” Nietzsche suggests that we
do this by seeking what is lawful and necessary. So this questioning does not happen by
mere creation ex nihilo. (GS §319)
The one of intellectual conscience, like a physicist, seeks the lawful and
necessary. In this section, this is connected with conscience as regards experience—the
one of intellectual conscience scrutinizes “our experiences,” meaning one’s experiences.
As the scientific experiment is a search for that which is lawful and necessary, Nietzsche
implies that the work of intellectual conscience is to seek that which is lawful and
necessary within one’s experiences. Those who scrutinize their experiences in this way
“thirst for reason.”23 (GS §319)
My point is that this use of the phrase “becoming who we are” indicates that this
is not everyone, it is only those who are autonomous and self-creating. Becoming such
requires a search for law and necessity in everything. Hence, necessity bears a lot of the
weight here of explaining who we are.
When we return to Ecce Homo’s subtitle, then, finding “how one becomes what
one is,” we might understand this possible demonstrative, this “how,” to be importantly
related to necessity.24 For in GS §335, the how was implied to require a certain

23

In GS §345 Nietzsche speaks of the imagination of scientific experiment, the “refined experimental
imagination of psychologists and historians that readily anticipates a problem and catches it in flight
without quite knowing what it has caught.”
24
Further, regarding the “how,” we have already seen in the preceding chapter on the Subject that part of
the reason why the Subject is critiqued by Nietzsche is because of its pretensions to immediacy, to being.
Whatever we are, it is not a being that is; we become. So the subtitle raises this question: is the writer
suggesting, in “how,” that there is an end to becoming, and that one arrives at being? But there’s a
problem here, for the being is of what one is, not who one is. Or, is the force of the “how” extensive,
suggesting that everything included in these pages is part of that process of becoming, which doesn’t
actually reach the what that it is, only the how of it? And if the issue is the how, what is the how? Is it the
how of the narrator, the one who writes, and recounts? Or is it the how that is written, that is
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schooling in necessity. The implication here is that the ensuing text of Ecce Homo, if it is
a demonstration, is in part a demonstration of necessity, of finding the kind of necessity
that characterized these other physicists who could become self-creators in the earlier
passage.
We can thus already read out of the brief subtitle a suggestion that what is at
work in the text is related to that notion of necessity and its prefatory relation to selfcreation. What is this necessity, that which is clearly not the necessity of causation and
other laws of nature which those other physicists of the past may have sought? If
finding this necessity allows us to become self-creators, does the text show us both,
necessity as/and self-creation?
Prefatory Elements and their Ambiguities
Now we are three lines in. The structure of the ensuing prefatory elements stage
the same ambiguity introduced by the titular repetition and subtitular comma.
Preface Section 1
When, as recounted in Exodus 3, God gave Moses his world-historical task of
taking the Israelites from Egypt to Canaan, Moses doubted his selection for the task,
asking “Who am I, that I should go unto Pharaoh, and that I should bring forth the
children of Israel out of Egypt?”25 To counter this doubt, God speaks not of Moses, but

recounted—is it the process undergone by the one writing, or is it the process undergone by the one
written about? Is the “how” found in the steps that are recounted, the content of the story? Or is the
“how” found in the very attempt, work, project of recounting itself? In simplest terms: does one become
what one is by living as the recounted life lived; or does one becomes what one is by recounting as the
recounter recounts? Or, does the answer depend upon who you are?
25
All Biblical citations taken from the NIV version of the King James Bible, unless otherwise indicated.
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of himself, “I will be with you” and “I have sent you.” But Moses wonders how to tell the
Israelites who this “I” is. God answers, in a formation taken as one of his names: Ehyeh
asher ehyeh—most often translated into English as “I am that I am,” “I will be what I will
be,” or “I will be who I will be.”
As if enacting the principle of reason here, in the first section of the Preface
[Vorwort], the narrator twice tells us a possible “why” for this text, beginning by
suggesting that what compels the text is the desire to clarify who he is—to “say who I
am.” But why this need to clarify who he is? “In the expectation that soon I will have to
confront humanity with the most difficult demand it has ever faced . . . ”—the task,
described throughout the later works, of the revaluation of values. Because he will soon
confront humanity with its most difficult task—we infer, the revaluation of values—it
seems [scheint] imperative to this confrontation that humanity know the who, the one,
from whom the task is issued. Though such a “testimony” has been left—as we will see,
in “Nietzsche’s” writings—no one has really looked and beheld him. So he will try again,
saying: “I am the one who I am [I am, that and who]!26 Above all, do not mistake me
[especially].”27 (EH, 71)
What is especially wrong with being mistaken? In this section, Nietzsche will
indicate that he does not want to be mistaken as holy: “I have a real fear that someday
people will consider me holy: you will guess why I am publishing this book beforehand;
26

“Hört mich! denn ich bin der und der.” /“Listen to me! I am, that and who . . .” (i.e. I am that I am and I
am who I am).
27
To be compared with the claim in “Why I Write Such Good Books” that “I am one thing, my writings are
another.” These are not necessarily conflicting claims, though they could be. The issue regardless, in both,
is the difficulty of finding Nietzsche. In the former statements it is suggested that at least some testimony
is left regarding who he is, in his books (this does not mean he is his books). In the second statement,
quoted here, the emphasis is on distinguishing who he is from his books.
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it is supposed to stop any nonsense as far as I am concerned.”28 It is implied that
understanding the revaluation of values requires understanding from whom it is
coming, from whom it is not coming, because it too easily can take on the appearance of
a religious or doctrinal imperative—its provenance can be mistaken.
So this saying who I am is, in one sense, to distinguish the one from whom the
task comes, to distinguish him from all others, just as God gave to Moses a name,
whereby the Israelites could distinguish the one from whom Moses’ task, within which
they were all implicated, had come.
The remainder of the Preface consists in the narrator distinguishing who he is
from whom he might be supposed to be, but is not. Now, note that doing this requires
that he not be who he is in a sense, for this announcement of who he is goes against his
habits and the “pride of his instincts.” But he must go against them and say: “Listen to
me! I am the one who I am! Above all, do not mistake me for anyone else!” (EH, 71)
So this first section of the Preface ends with this proclamation of the goal of
clearly expressing his own identity, which is one, and which is distinct from all others.
But very quickly, in Preface section four, the clarification of who he is becomes a
clarification of how to read his texts—here, Zarathustra. While in Preface section two he
claims that “. . . I am the opposite of the type of person who has been traditionally
admired as virtuous,” by Preface section four, the clarification regards how to interpret
the words spoken by Zarathustra, these words being “[t]he exact opposite of what a

28

Ibid., 144. Compare to the claim elsewhere that “[e]very profound thinker is more afraid of being
understood than of being misunderstood. The latter may hurt his vanity, but the former his heart, his
sympathy, which always says: ‘Alas, why do you want to have as hard a time as I did?’” (BGE 290).
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‘wise man’, ‘saint’, ‘world redeemer’, or other decadent would say in this situation. . . .
He does not just talk differently, he is different. . . .” (73, some emphasis added).
The words quoted here, spoken/written by Zarathustra/Nietzsche relate to this
issue of identity, calling into relief the importance of knowing who oneself is:
Leave me now and guard yourselves against Zarathustra! . . . You say you
believe in Zarathustra? But who cares about Zarathustra! You are my
believers, but who cares about believers? You have not looked for
yourselves yet: and you found me. That is what all believers are like; that
is why belief means so little. Now I call upon you to lose me and find
yourselves; and only after you have all denied me will I want to return to
you . . .29
This quoted section of Zarathustra adds an element of ambiguity through its
placement in this text, for it both reiterates and undercuts what has already been said
by the narrator. Here Zarathustra speaks against discipleship and a concern for the one
whom one follows.30 What should be sought is the self; one should seek oneself first.
Now, the narrator has already suggested that we, those who will be presented with the
task of revaluation, need to know who he is first. Thus, the reference to Zarathustra
seems to provide an internal critique of the overt claims of the narrator, and the
expectation that has been set up thus far—are we reading to find who “Nietzsche,” the
narrator, is? This would be an approach out of the spirit of discipleship.
Thus there is a new ambiguity introduced by the end of the Preface: is this a text
about the self of “Nietzsche”? Or is this a text about the self that we ourselves are to be
seeking?

29

Ibid., 73.
As those fishermen whom Jesus is said to have called in Matthew 4 immediately drop their fishing nets,
for they are fishermen, and follow Jesus to become what he will make them, fishers of men.
30
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As if in answer to this ambiguity, the exergue follows with another statement of
the relation of the text to the self, and, another statement of why this text is written.
Exergue
The Preface of four sections is followed by a brief paragraph. This paragraph is
set off from the prior parts of the Preface, but from the beginning of the body of the
main text as well, it seems to float between. What are we to do with it? Is it Preface, or
text? The term that suggests itself here is exergue, a term always catachrestically
applied from the domain of coinage to the domain of texts, exergue being the line
below the design on a coin noting the date and location of its provenance. “Exergue”
will do—this brief paragraph is a remark about the day of the telling of the text,
indicating its provenance, that from which it arose. But the point I want to make here is
that such a provenance is also suggested in the earlier parts of the Preface, and that
between both suggestions we find irresolution.
First, in the exergue paragraph, the narrator tells us that “thus” [Und so] he will
tell his life to himself, which he proceeds to do, not in the form of a recitation to which
we have no access, but in the text before us—after this claim, the text proper of Ecce
Homo begins.
If this “Und so” is a consequential, we have to look back to what comes before to
explain the consequentiality of the ensuing telling. What is before is the rhetorical
question “How could I not be grateful to my whole life?” which itself follows from noting
that all the living qualities of the last year have been rescued and immortalized in his
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texts, which are called “gifts” of the last year.31 Nietzsche’s recounting of his life to
himself thus might be the consequence of gratitude, as he looks back on the last year
and its gifts, asking “How could I not be grateful to my whole life?” This gratitude to the
whole life mirrors a prior gratitude to a deity, projected as the source of a people’s
power and gifts, in Antichrist:
A people that still believes in itself will still have its own god. In the figure
of this god, a people will worship the conditions that have brought it to
the fore, its virtues—it projects the pleasure it takes in itself, its feeling of
power, into a being that it can thank for all of this . . . On this
supposition, religion is a form of gratitude. People are grateful for
themselves: and this is why they need a god.32
The suggestion is that this satisfaction with oneself owes its gratitude, not to an
external being, but to “one’s whole life.” This telling of one’s whole life is thus like the
invocation of the name of the god, identifying to whom one owes ones gratefulness for
who one is.33 Out of this affirmative gratefulness to his whole life for the gifts of the last
year, he will tell/narrate [Erzählen] his life, that to which he is grateful, to himself [mir,
to me/to myself]. This seems idiosyncratic, hermetically personal, closed in on the one
recounting. This suggests that what we have in the ensuing text, at the constative level,
is not Nietzsche’s self for us, or ourselves for ourselves, but Nietzsche’s self for
Nietzsche—or more precisely, Nietzsche for Nietzsche’s self, this text being fully
contained within the “space” of the narrator’s own self-relationship/self-articulation.34

31

It is important that the grapes are said to be turning brown at this moment, for even full grapes, for
Nietzsche, indicate the beginning of decline, and thus this comment that “not only” the grapes are
actually brown indicates a sense of his own being past his prime/in decay/in decadence—which is itself
met with affirmation, it seems.
32
A, 13, emphases added.
33
Invocation—instantiating in the saying—the names of god.
34
The use of “space” here is meant to connect up with my claims, above, about catachresis.
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We should notice though, that there is another possible sense of the “Und so,”
that of the sense of how—in this way—echoing the “how” of the subtitle—that he will
articulate how his life has come to be.35
Summary of Prefatory Elements
All of these prefatory elements give rise to a series of questions that seem
unending. They end, at least on the page, with the claim that the narrator will now
proceed with this task: to tell his life to himself. From the title, and all of its
connotations, this is a description of a person, a homo; from the subtitle, this is a
description not of one’s static qualities, but of one’s becoming, and perhaps, an
articulation of how a “one” differs from a subject; from the beginning of the Preface,
this is a distinction of the narrator from common misperceptions about him, which
might interrupt the recognition of a task that he gives voice to; from the end of the
Preface, the exergue, this is the story of a self, of a disposition to oneself and to life,
whereby the gratefulness for oneself is attributed not to god, but to life, one’s life, and
that life is what is to thank for the self’s becoming.
But when this narrator turns to give his story, to where does he turn? Presaged
in his claim that “all its [the past year’s] living qualities have been rescued, they are
immortal” and live on in the texts that were written that year, the telling of the life to
oneself will occur through returning to those vestiges of life, those writings, in which all
that is living has been made immortal. The self is depicted as retrieved from the texts,
35

It becomes possible to think that it is precisely this idiosyncratic relation that is the “how,” that the
following text is not only a self-recounting, but a demonstration of how one becomes who one is. But the
question still remains: is it a demonstration, for us, of how a certain one becomes what that certain one
is? Is it a model?
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from reading what has been written and saying, in a new act of writing, what has been
said there.
But there are two intervening sections that prevent this reading, two intervening
sections in which this telling of one’s life to oneself does not return to one’s writings, at
least not before accounting for something else, and rather returns to one’s memory
regarding heredity, nutrition, location, and climate. In the text proper, following the
exergue, Nietzsche spends two sections on this autobiographical narrative before
turning to his writings, a turn which is finally opened with the claim “I am [the one], my
writings are the other.” These matters, they are so intimately related to one’s
disposition, so idiomatic; regarding one’s ability to treat oneself non-universally,
idiosyncratically. Why do they appear here, before the work of reading the texts has
even begun?
Interlude 1: Writing as Re-Reading the Self: An Exemplary Preface of 1886
In most of the Prefaces of 1886 we find this structure: Nietzsche reads Nietzsche,
and reads Nietzsche better than that prior Nietzsche, having written the text to which
the preface is appended, read Nietzsche. Nietzsche appears to read who the old
Nietzsche, having written an older text, is.
Notice, then, that Ecce Homo’s inclusion of this autobiography as read through
texts is not the only place in which this happens. It seems that, after 1886, this reading
and re-writing of the self is being continually staged in Nietzsche’s texts. What is
remarkable about Ecce Homo is, then, that this very work of reading forms the core,
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rather than the Preface, of the text—yet, indeed, this work has a Preface appended in
which the same self-reading occurs!
Let me here say a bit about those other Prefaces.
In the Preface to Daybreak, written in 1886, Nietzsche says what we are [was wir
sind]. He tells us, in the closing section of the Preface, that he has just recounted was
wir sind, what we are. This might be helpful, then, in trying to think what this “what”
indicates. Based on this Preface, what is it to say what someone is?
Starting in the first section of the Preface, Nietzsche tells us, of the one whose
work we read in this text, that he is a “’subterrestrial,” and an “apparent Trophonius, ”
indicating that he labors below ground in the dark, and will “return” to the surface.36
Not only is this a play on the trope of return, this particular iteration emphasizes
interpretation. The way in which interpretation is emphasized by choosing the
Trophonian oracle as the figure of return also distinguishes the writer of this text from
other figures of return: Socrates or the messiah, for example. This metaphorical
reference to Trophonius introduces a network of relations whereby the issue being
emphasized is the interpretation, or translation, of what is communicated in the ensuing
work.
Sean D. Kirkland emphasizes the significance of the structure of the petitioner’s
experience with this oracle, and I believe it is this structure that is also emphasized here.
Drawing from a variety of sources, Kirkland describes it thus:

36

Thirteen years earlier, in PTzG, Nietzsche had referred to the emergence of the pre-Platonic philosopher
as if “walking, as it were, out of the Cave of Trophonius” (1).
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As opposed to the oracle at Delphi, petitioners at the Cave of Trophonius
communed with divinity directly, without the mediation of a Pythia or
priests. After days of elaborate ritual preparations, including fasting,
scourging, purification, dance, and sacrifices, the petitioner would enter
the cave—a consultation that was referred to as a katabasis or a
‘descent’ and that, with its ritual of drinking a “water of Lêthê ” before
entering and a “water of Mnêmosuneˆ” upon exiting, seems intended to
evoke a journey to the underworld. The petitioner would place himself at
the very small mouth of the cave and would eventually be violently and
inexplicably drawn inside. Utterly alone and in a state of more or less
complete sensory deprivation, the petitioner would find himself on his
back, holding honeyed barley-cakes in both hands as offerings to the
serpents associated with the god. In this posture, he would be visited by
Trophonius himself, who would provide him with visual or auditory
phenomena somehow in response to his question. Pausanius tells us,
from first hand experience, that after a katabasis the petitioner would be
ejected from the mouth of the cave, as inexplicably as he had been
drawn in, and then interrogated by the priests as to what he had
experienced, the entire process leaving him “paralyzed with terror and
unconscious both of himself and of his surroundings.” The experiences
undergone would then be interpreted and the petitioner would leave
with an oracular response to his question.37
What I would emphasize here is the approach to the words of the petitioner
upon emerging from the cave. Upon his exit, the petitioner appears mad, and seems to
rave. The words he emits are related to as ravings whose meaning must be interpreted,
this interpretation provided by the priests of the shrine. When Nietzsche thus claims in
this first section of the Preface that what has been sought in the depths “he himself will
tell you . . . ” upon his return, the reference to Trophonius calls up the relations of
madness and interpretation.
In the remainder of the Preface, he reads himself, the one writing this text (in
1881), in what is a sort of self-criticism. Now, this appears to be Nietzsche reading

37

Sean D. Kirkland, “Nietzsche and Drawing Near to the Personalities of the Pre-Platonic Greeks,”
Continental Philosophy Review 44 (4): (2011), page 429.
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Nietzsche: Nietzsche reading the Nietzsche who had just “emerged” from his
underground work, from the cave of Trophonius. That emergent speaker presents a
contradiction that it seems he did not avow: for he criticized morality, but in fact out of
the same spirit of morality in which he himself had been raised (so German, all-tooGerman). In other words, this later Nietzsche reads this earlier Nietzsche as a man of
conscience, thus, not yet having escaped morality, but as one who (like the one
suggested in the closing passages of GM §2, one who would turn the bad conscience
against itself) uses morality to overcome morality, executing, like the German
precursors, “a pessimistic will,” with the difference that it “is not afraid to deny
[Verneinen—negate/deny] itself, because it denies itself with joy! In us is consummated,
if you desire a formula—the autosuppression [Selbstaufhebung] of morals.”
In the final section of the Preface, the issue is learning to read Nietzsche [mich]
well, and this is done slowly—hence, the Preface took 6 years to appear, which is not a
problem, the work is simply slow. He seems to indicate here that reading involves
reading what, one reads what someone is—and one can read well, or one can read
poorly, hurriedly, thus mistaking what someone is.
Into the Text: Physiology, Fate
The first two sections beginning the text proper regard an idiosyncratic,
physiologically derived morality as opposed to a universal one for all. In these sections,
Nietzsche turns against metaphor, understood in the sense it has had since Aristotle, as
meta-phor, as transfer, as a turn, a translation, a movement across, a leap into an
entirely new sphere.
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While earlier Nietzsche had remarked, in OTL, that all words are metaphors,
much of the discussion of physiology in Ecce Homo seems to consist in an unworking of
the metaphorical/literal distinction, at least in the case of the relation between body
and mind. One of the functions of the narrative in these sections is to invoke physiology
in contexts that initially seem striking, in such a way as to unwork the dichotomy
between physiology and its supposed “other,” Geist, spirit, mind.38 What initially seems
metaphorical, use of expressions regarding the physical to express something about the
ideal, unwork such a separation of realms. When the spirit is called a stomach, memory
indigestion, recognition smell, this is more than a metaphor—it appears as a metaphor,
but unworks itself as such, because, in fact, these ‘spheres’ are continuous, and the
processes of spirit are not being described through a transfer into bodily terms that thus
retain a tension with their new use; in fact, this tension is eradicated because Nietzsche
means that the supposedly ideal is an extension of the physiological.
Hence we see a connection with the critique of the Subject, which also involved
this turning against the distinction between body and mind. The process of assimilation
was the key there, as it allowed an image, which may have first seemed metaphorical,
that of assimilation, to introduce the continuity between the body and the mind. Ecce
Homo, tracing philosophical ideas back to physiology and instincts and particularities
that express themselves in physiological comportment to situations, does much the

38

It is not that physiology and spirit are “alike,” such that the physical can be the source of metaphors for
the ideal, but rather that these “realms” are continuous. The notion of there being similitude between
physical and ideal preys on the presumed distinction between the body and mind; it soon becomes clear
that the demonstrated relation between physiology and ideas, philosophy, aspects typically attributed to
Geist, is not merely of the order of similitude—one which requires a crossing between spheres, and thus
which asserts its character as both being and not being the case—but is in fact one of continuity.
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same work here as the connection of the prejudice regarding the Subject back to
assimilation, and interpretation back to assimilation. But in this text, there is another
layer: not only is the narrative content an apparent physiological description of himself,
the text, explicitly called out as a work in relation to the self in the Preface, is an
enactment of assimilation as interpretation.
Physiology as More than Metaphor
Cleverness is the difference between being “just a piece of chance” and
“necessity.” Those who are just pieces of chance, rather than necessity, are not
“governed by an instinct for self-preservation that is most clearly expressed as an
instinct for self-defence,” an instinct which also goes by the name of taste. (EH, 95)
First, we might consider how the distinction between becoming chance and
becoming necessity is expressed in terms of physiology.
Nietzsche expresses his position in relation to Christianity in terms of his “instinct
for attack,” and his psychological acuity, in part, to his “instinct for cleanliness.” His
antipathy to ideas such as “’God’, ‘immortality of the soul’, ‘redemption’, ‘beyond’ are
explained in terms of a taste or preference; he simply has never, even when a child,
been inclined to them. (EH, 82)
These idiosyncrasies may seem to be nothing but, just the tracing of one’s
idiosyncrasies; but they are related to the issue of nutrition in that nutrition first enters
in what seems to be a metaphorical sense; as one’s nutritional intake impacts the
growth, health, and becoming of the body, it seems that one’s intake of ideas also
impacts one’s spiritual health: these seem to be similitudes, and hence the body as a

269

metaphor. However, Nietzsche’s description elides the spheres of body and spirit, so
that their distinction is difficult to maintain.
The spiritual diet that he initially had led him to misunderstand, in fact, the way
that his physiological idiosyncrasies indicated the constitution of reason. His ‘idealistic’
German education taught him to “lose sight of reality.” It taught him to “eat badly …--in
moral terms, ‘impersonally’, ‘selflessly’, ‘altruistically’, for the sake of cooks and other
fellow Christians…between Leipzig cuisine and my first studies of Schopenhauer (1865), I
effected a very serious denial of my ‘will to life.’ How to ruin your stomach for the sake
of inadequate nutrition—the aforementioned cuisine seemed like the perfect solution to
this problem.”39
It could seem here that this is merely a metaphor, that eating food dictated by
cooks, regardless of its impacts on one, out of deference to the cook, a little selflessness
for their sake, is like taking on ideas dictated by philosophers, without a mind to their
effects on one.
When Nietzsche attends to his dietary idiosyncrasies, judging his intake on the
basis of its effect on his own feeling of health, he creates his own “morality,” his own
valuation of food and drink from the perspective of his life. These evaluations, pros and
contras, even change across time. His valuation of nutrition is neither universal, nor
even without variation in his own case, as only in middle age did water become his main
drink, and liquor become forbidden entirely, as it was at odds with his physiology.

39

EH 86, emphasis added.
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“Everyone has their own standards here, sometimes between the narrowest and most
delicate boundaries.”40
This calls to mind his claim that moralists want to project themselves as the
model that everyone ought to follow; in contrast, what he here calls his “morality” is the
eventual finding that the value of nutritional products, and his ‘for’ and ‘against’ them,
are matters that must be self-imposed on the basis of their effects on one.
This is not merely a matter of nutrition, though. Spiritual and physiological value
are the same because physiology disposes one in matters of the spirit; or, the other way
to state this, matters of the spirit are continuations of the state of the body: “[T]he
origin of German spirit” is “from depressive intestines . . . German spirit is indigestion, it
is never through with anything,” and further, “[a]ll prejudices come from the
intestines.”41
What we have here is not simply a metaphor, but an interpretation that the
spirit expresses the body’s disposition. If German spirit is from the intestines, from
indigestion, not simply like them, then we must consider the perspective from which
Nietzsche has evaluated digestion. This is the perspective of what he calls the will to life,
or previously, the will to health. Gustatory intake has an impact on whether there
ensues an ascent or a decline. As the formula for decadence is practically choosing that
which is harmful to one, gustatory choices that are harmful to one announce, in their
harm, the illogic of their selection. Reason is this attention to the reality that one is, as
one who becomes on the basis of gustatory selection, as capable of ascent and decline
40
41

EH, 87.
Ibid., 86-87, emphasis added.
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on the basis of such selections and their interaction, at the physiological level, with
one’s idiosyncrasies. Some choices will lead to a state of physiological decline, others to
ascent. Out of this reality, spirit will be a continuation, in the sense that the
development of spirit follows upon it. Having gotten oneself into a state of indigestion, a
philosophy of indigestion ensues. There is no transfer or leap into an entirely different
sphere here, there is a direct continuity from the digestive into the spiritual.
But, there seems to be something more than just continuity between physiology
and spirit, physiology and philosophy, demonstrated here. A person who does not
attend to their own digestive processes and their idiosyncrasies, who does not take the
standard of health, which can only be established by the person considering their own
idiosyncratic responses, will likely have two ensuing features: 1) they will follow the
digestive practices available to them by habituation and example, with no sense for how
their needs may differ; 2) as a result, in not being able to have the insight that their
dietary needs may differ from others when measured against the standard of decline
and ascent, they will also not be afforded the insight into the connection of the spirit
with the body in this way. They will not be afforded the insight into reason as an
assessment of value on the basis of its relation to one’s own decline and ascent. And this
is precisely the insight into reason that marks the difference between Nietzsche’s
thought and that “idealism” that came before. This insight into the products of thought
as continuations of the physiological states of thinkers—states shared by entire swaths
of people similarly educated to take on the habitus of nutrition and thinking—is an
insight that Nietzsche, in his discussion of nutrition, traces to his ability—his fatedness,
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his idiosyncratic destiny—to see nutritional choices as necessarily idiosyncratic. Because
this idiosyncratic, physiological insight allowed him to see the role of idiosyncrasy in
determining the most appropriate evaluation of nutritional choices, he was able to
approach the spirit with the same insight. This is why it seems that what we have here is
neither simply a metaphor, for there is more than just a similarity of structure proposed
here between nutrition and spirit; and it is also not a claim of the order of a universal
dictum, that all people should eat x in order to become y.
Rather, with all of the physiological issues considered in the two opening
sections of the text—nutrition, location and climate—what we are faced with are
choices, but choices “governed by an instinct for self-preservation that is most clearly
expressed as an instinct for self-defence,” or, taste.42 The difference is that between
being a matter of chance versus necessity. Those who are matters of chance do not
have this instinct for self-defense. When one is a matter of chance, one is caught up in
the work of taking in, saying yes, in habitual ways, without any idiosyncratic drawing of
boundaries, setting of limits that can cut down on the onslaught. To be a matter of
necessity, one needs not only not to say yes in these habitual ways, but also to say no as
little as possible; “warding off,” “saying no,” is a depletion of energy. In other words, to
be a matter of chance is to allow oneself to be determined by anything which comes
one’s way, in relation to which one will need to invoke a response at each moment. The
difference between necessity and chance is an attunement to that which already calls
up one’s own yes: an attunement to idiosyncrasy, an ability to steer away from that
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Ibid., 95.
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which would call up one’s “no” in advance. Self-defence, the requisite of necessity,
requires that one already set one’s horizon around that which pertains to them, and
thus, implies some kind of familiarity with oneself already; when this is done, energy
does not need to be wasted taking on each onslaught.
However, there is something oblique about this. Nietzsche tells us that “the
answer to the question of how you become what you are” leads to a selfishness that is
unordinary and entirely contrary to “catching sight of yourself with this task.” If you
catch sight of yourself with this task, then you will attempt to preclude mistakes based
on your current understanding of what you are. But cleverness involves a kind of not
looking too closely, and “[b]ecoming what you are presupposes that you do not have
the slightest idea what you are. If you look at it this way, even life’s mistakes have their
own meaning and value, the occasional side roads and wrong turns, the delays, the
‘modesties’, the seriousness wasted on tasks that lie beyond the task” (96). There is an
incorporation into a whole that is prepared in advance, but which cannot occur if the
whole is presaged ahead of time.
The Physiological Basis of Fate
As in the focus on nutrition, throughout “Why I am so Wise,” Nietzsche
expresses a number of other major themes in relation to his physiological
characteristics, a central one being his presentation of himself as the duality of
decadence and its opposite. The opposition to decadence is in what he calls his “will to
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health, to life,” an instinctive ability to, in the midst of bodily decadence, select the
appropriate methods for remedy and recovery, which implies the desire for health.43
The body is meant here literally, though it often appears as a metaphor. Bodily
states are not merely being used as analogies for spiritual states, but rather, spiritual
states are said to be expressions of bodily states. Uses of the term “decadence,” with its
provenance in a description of the physiological state of decline, and in its use in
describing tastes, ideas, or proclivities that are understood as the outgrowths of such a
state, can be traced back to that origin in physiological decadence only by reading them
as its symptoms.44
Notice, then, how this contrast between decadence and life, symbolized in the
image of conjoined deceased father and living mother, is treated in these early sections
as the reason for many of Nietzsche’s key insights. 45 One of these, that philosophy
heretofore has been decadent, based on reading philosophy as a symptom of
physiological decadence, owes itself to Nietzsche’s own physiological duality described
above, his decadence coupled with his will to health. This was an insight he could only
gather after a certain experience, it seems, that of being able to look back and read the
qualities of his productions, his books, in relation to his physiological states—he saw
then the connection between physiological states and philosophical productions. The
43

This is a kind of instinct, which, by taking on a relation to the body, creates—and here the right word is
difficult—in his case, it created a “well-turned-out person.” What matters is the relation taken by this
instinct to the bodily states.
44
So when the narrator claims that “I created my philosophy from out of my will to health, to life” this will
to life was that which took up a relation of overcoming in relation to the body’s inclinations toward
decline. The body’s inclinations toward decline provide a sort of principle of selection for the will to
health.
45
His literal father’s actual early death is the expression “in the form of a riddle” of Nietzsche’s tendency
toward decline, the father’s demise the symbol of his decadent instincts.
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difference in the relation between his states and his thinking, and the state and thinking
of most philosophers, is that for his there is a contrast: while he experienced “the
deepest physiological weakness [and] an excess of painful feelings,” he produced a work
of “perfect lightness and cheerfulness” in Daybreak. His very ability to note this contrast
is traced to his long experience both in states of decay, and, in the vacillation between
decay and recovery. 46
Given that his relationship to his own decadence was that will to health and life
which seeks to remedy decadence, a certain possibility was made available to him:
rather than the ressentiment, which is a continuation of physiological decadence absent
the counterforce of the will to health, he had the option of fatalism.47 Initially, this is a
physiological response to the very physiology of decadence, a sort of triage in
emergency conditions: when one is in a state of decadence, ressentiment is harmful, as
it is a formula for compounding decadence, which is choosing precisely that which is
harmful for one: “born from weakness, ressentiment is most harmful to the weak
themselves.”48 Decadence is susceptibility, and an inability to rein reaction in;
decadence is expressed in ressentiment, which is decadence rebounding off its own lack
of resources of resistance. These resources can be built up through fatalism, through
hibernation, as non-response allows a being at the near end of its rope to tie the rope
46

Bouts of sickness produced the finger for nuances, but only because the will to health could note the
value of these nuances, these slight differences that might make the difference between sickness and
health; and the vacillation between states of sickness and health produced the eye for the oblique, for
what is “around the corner,” for what is not seen but otherwise indicated, and the ability to change
‘perspectives,’ given these changes. “I have a hand for switching perspectives: the first reason why a
‘revaluation of values’ is even possible, perhaps for me alone” (76).
47
“. . . [T]he sick person has only one great remedy for this [growing of sickness into ressentiment]—I call
it Russian fatalism” (EH, 81).
48
Ibid., 81.
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and start an accumulation, as if the energy of response is saved up. Russian fatalism is,
at least, the refusal of that which is harmful to one in one’s most vulnerable state: the
privation of the response that would continue the decadence, and hence it involves a
decadent being turning on its own decadence and preventing the reaction. Fatalism is
presented as a strategy for the decadent, in the emergency of lacking the strength for
“weapons and war,” which is to say, for resistance, as well as for even the
internalization of ressentiment.49 It is in this context that Nietzsche claims “To accept
yourself as a fate, not to want to ‘change’ yourself—in situations like this, that is reason
par excellence.”50 The situation here is, precisely, decadence—in such a condition,
fatalism is wise.
We have seen that Nietzsche characterizes himself as decadent. And here
fatalism is presented as a certain response from within decadence. If we recall that
European culture is regarded by Nietzsche as largely decadent, of the oft-noted
decadence of both contemporary culture and philosophy itself, then if fatalism is being
presented here as a normative proposal, it is not so for man as such, but for decadent
humanity, as a strategy that allows for a recuperation of energy—it is the greatest
reason “in such situations.” It is temporary, as its enactment overcomes the needs that
lead to it, allowing for the transformation of decadence and the relation to
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As it is for the Russian soldier, already tired, already weak, already freezing, who lies down in the cold
snow that seems the opposite of what is needful. But the logic here is that this lack of everything needful
for the waking state, namely the intense cold, has the physiological effect of slowing down physiological
need itself; in hibernation, energy is conserved, and lack can be endured that could not be otherwise, as
both metabolism and temperature decrease.
50
Ibid., 82.
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ressentiment: through fatalism one grows too strong for ressentiment, it becomes not
simply harmful but “beneath” one.
Fatalism was a strategy, demonstrating his duality between decadence and will
to life, that Nietzsche claims he employed in relation to his “situations, places, lodgings,
company” for years. Again the physiological experience of hibernation might seem to be
a metaphor but also is a description of what is ultimately a physiological situation; just
as the hibernating soldier stops fighting, immerses himself in the snowy situation
without trying to resist or change it, so Nietzsche accepted the above list of existential
situations without trying to change them.51
Interlude 2: Amor Fati, the Dionysian, and Dis/unity
In BGE §231, fate is that which remains deep down unteachable in us. But we
only discover how fate is “settled in us”—the temporality of this discovery is future
anterior, what we discover is how fate was already settled in us.52 And in NCW, he
speaks of how, as a result of “taking sides” against himself, “[I] found my way to that
courageous pessimism that is . . . as it seems to me today, the way to myself,—to my
task. That concealed and imperious something for which we for long have no name until
it finally proves to be our task. . . .”53

51

Nietzsche calls accepting these situations “accepting oneself [sich selbst]” as a fate, not wanting oneself
to be different.
52
“At times, we find certain solutions to problems that inspire strong faith in us . . . Later—we see them
only as steps to self-knowledge, signposts to the problem we are—rather to the great stupidity we are, to
our spiritual fatum, to what is unteachable very ‘deep down’.”
53
NCW, 277. In Ecce Homo, as well, Nietzsche links “myself” with “my task.” Becoming what one is is in
some ways this future anterior discovery of one’s task. And the practices of selfishness that he describes
in the first two sections are the sine qua non of finding one’s task. This suggestion that what one is is one’s
task—and we know there are those who can fail to find this.
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In Ecce Homo, and just before the claim that “I am one, my books are another,”
amor fati comes up: “My formula for human greatness is amor fati: that you do not
want anything to be different, not forwards, not backwards, not for all eternity. Not just
to tolerate necessity, still less to conceal it—all idealism is hypocrisy towards necessity--,
but to love it. . . .”54
Elsewhere, after Book IV of The Gay Science has been dedicated to Saint January,
Nietzsche remarks on the wish that he has for the new year: “I want to learn more and
more to see as beautiful what is necessary in things; then I shall be one of those who
make things beautiful. Amor fati: let that be my love henceforth!” This seeing the
necessary, depending on first finding the necessary, is a making beautiful of those
things.55
This sense of necessity is echoed in GS §377, wherein Nietzsche describes a “high
point in life” that is characterized by great freedom in which we have “faced up to the
beautiful chaos of existence and denied it all providential reason and goodness,” in
which we are able to see by “the evidence of our own eyes . . . how palpably always
everything that happens to us turns out for the best.” Nietzsche calls this vision that of
“personal providence,” in which “life” and the everyday events we experience “see[m]
to have no other wish than to prove this proposition again and again,” the proposition
that all things that happen to us turn out for the best, because “either immediately or
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Ibid., 99.
Clearly, tragic affirmation, of which Dionysus is exemplar, does not require that what is affirmed be
beautiful, for the Dionysian “says yes to the very things that are questionable and terrible . . .” (TI, 170).
55
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very soon after [they] prov[e] to be something that ‘must not be missing;’ it has a
profound significance and use precisely for us.”56
This kind of personal providence involves chance, in the sense that in the
unfolding of what comes to be seen as necessary for us, we do not see it before the fact
as necessary. The necessity is in fact retrospective.57 Chance is here contrasted with the
providence of a deity, to whom all things are known beforehand, one “who is full of care
and personally knows every little hair on our head. . . .”58
In the final section of Book VI of BGE, we are in the language of learning again. It
is hard to learn what a philosopher is, we are told, because it cannot be taught but
rather must be “know[n] . . . from experience.” But learning, as in learning to love,
involves figuring or figuration. Nietzsche picks up the strands linking love with learning
to see in GS §334, describing “how we have learned to love all things that we now love”
by the initial strangeness shedding its veil and “turn[ing] out to be a new and
indescribable beauty.” This process of learning to love happens to us as a progression of
stages exemplified by the way of relating to music by those who learn to love it: “First
56

It becomes tempting here to lose the personal freedom that has been won, and to attribute the power
of this “providence” to a deity. This is precisely what Nietzsche does not do, marked in the final lines of
the preface, when he indicates it is to his life that he gives thanks and is grateful—just the sort of
gratefulness for gifts out of which attribution of external deities once arose. Rather, Nietzsche suggests
that we make another interpretive supposition, “that our own practical and theoretical skill in interpreting
and arranging events has now reached its high point.” This high point of freedom is one, firstly, in which
everything appears oriented to a unified point, that of the providence of the one seeing, to whom all
appears as what must not be missing. And this high point of freedom and providence is to be interpreted
as the high point of “our own practical and theoretical skill in interpreting and arranging events.” This
sense of arrangement and interpreting events—which Nietzsche undertakes in Ecce Homo, in his retelling
of his life—it is more than a recollection.
57
See Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, Study 6, for the narrative relation to chance as a retrospective creation
of necessity.
58
That chance is involved in this kind of providential harmony is related back to the initial strangeness of
music, indeed the providential “harmony” that we find is a kind of music in which chance means we do
not know before the fact what is being sounded: it is sometimes the case that chance “guides our hand”
in the playing of “beautiful music” that “our foolish hand produces.”

280

one has to learn to hear a figure and melody at all, to detect and distinguish it, to isolate
it and delimit it as a separate life.” The appearance of the figure is felt as strange and
odd, and requires “tolerance” and living with, until there comes to be a moment at
which “we are used to it . . . when we sense that we should miss it if it were missing.” At
this point of recognizing that it must not be missing for us, “it continues to compel and
enchant us relentlessly until we have become its humble and enraptured lovers who
desire nothing better from the world than it only.”
Learning is giving figure to what one has experienced, and giving figure or shape
involves a certain relation to necessity, once again.
Necessity is a category of figuration that artists are skilled in and that scholars
fumble with, because to the latter, necessity is confused with need, in the sense of
compulsion. Necessity is pictured as following the lead of a compelling external force.59
In this sense, what is necessary gets its character or direction from what compels it and
what it must follow, it is “picture[d] . . . as a painstaking having-to-follow and beingcompelled.” Necessity is different for artists because of how they experience necessity.
Artists “kno[w] only too well that precisely when they no longer do anything
‘voluntarily’ but do everything of necessity, their feeling of freedom, subtlety, full
power, of creative placing, disposing, and forming reaches its peak—in short, that
necessity and ‘freedom of the will’ then become one in them.” This indication harkens
back to the seeing of what “must not be missing” which is the high point of freedom
59

Here Nietzsche diagnoses a dual nature in a philosopher, “a bold and exuberant spirituality that runs
presto and a dialectical severity and necessity that takes no false step.” This combination of exuberant
running ahead and the severe demand that each step be necessary is not “experienced” by most scholars
because of their misrepresentation to themselves of the force of necessity.
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mentioned in the GS passage, and adds to it the language of necessity, implicit in that
sense of what must not be missing. The great clue that we are given here is that this
necessity of the artist’s creative act is inextricably bound with the freedom felt by them
to be revealed in figuring and ordering, and that the necessity and this freedom are
“one.” (BGE, 213)
Those who believe that the direction of becoming can be laid out beforehand,
imposed as an imperative by them for others—moralists—believe, in fact, that people
should be “different from the way they are,” and that they would become what they
ought to be by following the pattern of the moralist, who actually uses himself as the
model. This is insanity, Nietzsche claims.60 There is a Dionysian power that such men
lack, which is the ability to affirm, to “say yes to the very things that are questionable
and terrible” (TI, 170). This can be viewed as an economy, which follows “that economy
in the law of life that can take advantage of even the disgusting species of idiot, the
priests, the virtuous . . .” in the sense of turning them to an advantage. The advantage is
“we ourselves, we immoralists.”61
There are a number of strands within what later Nietzsche calls the Dionysian,
and the apparent tension between these strands poses difficulties for coming to a
resolution regarding Nietzsche’s view of the self.

60

“An individual is a piece of fate, from the front and from the back; an individual is one more law, one
more necessity imposed on everything that is coming and going to be. To say to an individual: ‘change
yourself’ means demanding that everything change, even retroactively. . . . And in fact there have been
consistent moralists who wanted people to be different, namely virtuous, who wanted to have people in
their own image, which is that of an idiot: and to this end they negated the world!” (TI, 175).
61
TI, 176.
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Dionysus: Unification and Unworking of Unities
I want now to just call attention to the ambivalence in the relation of the figure
of Dionysus in later Nietzsche to unification.
In TI IX §49 Goethe is called one who “created himself.” He is called an “event”
and a type of “self-overcoming.” This description of Goethe prizes unification and
totality: “What he wanted was totality; he fought against the separation of reason,
sensibility, feeling, will … he disciplined himself to wholeness, he created himself … In
the middle of an age inclined to unreality, Goethe was a convinced realist: he said yes to
everything related to him.”62
This is also called a kind of becoming free:
A spirit like this who has become free stands in the middle of the world
with a cheerful and trusting fatalism in the belief that only the individual
is reprehensible, that everything is redeemed and affirmed in the
whole—he does not negate any more . . . But a belief like this is the
highest of all possible beliefs: I have christened it with the name
Dionysus.—63
We should notice two senses of wholeness at work here. First is the wholeness
that characterizes Goethe “himself.” This wholeness is a lack of separation of “reason,
sensibility, feeling, will,” and, this wholeness is the result of “discipline,” for he
disciplined himself “into” wholeness. This disciplining into wholeness is called
“creat[ing]” of himself. And the wholeness he had become through discipline into
totality is also called a “becoming free.”

62
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TI, 222-223, emphasis added.
Ibid.
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So this example of one who has “created himself” and thus become free is
expressed in terms of unification, totality, wholeness.64 However, we should return to
Goethe, for is there another sense of wholeness at work here, wholeness as the all or
everything, whose reference is decidedly not contained within the individual. Precisely
in creating himself into a whole, becoming free, Goethe was able to create another
relation to a whole: to stand in the middle of “im All,” in the all/everything, and take on
a cheerful and trusting fatalism that is called Dionysian, the belief that only the
individual [das Einzelne] is reprehensible and that as a whole or in the whole itself [im
Ganzen sich] everything [Alles] is redeemed and affirmed.
It seems that there are a few ways to take this Dionysian belief. It could suggest
that the separation of individual parts out of the context of a whole makes them
reprehensible, and that those parts become redeemed when they are incorporated into
a whole, part of a whole. This could describe Goethe: one in whom everything is united
into a whole, the individual being that whole. On the other hand, this passage could
suggest a supra-individual wholeness within which the individual is part of that whole: if
Nietzsche means by “das Einzelne” the individual person, not simply the individual part.
This second sense would claim that even the individual person is reprehensible if viewed
out of the context of a whole. In other words, is Goethe’s making of himself a whole
precisely the way that the redemption and affirmation is achieved?
Yet another question we are faced with is the role of totality and wholeness in
relation to self-creation. For there is another sense of the Dionysian that seems to pull
64

This is echoed in the passage on the grand style in GS §290, evidence of “a single taste,” in terms that
recall unification.

284

against this suggestion of wholeness as unification. It is the sense of the Dionysian in
relation to intoxication and the aesthetic state.
Overflowing: Dionysian Intoxication and art
It might be that what Nietzsche is describing here as the Dionysian state is a
state of intoxication, an aesthetic state that allows for the type of vision described
above. In TI, IX, 10 Nietzsche describes the Dionysian “state” as one in which “the entire
system of affects is excited and intensified: so that it discharges all its modes of
expression at once, releasing the force of presentation, imitation, transfiguration,
transformation, and all types of mimicry and play acting, all at the same time. The
essential thing is the ease of metamorphosis, the inability not to react.” As a result of
this state, “[h]e enters into any skin, into any affect: he constantly transforms himself.”
This should call to mind the description of intoxication, the indispensible precondition
for art, that “intensif[ies] the excitability of the whole machine, ” as “the feeling of
fullness and increasing strength. This feeling makes us release ourselves onto
things. . . .”65
Someone in this state, this Dionysian state of intoxication, “has enough fullness
to enrich everything… transforms things until they reflect his own power—until they are
the reflexes of his perfection. This need to make perfect is –art.” It is called
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TI IX §8. This should call to mind those other “explosions,” those “great human being[s],” of whom it is
said in TI IX §44 that “the overwhelming pressure of the out-flowing forces does not allow for any sort of
oversight or caution,” as this person “pours out, pours over, consumes himself, does not spare himself,-fatalistically, disastrously, involuntarily, as a river is involuntary when it overflows its banks” (emphasis
added).
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“idealization,” but not in that traditional or philosophical sense of conceptualizing, not a
siphoning, a weeding down of things. It “exaggerates, distorts.”66
There are two other states of intoxication Nietzsche describes here in TI. Given
how central the Dionysian is to later Nietzsche, it would seem that this sort of
intoxication would bear an important relation to how he uses the term “Dionysian.” And
what we find in this state is a kind of overwhelming; there is involuntarity, lack of
restraint of reaction, overflowing of bounds, overflowing into “other skins”; one in this
state is not the unified whole that Goethe was described to be, and is not a figuring of
self-discipline, but is rather in a constant self-transformation.
Eternal return, amor fati, the Dionysian, all of these thoughts (Ansell-Pearson
and Conway call them “teachings” or “doctrines”) are ways of articulating varying
perspectives on one another.67
Who: Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, the Current Reader/Writer?
In the large middle section of Ecce Homo, Nietzsche engages in this reading of his
writings, and I’ve suggested that this amounts not only to the provision of
interpretations of the texts, but that it amounts to a retrospective performance that is
related to that sense of becoming what one is. Schopenhauer as Educator (SE), the third
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7. In TI X §1, Nietzsche talks about his style. He claims that he tried to adopt a Roman style in his works.
This sense of style was aroused by Sallust, and Horace. His description of Horace’s style brings to mind his
description of Dionysian intoxication: they gave him an “artistic delight,” “this mosaic of words, where the
force of every word flows out as a sound, a place, a concept, to the right and the left and all over the
whole, a minimal range and minimal number of signs achieving a maximal semiotic energy” (emphasis
added). In comparison, other poetry is “just a prattle of feelings.” To this poetry Nietzsche claims he owes
the rousing of his sense of style. This suggestion that there could be a maximal outpouring of energy from
the composition of the text calls to mind the Dionysian state.
67
Regarding the question of whether one is the more determinative, see the following section.
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of Nietzsche’s Untimely Meditations published in 1874, is treated, and it is interesting
for our purposes because of the destruction of the preexisting unities—of
Schopenhauer, of the younger self of Nietzsche—are demonstrated in the current act of
reading/writing in Ecce Homo.
SE contains in its first few pages an image of what Nietzsche calls “finding
oneself again,” and there are a few reasons why it calls for consideration given the
themes at issue here. First is the retrospective temporality of this process involving the
self and a relation to oneself. Second is the resonance of the themes of becoming and
fate within this process. Third is the fact that Ecce Homo provides a reading of this text.
So we might ask: what is this “finding oneself again” and can it justifiably be related to
the notion, in much later texts, of becoming what one is? And given the central role of
love in its description, can it also justifiably be related to that later important form of
love, amor fati? Does making these connections shed light on the performance that
Nietzsche engages in Ecce Homo, if only by way of contrast?
In the first section below, I will discuss the image of “finding oneself again,” and I
will ask how Nietzsche’s ensuing recollection of the Schopenhauer he claimed to have
loved relates to that opening image as a possible performance. In the second section, I
turn to a consideration of Ecce Homo, which provides a potential commentary on SE’s
treatment of “finding oneself again.”
Finding Oneself Again, and the Educator as Beloved
The first section of SE opens with a description of an experience that is
elsewhere thematized by Nietzsche, what goes by the name of the “great liberation” in
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the 1886 Preface to HTH. It is that of young person in the midst of an experience that
Nietzsche claims occurs to “every youthful soul,” that of feeling that one’s true nature is
distinct from, and has been buried under, the social conventions of the culture in which
one has been raised, which seem to have only made of one what one is not, and merely
provided a “painted bag of clothes” equipped with “artificial limbs,” “glasses of wax”
and “plastic nose.” And so the question for such a person becomes, “How can one find
oneself again?” (SE, 129)
To find oneself again, Nietzsche tells us, this person should be encouraged not to
dig down—as if one’s true nature were pre-existing and waiting to be uncovered—but
rather to “look back” over her life in order to recollect her loves. The passage is worth
quoting in full:
Let the youthful soul look back on life with the question: what have you
truly loved up to now, what has drawn your soul aloft, what has
mastered it and at the same time blessed it? Set up these revered objects
(Gegenstande) before you and perhaps their nature and their sequence
will give you a law, the fundamental law of your own true self. Compare
these objects one with another, see how one completes, expands,
surpasses, transfigures another, how they constitute a stepladder upon
which you have clambered up to yourself as you are now; for your true
nature lies, not concealed deep within you, but immeasurably high above
you, or at least above that which you usually take yourself to be.68
Finding oneself again is thus a retrospective retrieval of all that one has loved,
coupled with a re-reading of the progressive interrelation of those loves—as if they had
formed a necessary series of steps leading to what one is now.
The educator factors into this process precisely in his or her being the
recollected love: Nietzsche closes this section with the claim that he knows of no better
68

SE, 129-130.
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way to find oneself “than to recollect one’s true educators. And so today I shall recall
one of the teachers and taskmasters of whom I can boast, Arthur Schopenhauer.” The
only recollection in this text is of an educator, suggesting that educators are the loves
we recollect in finding ourselves again.
The educator is not only an object of love, but the provision of a liberation.
Nietzsche claims that educators can only be our liberators, because they reveal “that the
true, original meaning and basic stuff of your nature is something completely incapable
of being educated or formed and is in any case something difficult of access, bound and
paralysed.”
What is the liberation provided by true educators? To answer these questions, a
few features of Nietzsche’s recollection of Schopenhauer seem important to note.
Nietzsche tells us that a philosopher is only of use to him inasmuch as he can be
an example, and this example must be provided by his “outward life and not merely his
books.” He laments that he only knew Schopenhauer through his books. But the content
of those books, what Schopenhauer claims and writes, barely figure into this
recollection at all: there is only one direct quotation, and only four brief references to
his texts, in 80 pages. This is not a recollection engaged through the encounter with
texts.
References are rather to the kind of person he is said to have been and the
example that he was. What is strangest about this is that Nietzsche writes that he never
met Schopenhauer, the man. So, what exactly is being recollected here?
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After listing the first set of Schopenhauer’s traits—cheerfulness, honesty, and
steadfastness—Nietzsche ends their account by noting that what came first for him was
simply an intense physiological response upon encountering Schopenhauer in his texts,
which only later yielded to analysis this list of traits: “I am describing nothing but the
first, as it were physiological, impression Schopenhauer produced upon me, that
magical outpouring of the inner strength of one natural creature on to another that
follows the first and most fleeting encounter” (emphasis added). This description uses
terms Nietzsche uses to describe one in a Dionysian state, one who is overfull; but it also
calls to mind that a result of this Dionysian state, connected with the psychology of the
orgiastic, that one invests in all that one sees one’s own abundance; it could then be
that what appears as an outpouring of strength from one creature to another, to a
creature in a Dionysian state, is in fact his own outpouring, investment, striving to
perfect, whereby he is able to see as beautiful. It is this seeing as beautiful that is called
in later texts amor fati.69 Nietzsche’s recollection of Schopenhauer in the early text thus
indicates an amount of just the sort of projection that in the later work is linked both to
the Dionysian state and to love.70
What can be the point of this idiosyncratic view of an educator, with its
overtones of falling in love, projection, and overvaluation?

69

GS §276.
The remainder of Schopenhauer’s qualities regard what he is said to be an example of, which is the
ability to withstand such dangers as: dependence on university and state; isolation; despair over truth in
the wake of Kant; and despair at the recognition of one’s own limitations, in the face of which one still
longs for and strives for a continual improvement of his talents. Readers of Nietzsche might recognize
these as Nietzsche’s dangers, not infrequently noted in other texts as matters of his own struggle: for
instance, his claim that for want of companions he had to create them, in HTH, his frequent later
references to his lack of readers or need to create them.
70
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Nietzsche offers a few comments whereby we might glean a general
understanding of the way that Nietzsche views love functioning in this process of finding
oneself again. After he describes Schopenhauer’s example, he asks if this view of
Schopenhauer is only an “intoxicating vision,” or if it can “educate,” and he elaborates
that that education would be the ability of an ideal to be attached to practical actions
whereby we might realize the ideal. So education seems to be the process of altering
oneself away from what one now is toward an ideal with the aim of making it flesh. Love
is a prerequisite for this process, and it seems that love is what attaches us to an ideal in
the first place. Nietzsche will tell us later in the text that the love of a great man
provides a longing for a better version of oneself, because love allows two things to
happen at the same time: a perception of one’s failings, and, an aspiration to redeem
them by becoming better. Nietzsche claims that “it is love alone that can bestow on the
soul not only a clear, discriminating and self-contemptuous view of itself, but also the
desire to look beyond itself and to seek with all its might for a higher self as yet still
concealed from it,” and that only a person who has “attached his heart to some great
man” receives the ability to be “ashamed of oneself” in this way (emphases added).
Now, we can make sense of why Nietzsche claimed that our educators are not
only our loves, but that they can only liberate us. The liberation, in this encounter, is
provided by the sense of deficiency, and longing for what is shown to be possible. The
encounter with the loved philosopher can generate a feeling of longing or
dissatisfaction: what one now is is shown to be distant from what it is possible to be,
and what it is possible to be is sighted through the example that the other is taken to

291

embody. The longing that traverses this distance, the sense that one might be
otherwise, that one as one now is is deficient, seems to be a precondition for an
ascension to the espied possibility. And this is the model of love gleaned from Diotima’s
speech in The Symposium: love is the in-between that draws us from what we now are
to what we in fact long for, without recognizing what we in fact longed for all along until
after the fact of its discovery.
Thus, our true educators are our loves and through the power of that love on the
self, they are our liberators, liberating us by pointing out the space of difference
between what we now are, and what we might become, through providing an example
that we read in them, which enables us to despise our current position and long to be
otherwise, though a key is that, in the moment, we are unable to see them as just a
projection of our inner longing to be otherwise.
If education is, as Nietzsche earlier described it, the alteration of oneself away
from a current state toward an ideal, it seems that his suggestion is that love is essential
here in attaching us to the ideal in the first place, and then, providing the means
whereby the change in the self takes place—the work of shame and aspiration in
consort.71

71

This effect of love, the aspiration to a better self, is repeated, when one reads the situation of all of
mankind out of this one—when one “employs his own wrestling and longing . . . as a means by which he
can now read off the aspiration of mankind as a whole,” finding that all mankind is also striving for a
higher production, a higher kind of man, the genius (SE, 163). Nietzsche will later claim that the goal of
culture is precisely the production of the genius.
Thus, we can come to understand the central goal of culture, production of the genius, that
combination of artist, philosopher, and saint, in that all have an aspirational quality, for they are related
to as pieces of an ideal, that which is not yet, but which we are aiming toward. What Nietzsche has
suggested is that, love for the educator establishes a relation of longing that becomes a prototype for
understanding humanity, as also longing to be otherwise: just as we aim for a better self viewed only
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Circling back to the opening image which suggested that educators are our
liberators, and that educators are our loves, we might now fit these elements together.
The love of a great man allows us to see him as an ideal, exemplifying a
possibility of being. In our love of him, we attach ourselves to the ideal that he seems to
exemplify, and we gain self-knowledge. This makes possible a self-dissatisfaction and a
longing for what seems to be the position that they uniquely occupy. We might initially
think that we strive to become like them, when we follow their example. Yet, the real
object of our love is the possible self that is sighted from our position of selfdissatisfaction.72
This might allow us to address those idiosyncrasies in Nietzsche’s description of
Schopenhauer: could it be that what he was describing, in the name of Schopenhauer,
was really the “better possible self” that love for Schopenhauer allowed him to produce
a vision of? If so, is this the work of Schopenhauer, or of Nietzsche?
To Ecce Homo through this Lens
Ecce Homo seems to speak directly to SE, not merely in the sections in which the
earlier text is its explicit subject. Ecce Homo could be said to be centrally concerned with
finding oneself again, for in the work Nietzsche is recollecting his life and reading it as a

through the effects of the love of a great man, so all humanity aims for production of the better form, the
genius.
72
The child produced from this union is called culture, the longing to produce a better human. Just as
desire is a state of being in-between, this first child of love soon enough shows itself to be desire not for
the educator, but for the higher self it allowed us to see, and then, for the higher human. So through
following love, the object of desire has changed: the new object of desire is no longer the great loved
man, but the higher self that our encounter with him allowed to be seen. Just as love proceeds, for
Diotima, from love of one beautiful body to love of all beautiful bodies, love here proceeds from love of
one great man, to love of all possible great men, including the great possible self. What started out as love
of the educator has become love of a future self, and then, love of a future humanity.
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progression to what he now is, suggested by both the subtitle, how one becomes what
one is, and the work of retrospection as which the text constitutes itself, as Nietzsche
closes the Preface with the claim that he will now re-tell his life to himself.
Even limiting ourselves to Ecce Homo, it is clear that Nietzsche’s view on
Schopenhauer has altered and become more nuanced; it is tempting to claim that what
has changed is simply Nietzsche’s view of Schopenhauer. But is the relationship
between the earlier text and Ecce Homo exhausted only by the difference of the
perspectives within which the two texts consider Schopenhauer? It does not seem to
be—something else has changed. Rather, it seems that part of what changes in the later
text is the relationship to love and to the objects of one’s love, objects including
educators in general. I would suggest that the alteration in the role of love and the
object of love, by the time of this later text, helps to explain how Ecce Homo represents
a progression beyond the earlier text’s enactment of finding oneself again.
But before moving into Ecce Homo, we should note that this change in the view
of love is foregrounded in the 1886 Preface to HTH. This Preface also regards SE’s
opening situation of a young person sensing the tension between his or her own nature
and the tradition-bound culture that has up to this point been the context of their
formation. In HTH, Nietzsche claims that this youth is on the brink of undertaking a
“great separation” or “great liberation,” a wandering away from all that has
characterized his Bildung thus far. So the two texts seem to be of a piece in locating this
moment of crisis. And this is the point at which the earlier Nietzsche had urged that the
youth undertake “finding himself again,” starting with recollection of past loves.
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But in HTH, Nietzsche adds a claim that critically references the role of love put
forth in SE: he says about young people at this point of crisis that “their supreme
moments themselves will fetter them the fastest, lay upon them the most enduring
obligation. The liberation comes suddenly for those who are fettered in this way” after
which, he claims, one “lives no longer in the fetters of love and hatred.”73
At this moment as it is described in SE, the recommendation for the young
person was to look back and recover his great loves. Nietzsche’s ensuing account of
Schopenhauer had emphasized what a supreme moment his first encounter with
Schopenhauer had been—recall his intense first physiological impression. And it had
been suggested in that text that precisely love enabled the liberation at issue. Here,
twelve years later, Nietzsche calls love, and one’s own supreme moments, the very kind
of fetters from which liberation is required. There is an implicit criticism of his earlier
inability to fully unfetter himself from an obligation to a supreme moment, the initial
encounter with his love, Schopenhauer, and the suggestion that the very love of the
object which seemed to drive the work of liberation in the earlier text might itself be a
fetter from which a liberation is needed. Love is classed with just those sorts of binding
forces, like the binding forces of conventional culture, from which one should free
oneself. And because the response to this moment in the earlier text was the start of
the process of “finding oneself again,” the suggestion here is that “finding oneself again”
requires an unfettering of one from one’s loves.

73

HTH, 8, emphasis added.
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Keeping in mind this change in the view of love in that intervening text, I will turn
now to Ecce Homo.
We know that this work is also a recollection. Whereas the earlier text
recollected Schopenhauer, a love, as part of a process of finding oneself again, which
consists in recollecting all of one’s loves as a necessary progression to the current self,
what is recollected in Ecce Homo is mein Leben, the life of the narrator, and it is recalled
in the form of a self-telling, telling to oneself one’s whole life. One of the points we
noted about the recollection in SE is that Nietzsche had there recollected only one of his
loves, even though finding oneself again requires recounting all of them as part of a
necessary progression. Cryptically, he closed that first section with the misleading
comment that after recollecting Schopenhauer, he would “later on … recall others.” But
we never got beyond Schopenhauer. Until now . . .
In the section of Ecce Homo titled “The Untimely Ones,” Nietzsche says of the
third and fourth of the Untimely Meditations, of which Schopenhauer as Educator is the
third, that they “use two images of the harshest selfishness, self-discipline to point to a
higher concept of culture, to reestablish the concept of ‘culture’—these are images of
untimely types par excellence . . . Schopenhauer and Wagner or, in a word, Nietzsche.”74
He says here, looking back, that he had taken hold of Schopenhauer “the way
you take hold of an opportunity, in order to express something, in order to have another
couple of formulas, signs, means of expression,” much like Plato used Socrates “as a
semiotic for Plato.” Further, he claims that looking back from a distance “I would not

74

SE, 112, emphasis added.
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want to deny that [the text] is basically only talking about me,” and “the piece gives an
invaluable lesson here, if we admit that what [basically takes the floor to speak here is]
not ‘Schopenhauer as Educator’ but instead its opposite, ‘Nietzsche as Educator’”
(emphasis added, translation emended).
Nietzsche here suggests not simply a substitution of names, but of position. For
Schopenhauer is not Nietzsche, just as Socrates is not Plato. Socrates is, as this text
would have it, a means Plato employs. So the Schopenhauer of the earlier text is the
means Nietzsche employed. Nietzsche is not claiming Schopenhauer as his educator but
as his proxy, or perhaps his mask.
What this emphasizes is the work that he was doing, the fact that the very
expression of Schopenhauer as an exemplar was part of the work, the work of reading,
the work of an investment of one’s own longing, that that earlier Nietzsche had been
performing, cunningly, perhaps behind his own back. Ecce Homo’s author realizes the
means that Schopenhauer had been, and that how Schopenhauer appeared was as a
result of the reading and investment Nietzsche had granted him.
Hence, if the title “Schopenhauer as Educator” corresponds to the literal
presentation of Schopenhauer as such, the title “Nietzsche as Educator,” its true title,
corresponds to the Nietzsche thus employing Schopenhauer, creating an ideal by
investing it with the longing and desire to overcome and surpass what he, at the time,
was, but which he, at the time, could not realize.
The title ‘Schopenhauer as Educator’ says Schopenhauer embodies the ideal to
be striven for, or provides the ideal through his example. The title ‘Nietzsche as
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Educator’ identifies the educated and the educator by recognizing two things: 1) we
create the ideals by “reading” our loves, and the very selection of an ideal implies a
reading, which becomes explicit in recollection, where we finally see our contribution to
it—our projection, that term for interpretation; 2) as education is the process of
embodying an ideal, it is our longing for the ideal, our love for the self as a better self,
that fuels the process. The ideal or exemplary figure owes itself to the longing and
striving of the educated, which is shown in the way they see or read the ideal. This
means, education as the process of striving to embody an ideal in ourselves obtains its
power not by the person being recollected, for even how they appear to us is our
contribution, but owes itself to the longing for a better self.
The suggestion, to my mind, is that Nietzsche had previously emphasized the
educator, had seen the educator as beloved, and emphasized the position of the
beloved, rather than emphasizing his own position as lover, as one through which love
leads always beyond the initial object of love. In leading beyond the initial object of love,
we find that the goal of the entire process had always been the self. But this can only be
retrospectively realized—once one has freed oneself from the shadow of the
educator.75

75

What comes to mind, when considering Ecce Homo’s view of the earlier text, is the figure of Alcibiades.
Alcibiades the tormented, whose tragic mistake was to see Socrates as his beloved, the object of his love.
He conflated the philosopher—the one who desires and thus lacks the virtues—with the virtues
themselves, and believed that Socrates was those things: the Socrates he calls “wise,” and calls virtuous,
instead of seeing that wisdom and virtue are what Socrates, too, longs for, and thus, lacks. He could not
recognize the difference between what his great loved man, Socrates, sought but did not possess, and
Socrates himself. Hence, Socrates was the apex of love’s ascent, for Alcibiades, and hence his failure to
win Socrates was felt as the loss of the ultimate object of love.
Diotima’s speech in praise of love provides a critique of Alcibiades’ praise of Socrates, for in her
speech, love is called “the leader,” leading us in the ascension beyond all particular objects to love’s
ultimate aim, which is, becoming something ourselves—through the encounter with the idea of Beauty,
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Interlude 3:
The Unification Involved in Reading: Heidegger, Eternal Return, and Ecce Homo
Heidegger does not presume to read Ecce Homo without a grounding in the
thought of eternal return, given that this latter is said to be Nietzsche’s fundamental
thought. Heidegger presents an interpretation of eternal return as the fundamental
thought of Nietzsche’s philosophy, a thought regarding being as a whole, and a thought
determining the autobiographical elements of Ecce Homo. 76 Why do I not begin here in
my own reading?

becoming wise and virtuous ourselves. At that highest point, there is a self-transformation, as the idea of
Beauty and the soul coincide, and the soul becomes able to reproduce true Beauty. Though love manifests
itself in a series of objects to which the lover is drawn, the central point that love is being a lover, not the
beloved, should have the result that love is understood as “in-between,” is never one of its objects, but is
rather a power that moves through, and draws us beyond, every particular object.
It seems possible that the Nietzsche of Ecce Homo is suggesting that his younger self erred in a similar
way as Alcibiades, that of mistaking Schopenhauer for educator, conflating him with the ideal that was
itself the product of Nietzsche’s longing and projection, and could not have been captured by one
particular object. And hence, he mistook the ultimate aim of his love, thinking it was Schopenhauer, not
seeing that Schopenhauer was a rung that had to be left behind, not seeing that it was really a self that
had become able to produce all that was attributed solely to the production of the object.
In saying this, I am suggesting that Ecce Homo carries out the very image of finding oneself that
prefaced the earlier text. The author of Ecce Homo has at least climbed to the rung of Schopenhauer, and
realized that what he was, at an earlier time, becoming through love was a possibility that he then
believed was made visible by Schopenhauer, but which he now believes was not held fast in him as a
person.
The narrator of SE simply doesn’t go so far, in that text, as to turn back and ask how he might have
actually moved beyond Schopenhauer. He experiences the transition of object, from educator to possible
self, but simply doesn’t make that explicit to himself. The author of Ecce Homo goes further, turns and
reflects on this affective liberation through Schopenhauer, and simply makes explicit that it was a selflonging generating the process. Finding oneself thus names that ongoing possibility of reflecting on one’s
ongoing education, one’s ongoing aspirations made apparent through love, and the ability to critically
turn back on love.
76
See Nietzsche. Vol. I: The Will to Power as Art, translated by David Farrell Krell (New York: Harper &
Row, 1961). Herein, Heidegger presents an interpretation of eternal return as the fundamental thought of
Nietzsche’s metaphysics, and the fundamental doctrine in his philosophy, claiming that “bereft of this
teaching as its ground, Nietzsche’s philosophy is like a tree without roots” and that “the major
components of Nietzsche’s entire philosophy have in that doctrine [eternal return] their ground and their
very domain” (6-7). Thus only by attending to this doctrine do we attain “a vantage-point on Nietzsche’s
philosophy as a whole.” Heidegger’s interpretation of Ecce Homo is thus framed by the context of this
interpretation of eternal return.
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In Heidegger’s reading, that part of Ecce Homo in which, in the narrator’s telling
of his life to himself, he recollects a day in 1881 in which the thought of eternal return
came to him is read as a bequeathal from Nietzsche to “us” of “his” account of the
genesis of the thought of eternal return. 77 It strikes me that there is, at the root of this
reading, an elision of the narrative voice and the authorial voice.
Suppose one had, not even a principle, but an inclination (based on noting
suspicions often expressed in Nietzsche’s texts) to question a few things here: the idea
that Nietzsche’s philosophy has a ground, or has one ground? The idea that, if there
were one, it would be found in an autobiographical testimony, given the relation
cultivated in readers toward suspicion of philosopher’s own statements about
themselves? Or, simply, that the narrative voice is to be trusted? One of the reasons for
these inclinations is my interest in the way that the narrator’s voice in Nietzsche’s texts
cannot be assumed to be the voice of the signatory, “Nietzsche,” and that the
irreducibility of these two is often part of what is performatively in play in many later
texts. It thus becomes difficult to locate the authority that would indicate anything like a
fundamental thought for Nietzsche.78

77

As eternal return is the fundamental thought of Nietzsche’s philosophy, this recounting of the life,
connected as it is with the task of this thought, is a recounting providing the palpability of this thought as
action. Eternal return becomes palpable as action in the life recounted, a life which is said to show the
sufficiency of thought for action. What does this give us for a reading of Ecce Homo? “Nietzsche’s
retrospective and circumspective glances at his life are never anything else than prospective glances into
his task” (Ibid., 10). In Heidegger’s view, that task comes to be understood as the thinking of and teaching
of eternal return.
78
This does not mean that I think readers can not generate interpretations that suggest what the
fundamental thoughts might be. But in the spirit of Nietzsche, that claim would be understood as an
interpretation, not deriving from the authority of “Nietzsche,” and hence, not requisite. Which is just to
say, there would be many possibilities for interpreting the texts, it seems.
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Along these lines, Conway’s comments on the thought of eternal return
demonstrate the difficulty for some readers of using it as the interpretive frame:
Any interpretation (and a fortiori any critique) of . . . eternal recurrence
thus rests on two basic presuppositions: first, that [Nietzsche] has
successfully conveyed a sense of this teaching to some of his readers,
perhaps in spite of his limitations; and second, that some of his readers
have successfully received this teaching from him, despite his reliance on
masks, personae, analogies, allegories, and other forms of indirection.79
Conway suggests that this is a ‘teaching’ left quite empty, that it is unlikely that
either Nietzsche or modern readers would be equal to it (given Nietzsche’s statements
about his readers), and that “[i]f we take seriously Nietzsche’s decadence, then we
should expect him neither to understand nor to enact the untimely teaching he has
been called to disseminate. He may stand as far removed from the teaching of eternal
recurrence as his enervated readers stand from Zarathustra.” 80
I want to be very clear about my reservations here. What I have said above is
that we have reason to be suspicious of the eliding of the narrative voice and the voice
of “Nietzsche.”81 We thus have reason to be suspicious of using claims made in the
narrator’s voice to provide the authoritative grounds by which we limit our
interpretations—if only in the sense that this might blind us to the performative
79

Daniel W. Conway, Nietzsche’s Dangerous Game: Philosophy in the Twilight of the Idols, (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1997), 157-164.
80
In a related vein, I am hesitant to say that “Nietzsche” has “a philosophy,” that it is of the sort that has a
“ground” and grows into a “whole” from this ground. For Heidegger, the thought of eternal return is a
view of “being as a whole.” Heidegger notes in closing the “Summary Presentation of the Thought” that
we proceed in this way “presupposing, of course, that we wish to proceed in the way that is prescribed by
the inner lawfulness of the guiding question of philosophy, the question of being as such.” It is true that
such a statement ‘being as a whole’ is not found in the corpus, and that Nietzsche’s statements about
‘being’ would seem to suggest some hesitation regarding this reading. However, Heidegger notes this, and
his view is that when Nietzsche uses the term “existence” [Dasein] with regard to the question of whether
it has meaning, this use “roughly parallels what we mean by ‘being as a whole’—though with some
reservations” (26).
81
Without doubt, I have, herein, failed to consistently employ this suspicion myself—this failure is a habit.
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unworking of the desire for origins enacted by the text. However, if eternal return is
offered as an interpretive valence through which this text can be read, then my
hesitation disappears, because of the difference between claiming a ground and
claiming a possible interpretation.82 The danger on the surface of Heidegger’s reading,
on my view, is that it can seem to come quite close to implying that readings of
Nietzsche that do not take eternal return as the key to Nietzsche’s thought are not
legitimate, are not proper readings. If one does not think that eternal return is the
ground of Nietzsche’s thought, because one is not looking for such a “ground”—
meaning, not that one disagrees with this, but simply reads differently—can one then
not read “Nietzsche”? This gets us back to the recurring issue, who is this “Nietzsche”
we are reading, what establishes the authority of the readings?
Whose/Who’s Nietzsche?
It is a commonplace that everyone has his or her own Nietzsche. We have also
seen the temptation to identify the concepts or concerns most central to Nietzsche, to
call him the thinker of x, y, or z. It is as if there is the temptation of unification of
Nietzsche’s thought under the guiding line of one or two concepts or doctrines, on one
hand; and the resistance to this temptation by emphasizing tensions, conflicts, a lessfrequently appearing term, on the other. The works under Nietzsche’s name easily can
be said to support both procedures; we might note, on one hand, the frequent claims
made in his works, by his narrative voices, as to his “fundamental insight,” central work,
82

My, admittedly cursory, reading of Heidegger here is that he tries to have it both ways, claiming
sometimes that he is working up an interpretation, but claiming, through the use of the language of
grounding thoughts (see above), otherwise.
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or the reappearance of certain arguments across multiple works; on the other, we might
note the slight rhetorical or formal differences of each text, the undercutting of previous
claims within one text, the self-implication of the ‘author’ of texts in certain phenomena
held under derision within them.
Nietzsche is perhaps no better expressed than as the name over the doorway to
a system that reveals itself as a labyrinth, keeping in mind that a labyrinth is both what
is made and what is traversed, that we might focus on either the guiding line that we
followed to however far we travelled, or, the sense that there might be an equally
suitable alternate guiding line, which might have got us further, or into the nooks we
weren’t able to reach. Reading Nietzsche makes of Nietzsche, makes us understand of
Nietzsche, at the same time Daedelus, constructing the labyrinth, and Ariadne, feeding
us clues to its traversal. But sometimes Nietzsche is Theseus too, and maybe as Theseus,
he gives us a vision of both Daedelus, and Ariadne.
All this is to say, it seems so equally unavoidable to unify Nietzsche, and also to
trouble that unity as Nietzsche does; it seems undecidable whether Nietzsche resolves
to a unity, let alone to the unity of Daedelus (creator/constructor), Ariadne (way-finder,
clue-giver), or Theseus (blind, impassioned, seeker of a way through that which he
cannot see as whole). “He” is all three, his work is all three, and this forms the
interruption of system: we believe there is a system, a unity with a way in and out; we
cannot see it, but must follow in fits and starts the line we’ve picked up; while this line
might be an illusion, or another way to say this, might reveal more about ourselves than
the ‘one’ we ‘read.’ And the part of us that follows, any way we follow, is, perhaps, the
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lover, the one in love, who has risked all, depending on their love; or, the one who is
only following themselves. But, perhaps this suggests, regarding the labyrinth, that I lost
my way in myself, in that I desired a way out to a vision of the whole, perhaps my
idiosyncrasies found the line that they created. ‘Nietzsche’ turned out to be for me, just
as Ecce Homo tells us ‘Schopenhauer’ turned out to be for Nietzsche, only Nietzsche,
only me, in the end. But how could I ever decide who is reading, who is being read?
Toward a Conclusion
As part of Part II of this project, this chapter was framed in its relation to the
previous one. The previous chapter covered the critique of the Subject, and the present
chapter dealt with texts that seem, on the surface, to pull against that critique, for these
texts seem to consist in an interest in the self, in reconstructing a self that, it is implied,
is retrieved from within the texts signed by “Nietzsche.” As laid out in introductory
comments, the question immediately raised by the presence of both views in the later
work is that of how this interest in the self, found in many later works but namely in
Ecce Homo, is to be related to a critique which consists in the unworking of a unified
Subject.
In this chapter I have attempted to raise some questions regarding the narrator’s
constative claims about the self based on the performance achieved in the same texts.
Rather than an exhaustive reading of Ecce Homo, I have merely read some of the ways
in which the structure, the surface, of this text announces a performance that
challenges the constative claims of its narrator. And it is the performative level of the
text—the meaning indicated by the structure of elements as surface-dwelling as the
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title, the subtitle, the Preface, the exergue—all those elements supposedly prefatory to
the matter of the text—that signal the unworking of the apparent achievements of the
narrator herein.
There is thus introduced a distance between the direct claims of the narrator,
and the revelatory power of the text. We are not wrong in finding here a repetition of
the basic structure of the lyric poet, covered in Chapter 2—for there we found that the
signification of the words of the lyric poet were not the matter at issue, but rather that
the engagement of the words, that from whence the words emerged, became
projected, through the uttering, performing, of the words, to the one who was speaking.
The words meant more than what they said—when taking the lyric poet’s words as
vicarious metaphor. What we find here, in Nietzsche’s last work, is another
vicariousness, another such oblique revelation, though through a writing, not a
speaking. It is a twofold revelation, of both the desire on the part of one—an exemplar,
perhaps, of the modern obsession with the uniqueness of the self, the desire to present
the self in its uniqueness, its singularity, its unity at any given time—and of the
impossibility of achieving this desire. The impossibility of this achievement is not
signaled through the constative claims of the narrator, but rather through the structure
of the text, which unworks the desired unified presentation of the self in a number of
ways. First, in all of the ambiguities and undecidables invoked by the titular and
prefatory elements themselves. But secondly, in the very structure as which the
narrator lays out his task in the text: that of returning to previous writings in order to reread them and, on that basis, re-write the self that, it is implied, already was there. This
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structure enacts, or performs, future anteriority, saying now what will have been the
case. The narrator, of course, seems immune to the recognition of this temporality,
speaking in the mode of retrieving. But the text structures the performance of this
reading, now, what will have been the case.
Thus, what is revealed about the “self” is the ambiguity of that to which the term
is applied; the temporality of future anteriority involved in its application; and the
catachrestic character of its application, that it covers over pre-existing absence while
denying that absence. The demonstration of the emergence of the application of “self”
thus unworks the basic elements associated with the self, elements which deny the
performativity that its application demonstrates.
What we thus find, in such later works, is the performative unworking of the very
unity that the application of the term “self,” “I,” is meant to name. And what does this
mean regarding language? Not only that language is the reserve of names—names such
as “self” that may be applied to apparent phenomena—but that language as “name,”
“nomina,” is epiphenomenal to another valence of language: that valence captured in
the bringing to appear as which every act of reading is—for it is to such acts, to
interpretations, that this later Nietzsche turns in order to “name” himself in the first
place.
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Conclusion

As stated in the Introduction, the beginning of this project was ambiguous,
informed by two valences. The first was my abiding curiosity regarding Nietzsche’s late
works and Prefaces, in which the question of the “work” performed in texts, in the
writing of them and the interpretation of them, looms large. This interest in writing and
reading gave rise to noting the surface curiosity that what seems the broader category,
language, is treated differently in the early and later works. From this observation, the
second valence was born, that regarding the question of how the early and later
treatments of language might relate. This second valence thus gave shape to the first
part of my project, that described in the Introduction and first two chapters, and to the
larger framework of the whole; the first valence installed itself in the fourth chapter,
and gave rise to, as a bridge and preface, the third.
In the first chapter, I considered three texts, comprising published works and
unpublished notes of the early-to-mid 1870s, in which Nietzsche deals directly with
language, and which we might be inclined to classify as focusing on physiology and
rhetoric. The common thread in these texts, prompting me to group them together, is
their inclusion of, or of elements of, what I have called a genetic account of language—
an account that seems to articulate language as emerging as one part of a more
extensive process of the translative work involved in the rendering of experience. Such
accounts of language, though they present language in its emergence as part of a
process that precedes and exceeds words, have a few commonalities: a denial of a

recuperable origin preceding this process; a description of the movement from one
“stage” to another within this process as a leap or translation; a significance attached to
rhetoric and/or physiology. I tried to draw attention to what I see as the achievement or
the thematic focus of such accounts: the way in which such articulations consist in
unworking, and serve to unwork either a number of oppositions significant to the
history of philosophy, or, dominant, presumed unities found within philosophy.
Approaching rhetoric directly, in the rhetoric course notes, Nietzsche’s overt claims
about language consist in unworking the binary oppositions that have defined rhetoric
in its Ancient and modern forms: the oppositions of persuasive versus truthful, and of
artful versus natural, language. Nietzsche takes those ways that rhetoric has been
classified, as a subset of language—either as persuasive, or as artful—and extends that
classification to cover all language. This extension dismantles, or unworks, the specific
oppositions, but it also dismantles the opposition between rhetoric and language itself.
While, if we then were to read only the text favored by the secondary literature here,
OTL, we might be led to the view that the emphasis on translation and metaphor within
this kind of account demonstrates a dependence on the opposition of origin and copy, I
suggest that we supplement this reading with a consideration from notebooks published
as “The Philosopher.” Doing so, we find that translation and metaphor are not treated
as primarily linguistic figures by Nietzsche, but describe the more general,
thoroughgoing work of physiology, before they become detached as specific elements
of language. Following this suggestion has two results. First, another opposition is
dismantled—that of the distinction between physiology and language—is physiology
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linguistic? Is language an extension of physiological processes? In fact, it appears, we
cannot say. But rather than being left in an undecidable position, what the ambiguity
here reiterates is the unworking of the opposition of origin to copy. The ambiguity
demonstrates the impossibility of delimiting the origin from the copy. And this is
because the specific work that is done—by, be it called physiology, be it called
language—is the work of projecting the form or the structure of origin: copy onto that
which appears as given, as experienced. The origin is not that which is preexistent to,
and the copy is not that which is the effect of, experience; but rather, experience
consists in, or requires, the projection that there is an origin of which there is the copy
or re-rendering. Language consists in this working up of an origin, but when we read it
as continuous with physiology, or continuous with rhetoric, we unwork the origin, and
see it is a projection. What is the site from which the projection springs? Even that
would be an origin. But when Nietzsche speaks, in OTL, for example (the text focused on
by secondary sources), it is possible to read his voice as lamenting the failure of
language to become equal to its origin, or, at least, marking the origin (the “mysterious
‘x’”) as out of our reach, impossibly achieved. When we add the texts on rhetoric and
physiology, we see the origin as the turn, that regarding which there is no behind, but
only a projection from which. This is why Platonism seemed to denigrate the aspect of
the painter—it projects an idiosyncratic vantagepoint of the one painting, but does not
get “behind” what is seen to the being of what is seen. Nietzsche might seem to have it
both ways here—to articulate language as not being able to get behind itself, but to
articulate physiology as that which projects what is behind itself (the projection of the
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grounding metaphor of cause). To operate within the nets of language, as these
accounts depict it, is to be physiological (projective), rhetorical (projective of one’s
vantagepoint), and, with language, to project that this is not a projection.
In the second chapter, I explored texts and unpublished notes that present what
initially seems to be the alternate “early” view of language that can be mined from
within Nietzsche’s texts of the early 1870s, those composed just prior to, and
sometimes overlapping with, the texts grouped in Chapter 1. These texts were grouped
together because they seem to present a view of language that we might call expressive
as opposed to genetic. This view of language depicts language in relation to music,
depicts music as itself emergent from and expressive of an origin, and seems to depict
language as the “recasting” of the origin-expression which music itself is said to be. On
the surface, then, the view of language in these early texts is distinguished from that in
the genetic accounts, as they depict language not as a creative, aesthetic leap into a
new sphere, but as the recasting of music, which is itself the provision into appearance
of an originary insight into being, that of either the Dionysian origin of all experience, or
an insight into the primal ground of all experience. In these texts, language seems to be
depicted as derivative, as the copy of the copy which music is.
However, by concentrating on two key elements in these texts, the duality of
language and the figure of the lyric poet, I tried to show that Nietzsche in fact
problematizes the very depiction of language as “copy of a copy” as which he seems to
present it. The duality of language is presented in OMW, and is that view of words as
comprised of a tonal and gestural half, out of the former of which music itself develops.
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This derivation disrupts the apparent priority of music to language—disrupts it, leaving
the question of priority ambiguous and irresolvable. Language is derivative of music in
its gestural sense, but music is derivative of language in its tonal aspect. That music is
language, as the further development of part of language’s tonal essence, and, that
language is the recasting of music—we again have an ambiguous origin.
When one reads BT, one finds the overt treatment of the lyric poet almost
buried, couched between the more textually dominant “artistic metaphysics” and the
discussion of tragedy. But the lyric poet presents, to my reading, a dismantling of the
metaphysical overtones of that artistic metaphysics in BT, and, is the necessary
prototype of the generation of tragedy. The lyric poet, again, introduces an ambiguity
regarding origin, regarding the apparent priority of music over language, a hierarchy
within which it seems to be placed, for it interrupts an overtly claimed linear
progression from origin to music to lyrical language—the overt casting of language as
the copy of music’s copy of the origin. This interruption occurs because the lyric poet, as
described in BT, does more than simply copy what is already there in music. For even as
the lyric poet is said to create “out of” the spirit of music, and is said not to penetrate to
the depth of the expression of music itself, the lyric poet nonetheless provides the
delivery of the encounter with the Dionysian/the originary exposure, which music
expresses, to the one who has been thus exposed for the first time, and in such a way
that this exposure can be interpreted. In other words, the implication seems to be that
the Dionysian exposure, though it is accessed in the production of music, is yet not
recognized or interpreted until this exposure is rendered in the form of language,
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specifically, of lyrical language. So even though this lyrical language is depicted, on the
surface, as the derivative of the musical experience, it is also said to be the first delivery
of that musical experience for interpretation. It provides the view, for the first time, and
in this sense, has interpretive priority. No matter what has occurred with regard to the
sounding of the primary exposure, this cannot be consciously experienced and
interpreted until it is delivered through lyrical language. This means that even though
lyrical language is presented as derivative of musical experience, it yet subverts the
priority of music, because lyrical language marks the delivery of that experience as
experienced.
In PTzG this work of delivery of the Dionysian experience to interpretation is said
to be the work of both philosopher and poet. Yet, in this text, in distinction to BT, that
very delivery of the prior exposure to the “sounding of the whole world,” which lyric
poetry and philosophy are here said to be, is said to occur through a “sad” means—the
very language through which the delivery occurs is lamented as merely metaphorical, as
failing in the possibility of a direct presentation, for it cannot become equivalent to, or
disappear into, the view that it presents. It is notable, then, as I remarked in the
conclusion to this chapter, that the lyric poet’s language is not lamented, in BT, in this
way. This language is said to be the living mirror, the vicarious, lived-through, similitude,
which achieves the delivery to the poet of the prior exposure. The interpretation of this
experience requires the copying, metaphorical nature of the presentation, for which it is
not lamented. What we thus seem to find in these texts is language splitting into various
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functions, language as re-presentation of what is, and language as valence of work,
performance, and becoming, already, at this early stage.
In Part II, comprising Chapters 3 and 4, I reoriented the consideration of
language around a more specific focus, that regarding the relation of language to the
Subject and the self, considering language as it is depicted throughout the coverage of
these two themes so central to the later work. In a sense, we might say that one can
understand the treatment of language in the later work in terms of how it is refracted
through these themes: the critique of the Subject, wherein it is a critique of language
that empowers the unworking of the unity of the Subject, and the narrativized
“reconstruction” of the self, wherein language, as the enactment of performances of rereading and writing, performs work on/of the self. But we should notice the similarity
with the early work even here: language remains the site of unworking of preexistent
unities, as already seen in the earlier chapter. This is clearly the case with the critique of
the Subject. Is it also for the narrativization of the self? Chapters 3 and 4 thus form a
whole in their consideration of the question of the relation between the critique of the
Subject in Nietzsche’s later work and Nietzsche’s projects of self-narrativizing in Ecce
Homo and late Prefaces. The significance given to the figure of the self in these later
works raises the question of how they are to be squared with the critique of the Subject.
How can we reconcile the denial of the Subject with the emphasis on narrativizing a self
that looks, on the surface, to comprise an attempt at the kind of unification denied by
the Subject critique?
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Given this framing, in Chapter 3, I consider the first of these elements, largely
recapitulating Nietzsche’s critique of the Subject. We see that Nietzsche critiques the
unity and immediacy of the “I.” Initially, it seems as if Nietzsche’s main claim is that the
unity and immediacy of the “I” is owed only to seductions of words, habits of grammar,
and that language, as words and grammar, is hence charged with the creation of the
deception of the unified, grounding Subject. However, I try to point out that the
genealogy Nietzsche traces here is more complicated, perhaps overdetermined. For he
extends the sense of language, beyond words and grammar, to the
biological/physiological process of assimilation. This is first figured by his discussion of
will, arising from a dominating “feeling” of ourselves whereby activity overwrites
passivity, this dominating feeling subtending the “I” as the “one” who wills. With this
domination in place, habits of grammar, the doer-deed attachment of a subject to verb,
can then shore up and intensify that habit of interpretation. This shoring up and
reinstatement of the dominating feeling allows a deception whereby there is a
projected substrate of all our action—but this projection is an interpretation; it is a
fetish that transfers the work of the multiple and disunified elements of physiology,
which are not “one,” to a “oneness” that operates as a conscious explanation of all
experience, thought, action. “I” is then said to be the cause of willing, when in fact it is
the dominating feeling, given the name of will, that is its source. Science, thinking, and
grammar in fact depend on this “interpretation based on ourselves.” But what is the
genealogy of this feeling and this tendency obviated by the coming to dominance of this
feeling over other phenomenal elements? This interpretation of ourselves is in fact
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traced back into the reaches of the elemental work of physiology: it is depicted as a
continuation of the tropic process of assimilation whereby the new is incorporated and
appropriated—the conscious “I” is then epiphenomenon of a preconscious physiological
process.
Thus, we have moved from language as grammar and words, back to feeling and
willing, back to physiological processes of all organic life—this genealogy of the Subject
unworks its unity and disperses it into a number of interworking processes, but
language is found throughout. The epiphenomenal interpretation of ourselves as
Subjects is a continuation of the process of interpretation at work in all life. When
Nietzsche, here, unworks the Subject in its predominating character as the pre-existent,
immediate, and unified ground of thought and will, at the same time, there is in this
very reading a projection, an alternate interpretation, enacted.
In the fourth chapter, I turn from the critique of the Subject to writings from late
in Nietzsche’s career that deal with the self, specifically, to texts in which we find
Nietzsche claiming to present himself on the basis of an apparent retrieval of himself
through the act of re-reading works previously written by himself, and writing anew a
depiction of that self. While this structure of retrieval through re-reading and re-writing
describes a number of later texts, namely both Ecce Homo and the Prefaces written in
1886, I concentrate only on Ecce Homo. The reason why, proceeding from the surface,
this issue of the self would seem to follow on the heels of the previous chapter is
because the apparent interest in constructing the self in this way seems to be in tension
with all that has been called into question in the critique of the Subject. As the critique
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of the Subject consists in unworking the unity of the Subject, showing it to be dispersed,
lacking an isolatable origin, is it not then curious that some later texts demonstrate what
seems to be a desire to claim and reproject a clear and distinct self from which the texts
of “Nietzsche” have proceeded?
My claim in this chapter is that we find a way out of this surface tension if we
note the difference between the constative and performative valence of such texts. This
notation enables us to see that the performative dimension of these texts engaged in
“self-narrativizing” unwork the constative claims to retrieval and presentation of the
self: what we find performed is the unworking of the unity, immediacy, and preexistence of the self that the narrator seems obsessed with finding. We find them
unworked because of features about the work within which they are presented as
occurring. Re-reading, re-writing what is read: the temporality of this procedure is
future anterior, for the writing is a projection that says what will have been the case;
but which, when figured as a rediscovery, covers over this temporality, allowing it to
masquerade as a recuperation of what already was.
I believe that Butler’s articulation of performativity, laid out in early sections of
Chapter 4, helps us to read this procedure clearly. The self is a concept that allows us to
disavow the actual constitution of becoming. The self is that which is performed, and
that as such, has its being in the mode of action, of making and becoming, hence it is not
already but is always the to be of our doing, but the interpretation of which reads that
becoming as an expression of what already was. If nothing else, I have simply shown
that Butler’s articulation helps us to read Nietzsche’s performance. Despite his claims to
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show us finally who he is, and his chidings of those bad readers who have been immune
to the testimony thereof, his very engagement of re-reading/re-writing shows he
himself, as narrator, to be a bad reader of himself—or, an unfaithful disclaimer, in
seeming to claim a presentation once and for all. While on the surface, those who are
chided are those who have not already been able to have read who Nietzsche already is
out of his writings, I suggest that what is demonstrated in the text is the dominating
insistence that selves be finally articulable, unified, and pre-existing. Nietzsche the
writer, but not the narrator, in these last of the later texts, calls this illusion of such a
self into question, even as he, as narrator, draws us in to its acceptance.

From the vantagepoint of the concluding moment, looking back and saying what
will have been the case, I have a slightly different take on this project than that depicted
in the Introduction and in the way the structure of the project has been borne out. From
here, I see that the real struggle of this dissertation was to find an organizing conception
with which to approach language, a concept on which to displace language. I had
thought at a certain point that this concept should be constellation, which I had so
belabored in the Introduction, but in late stages, looking back, re-reading what I had
written, I realized that the real organizing concept here is that of work, or more rightly,
unworking. This sense came quite late into the project. But I started to see that when
Nietzsche discusses language, he is involved in an unworking, an unworking of unities
that it may even seem, on the surface, he is busy lamenting the loss of and hence trying
to reconstruct.
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It does seem in the end that dealing with language in Nietzsche will always
require one to address the seeming departure that occurs after BT and corresponding
notes composed in the period. The tendency in the scholarship has been to address this
in a few ways. One, to claim that the content of Nietzsche’s claims changes over time—
this is Clark’s claim (I called it discontinuity). Another, to claim that Nietzsche becomes
after this period interested in the use of language—this is the claim of Lacoue-Labarthe
and Kofman (I called it mitigated continuity). The other is to claim that the content of
the work never alters (I called it strong continuity). But one position not provided in
these approaches is that of a continuity of use—a continuity in the performance of
Nietzsche’s language. This is what I think I have suggested: that Nietzsche does not take
a rhetorical detour, but that the concern with rhetoric is found in all the texts, a focus on
the performance enabled by language that is there, in the BT period, even when
Nietzsche seems to be lamenting the failures of language. We see this when we focus on
the figure of the lyric poet, and the figuration involved in the opening gestures of the
aesthetical metaphysics.
Yet, why does the question of oeuvre matter? My insistence at certain points
that I am not interested in a reading of the historical Nietzsche and his intentions can
seem to be in tension with the very organizing focus in this dissertation on the entirety
of the oeuvre, which depends on an interest in the signified of the proper name, does it
not?
I say this also as a foreground to my feeling that the real heart of this
dissertation is in the final chapter, already indicated by my claims in the Introduction as
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to where this dissertation began. It began in the fourth chapter. Why did I not simply
begin there?
Were I to begin again, my focus in this project would be on unworking—it would
be on the tension between what the text performs, as clearly beyond the stated
intention of the narrative voice, and what it sets itself up to achieve. Clues to this
approach are found throughout, but are just not called into relief as clearly as I would
like. I would also deal more carefully with the philosophical tradition of treating this
term as a technical term, which I barely signal here.
Were I to have more time here, things I would want to point out: that the
spectre that haunts the texts of Chapter 1—those texts consisting in the “genetic”
account of language—is the origin. Even as the narrative voice of this text is busy
disclaiming, with enthusiasm and aplomb, any possible access to the origin of
experience, the narrator yet chooses, to mark that impossibility, the very structure of
genetic schema that imply an origin. He thus marks his own obsession with origins, for
what is the name of “the mysterious x” marking if not the space of an origin? I would
then point out, in Chapter 2, how despite the overt claims of BT to find the origin of
tragedy, the very origin of the text seems to mark such a retrieval as impossible, for it
begins quite literally inside the mediation of figuration, wherein we are to “get back to”
the Greek conception only by way of the “figures” as which the Greek gods are for us.
This entry through figuration—the figures of the gods, and, the figures of the states
through which we can figure their import—performatively marks, as above, the
impossibility of the design of the narrative voice. Chapter 3, then, is just a recapitulation
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of this basic structure, the impossibility of the relevant origin, but what element of the
narrative voice is being called into question? I am not sure. Finally, Chapter 4 easily fits
into this structure, for we have the desire of the narrative voice, to recapitulate the self,
met with the text’s making that impossible. So what Nietzsche will have always been
about, if I had my druthers here, is a performative unworking of the claims of the
narrative voice. The narrative voice wants to present itself as sovereign, but the text has
its way in the end, even when the text has been constructed, or seems to have been, by
that narrative voice.
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